

# 第77回人口問題審議会総会議事進行予定

平成9年12月16日(火)  
特別第1会議室  
15時00分～17時00分

## 1. 開 会

## 2. 議 題

少子社会を考える国民会議、少子化時代を考える厚生政策セミナーの報告について  
(資料1、2) 阿藤 誠 委員

イギリスとフランスの出生率と家族政策について(資料3、4)  
キャサリン・キーナン ロンドン経済大学講師  
ジャン・クロード・シェネ フランス国立人口研究所部長

## 3. 閉 会



# 少子社会を考える 国民会議

～人口減少時代。私たちが迎える21世紀への課題～



主催：厚生省

# 少子社会を考える 国民会議

～人口減少時代。私たちが迎える21世紀への課題～

晩婚化や未婚者の増加等を背景に、近年、出生率が急激に低下しております。

平成7年の合計特殊出生率（1人の女性が一生の間に生む平均子ども数）も、史上最低の1.42を記録し、1.57ショックを記録した平成元年以降依然として低下し続けております。

この少子化の進行は、将来の我が国の社会・経済の在り方に深刻な影響をおよぼすことが懸念されております。

このため、現在、少子化問題について本格的な論議を行っている人口問題審議会と密接な連携を図り、全国8カ所で「少子社会を考える市民会議」を開催しております。

この国民会議では、市民会議の報告をもとに様々な分野から幅広い議論を行い、皆さまと一緒に少子社会の諸問題を考えてまいりたいと思っております。

皆さまのご参加をお待ちしております。

【主催】：厚生省

【後援】：こども未来財団、全国社会福祉協議会、日本経営者団体連盟、日本労働組合総連合会  
全国児童館連合会、全国母親クラブ連絡協議会

【日時】：平成9年11月4日(火) 12:30～17:00（12時受付開始）

【場所】：イイノホール 東京都千代田区内幸町2-1-1飯野ビル7F

【参加人員】：500名 ☆託児ルームをご用意しております。

【参加費】：無料

【申込み締切】：平成9年10月22日(水) 当日消印有効

【応募方法】：官製ハガキに住所、氏名、職業、年齢、電話番号をご記入の上、  
〒100-45 東京都千代田区霞が関1-2-2  
厚生省児童家庭局育成環境課宛にご郵送下さい。

## 【会議内容】

12:00 受付開始

12:30 開会 挨拶 厚生大臣 小泉 純一郎

基調講演

各市民会議の報告

歌と語り

討論会

17:00 閉会

# プロフィール

## ● 講師

### 基調講演テーマ「少子社会の現状と課題」

阿藤 誠

【国立社会保障・人口問題研究所副所長】

東京都出身 東京大学文学部社会学科卒、同大学院社会学研究科修士課程終了後、厚生省人口問題研究所入所、国立社会保障・人口問題研究所の発足に伴い現職に。東京大学客員教授、お茶の水女子大学非常勤講師。国連人口開発委員会日本政府代表、厚生省人口問題審議会委員等。編著「先進諸国の人口問題」(東大出版会)など。



※討論会にも参加

## ● 市民会議の報告




岩淵勝好

【産経新聞社論説委員】

埼玉県出身 早稲田大学政経学部政治学科卒。産経新聞浦和支局記者、夕刊フジ報道部記者、夕刊フジ報道部次長、産経新聞政治部次長を経て、現在、産経新聞論説委員。

## ● シンポジスト

### 進行調整役



宮澤健一

【一橋大学名誉教授/人口問題審議会会長】

東京商科大学(現一橋大学)卒。横浜国立大学教授、一橋大学教授、一橋大学長等を経て、現在、一橋大学名誉教授、八千代国際大学教授。社会保障制度審議会会長、人口問題審議会会長等。エコノミスト賞受賞(毎日新聞社)など。主著「制度と情報の経済学」(有斐閣)など。経済学博士。



残間里江子

【プロデューサー/エッセイスト】

宮城県出身 明治大学短期大学法律科卒。SBS(静岡放送)を経て、「女性自身」編集部勤務。山口百恵自叙伝「蠢い時」の出版プロデューサー。1995年、(株)情報・空間デザインを設立し、全国各地の地域振興計画等に関わる。総理府「婦人問題企画推進有識者会議」委員等。著書「女の仕事」など。



千葉一男

【日本経営者団体連盟地域・組織活性化特別委員会委員長】  
(王子製紙(株)相談役)

宮城県出身 東京大学経済学部卒、王子製紙株式会社入社。中越ハルプ工業株式会社代表取締役社長、新王子製紙株式会社代表取締役社長等を経て、現職。日本経営者団体連盟常任理事。人口問題審議会委員、林政審議会委員。藍綬褒章受賞。



野口徹也

【日本労働組合総連合会副事務局長】

東京都出身 東京大学法学部卒、帝人株式会社入社。帝人労働組合東京支部長、ゼンセン同盟常任中央執行委員、副書記長。日本労働組合総連合会総合政策局長を経て、現在、副事務局長。



福島瑞穂

【弁護士】

宮城県出身 東京大学法学部卒。アジアからの出稼ぎ女性の緊急避難所「女性の家HELP」協力弁護士、日本弁護士連合会の両性の平等に関する委員会委員、川崎市男女平等推進協議会会長等。著書「アジア人出稼ぎ労働者手帳」、「楽しくやろう夫婦別姓」(共に明石書店)など。



帆足英一

【東京都立母子保健院副院長】

東京慈恵会医科大学卒業。埼玉県小児保健センター、東京慈恵会医科大学小児科等を経て、現在、東京都立母子保健院副院長。日本小児精神神経学会常任理事、日本小児心身医学会常任理事等。著書「心のサインに気がついて」(企画室)など。

●歌と語り「車椅子のおしゃべり」  
 —————ボニージャックス—————




昭和33年(1958年)、早稲田大学を卒業したグリークラブ出身の4人は、作曲家、磯部徹(いそべとし)氏より「ボニージャックス」と名付けられて、コーラスグループを結成しました。

ボニージャックスのレパートリーは、世界各国の民謡・歌曲・黒人霊歌・ジャズ・ポピュラーナンバーと非常に幅広く、5,000曲以上の楽譜を保持しています。

そして常にその中心として歌い続けてきた日本歌曲・唱歌・民謡・子供の歌、中でも体に障害を持つ子供らが作った詩に曲をつけて発表した詩集やCD「空とふうさぎ」「車椅子のおしゃべり1、2」(中央児童福祉審議会特別推薦)は、各方面でとりわけ高い評価を受けています。(平成8年度児童福祉文化賞・厚生大臣賞受賞)

ボニージャックストーンと呼ばれる美しいハーモニーと清潔で明快な歌い方は聞く人の心をなごませ、豊かにしてくれます。

■イイノホール会場案内図(飯野ビル7F)



- 千代田線「霞ヶ関」駅C-4イイノホール出口
- 日比谷線「霞ヶ関」駅C-4出口
- 丸の内線「霞ヶ関」駅B-2出口
- 銀座線「虎の門」駅9番出口
- 三田線「内幸町」駅A-7出口
- JR線「新橋」駅日比谷口


●参加お申し込み、お問い合わせは

厚生省児童家庭局育成環境課育成環境係  
 〒100-45 東京都千代田区霞が関1-2-2  
 電話：03-3503-1711 内線3147

第2回 厚生政策セミナー

# 少子化時代を考える

●  
**Below-Replacement  
Fertility and Family Policies**



●  
1997年12月15日(月)  
経団連会館ホール

15 December, 1997  
Keidanren Kaikan Hall

●  
主催：国立社会保障・人口問題研究所  
National Institute of Population  
and Social Security Research

●  
後援：毎日新聞社  
The Mainichi Newspapers  
●

## 開催の趣旨

**日**本を含む多くの先進諸国においては、1970年代以降、人口置換水準を下回る出生率が続いてきた。90年代半ばの時点で見ると、先進諸国は、比較的置換水準に近い出生率をもつ北欧諸国、英・米・仏などと、置換水準を大幅に下回る出生率の南欧諸国、ドイツ、日本などに二分されつつある。

本年1月に発表された日本の将来推計人口によれば、日本人口の高齢化は21世紀半ばまで続き、65歳以上人口割合は現在の7人に1人から3人に1人まで上昇する。また、21世紀初頭からは総人口の減少も始まり、21世紀の末には日本人口は今日の半減に近い状態になる可能性もある。国連の推計によれば、出生率の低迷が続く日本以外の先進諸国でも、今後、極端な人口高齢化が進み、総人口の減少が始まること が確実視されている。

本シンポジウムでは、内外の専門家を招き、先進諸国における出生率の低下・低迷の社会経済的背景、その見通し、人口ならびに経済社会への影響、政策的・非政策的対応について、包括的に議論することを目指す。具体的には以下の問題について実りある討論を期待したい。

1. 先進諸国における置換水準以下の出生率は必然的なものなのか過渡的なものなのか。
2. 女性の社会進出と出生率低下との間にはどれほど密接な関係があるのか。
3. 子ども「消費財化」仮説にはどれほどの普遍性があるのか。
4. われわれは、少子化ならびに長寿化の帰結としての人口減少・超高齢社会において、なお豊かさを享受できるのか。
5. 人口減少・超高齢社会においては、外国人労働力への依存度はどれほど高まるのか。
6. 出生率向上のための政策についてどのように考えるのか。
7. 出生率向上対策あるいは家族政策は出生率に対してどれほどの効果があるのか。
8. 先進国のなかで、比較的出生率の高い国と低い国とを分けるものは何か。

**T**he below-replacement fertility has continued in many developed countries including Japan since the 1970s. In the mid-1990s, however, the developed countries seem to be divided into the two groups: those with the fertility relatively closer to the replacement level, including Northern European countries, England, the United States and France; and those with the fertility far below the replacement level, including Southern European countries, Germany and Japan.

According to Japan's official population projections published in January 1997, the aging of population in Japan will continue until the mid-twenty-first century and the proportion of those aged 65 and over is expected to rise from the current level of one seventh to one third of the total population. The total population will start to decline from the beginning of the twenty-first century and may be reduced to almost one half at the end of the next century. Similarly, the UN population projections predict the hyper-ageing of population and the beginning of population decline for other developed countries with continued low fertility.

This symposium aims at a comprehensive discussion of the socioeconomic determinants of fertility decline or stagnation, its future prospects, its demographic and socioeconomic consequences, and policy and non-policy responses to it, by the four experts invited from Japan and abroad. The substantive discussion are expected on such specific topics as follows:

1. Is the below-replacement fertility faced by developed countries inevitable or transitory ?
2. Is there any close relationship between women's empowerment and fertility decline ?
3. Is the hypothesis about children as "consumer goods" universally applicable ?
4. Can we still enjoy the affluence in a society with population decline and hyper-aging as a consequence of fertility decline and lengthened life expectancy ?
5. To what extent will the dependence on foreign workers increase in a society with population decline and hyper-aging ?
6. What do the experts think of the measures to raise fertility ?
7. To what extent are pronatalist measures and family policies effective in raising fertility ?
8. What distinguishes between developed countries with relatively high fertility and low fertility ?

プログラム

司会：阿藤 誠

Moderator: Makoto Atoh

13:30 ~14:00

セミナー趣旨説明

13:30 ~14:00

Introduction

14:00 ~15:20

パネリストの報告

14:00 ~15:20

Presentation by Panelists

パネリスト

- キャサリン・キアナン
- ジャン・クロード・シエネ
- 上野 千鶴子
- 八代 尚宏

Panelists

- Kathleen E. Kiernan
- Jean-Claude Chesnais
- Chizuko Ueno
- Naohiro Yashiro

15:20 ~15:40

休憩

15:20 ~15:40

Break

15:40 ~17:30

パネル討論

15:40 ~17:30

Panel Discussion

厚生政策セミナー

1996年12月1日、社会保障研究所と人口問題研究所とが統合され、国立社会保障・人口問題研究所が発足した。新研究所は社会に対する啓発活動の一環として「厚生政策セミナー」を継続的に開くことにしており、今回の第2回は“少子化時代を考える”をテーマに行われる。



## パネリスト



### キャサリーン・キアナン

ロンドンスクール・オブ・エコノミクス・社会政策学部リーダー

ロンドン大学人口学博士。家族政策研究センター研究部長、ロンドン・スクール・オブ・エコノミクス上級研究員を経て、1995年より現職。社会政策および人口学を専攻。主著は『家族変動と将来の政策』（1990、共著）、『同棲、婚外出産、社会政策』（1993、共著）、『20世紀における母子家庭』（1998刊行予定、共著）など。

### Kathleen E. Kiernan

Reader in Social Policy and Demography, London School of Economics (LSE)

Ph. D. in demography, University of London. Dr. Kiernan was Research Director, Family Policy Studies Centre and Senior Fellow in Demography, LSE. Her research fields cover social policy and demography. Her publications include *Family Change and Future Policy* (1990, co-authored), *Cohabitation, Extra-Marital Childbearing and Social Policy* (1993, co-authored), and *Lone Motherhood in the Twentieth Century* (1998 forthcoming, co-authored).



### ジャン・クロード・シエネ

フランス国立人口研究所 (INED) 上級研究員/フランス理工科大学校・国立行政学院兼任教授/米国ジョンズ・ホプキンス大学客員教授

パリ大学人口学博士、パリ政治学院 (IEP) 経済学博士。国立科学研究センター (CNRS) 助手、フランス国立人口研究所社会経済研究部長を経て、1994年より現職。人口学および社会経済学を専攻。主著は『人口転換』（1986、英訳1992）、『フランスの人口』（1990、編著）、『西洋の凋落期—人口動向と政策』（1995）など。

### Jean-Claude Chesnais

Senior Research Fellow, French National Institute of Demographic Studies (INED); Maître de Conférence, Ecole Polytechnique and Ecole Nationale d'Administration; Visiting Professor at Johns Hopkins University (SAIS)

Ph. D. in demography, University of Paris (Sorbonne) and Ph. D. in economics, Institute of Political Studies (IEP), Paris. Dr. Chesnais was Research Assistant, National Center of Scientific Research (CNRS) and Director of Social Economics Department, INED. His research fields cover demography and social economics. His publications include *La transition démographique* (1986; English translation 1992), *La population de la France* (1990, ed.), and *Le crépuscule de l'Occident: démographie et politique* (1995).



### 上野 千鶴子

東京大学文学部教授

京都大学大学院社会学博士課程修了。京都精華大学助教授、ボン大学客員教授、国際日本文化研究センター客員助教授を経て、1995年より現職。構造主義社会学、マルクス主義フェミニズム研究を専攻。主著は『セクシー・ギャルの大研究』（1982）、『家父長制と資本制』（1991）、『近代家族の成立と終焉』（1994）など。

### Chizuko Ueno

Professor, Department of Sociology, University of Tokyo

Completed Ph. D. course in sociology, Kyoto University. Prof. Ueno was Associate Professor, Kyoto-Seika University, Visiting Professor, Bonn University, and Visiting Associate Professor, International Research Center for Japanese Studies. Her research fields cover structuralist sociology and Marxist feminism. Her publications include *Comprehensive Study on Sexy Gals* (1982), *Patriarchy and Capitalism* (1991) and *Rise and Fall of the Modern Family* (1994).



### 八代 尚宏

上智大学国際関係研究所教授

メリーランド大学経済学博士。OECD主任エコノミスト、経済企画庁計画官、日本経済研究センターを経て、1992年より現職。公共経済学および日本経済論を専攻。現在、人口問題審議会委員。主著は『現代日本の病理解明—教育・差別・福祉・医療の経済学』（1980）、『結婚の経済学』（1993）、『日本的雇用慣行の経済学』（1997）など。

### Naohiro Yashiro

Professor, Institute of International Relations, Sophia University

Ph. D. in economics, University of Maryland. Prof. Yashiro was Chief Economist, OECD, Chief Planner, Economic Planning Agency, and Senior Research Fellow, Japan Economic Research Center. His research fields cover public economics and Japanese economy. His publications include *Analysis of Ailing Japanese Society: Economics of Education, Discrimination, Welfare and Health* (1980), *Economics of Marriage* (1993), and *Economics of Japanese Employment Practices* (1997).

## 司会者・Moderator



### 阿藤 誠

国立社会保障・人口問題研究所副所長

ミシガン大学社会学博士。厚生省人口問題研究所人口政策研究部長、同所長を経て、1996年より現職。現在、東京大学客員教授、人口問題審議会委員、日本人口学会理事。人口学および社会学を専攻。主著は『先進諸国の人口問題—少子化と家族政策』（1996編著）、『人口変動と家族』（1997共編）など。


### Makoto Atoh

Deputy, Director-General, National Institute of Population and Social Security Research


Ph. D. in sociology, University of Michigan. Dr. Atoh was formerly Director-General of the Institute of Population Problems, MHW, and took the current position in 1996. He is a visiting professor, University of Tokyo. His research fields cover demography and sociology. His publications include *Population Issues in Developed Countries: Below-Replacement Fertility and Family Policies* (1996) and *Demographic Changes and the Family* (1997).

## 少子化に関するデータ


**Figure 1** 合計特殊出生率の推移  
Trends in Total Fertility Rate




**Figure 2** 高齢(65歳以上)人口の割合の推移  
Trends in Proportion of Elderly Population (aged 65 and over)



**Figure 3** 女子の年齢別労働力率(1995年頃)  
Female Activity Rate (c. 1995)



**Figure 4** 子供数別に見た政府の経済的支援  
Value of Child Benefit Package by Number of Children (one-earner family on average earnings)



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## PARENTHOOD AND FAMILY LIFE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

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### INTRODUCTION

The majority of British men and women become parents at some stage in their lives, but in recent times they have been becoming parents at older ages than their recent predecessors; more of them are becoming parents outside the legal framework of marriage; and a growing minority of men and women are eschewing parenthood altogether. Within the context of Europe, the United Kingdom (1) has had, along with France, one of the highest and consistent total fertility rates over the last twenty years: since the mid 1970s, with the odd exception, the rate has been within the range 1.7 and 1.8. This can be clearly seen in Table 1. For example, in many European countries the total period fertility rates (TPFR) have fallen below the 1.5 level and in some of the Southern European countries to as low as 1.2: whereas the nadir of British fertility was in 1977 when for one year the TPFR fell below 1.7 to stand at 1.66. Furthermore, Britain has not experienced the oscillations to be seen in, for example, Sweden with swings from 1.68 in 1980 through 2.13 in 1990 and down to 1.61 in 1996 (Council of Europe, 1997).

Table 1 about here

## FERTILITY BEHAVIOUR

### The timing of childbearing

Insights into what demographic impulses may lie behind the United Kingdom's relatively high TPF<sub>R</sub> come from an examination of the timing of childbearing. An important feature of European fertility patterns since the 1980s has been the decline in childbearing at ages in the twenties and a rise for women in their thirties (Craig, 1992). However, until very recently the United Kingdom had a smaller swing to older age fertility than in most other European countries, but this has changed in the last few years with noteworthy increases in the fertility of women in their thirties and older ages. In 1991, 31 percent of all live births were to women aged 30 and over whereas in 1996 the proportion was 41 per cent. This change in timing may well be contributing to the declines in TPF<sub>R</sub> seen since 1991: in 1991 the TPF<sub>R</sub> stood at 1.82 whereas in 1996 it had fallen to 1.74. Additionally, the United Kingdom has the highest teenage fertility rate in Western Europe and is the one country where there was no decline in this rate over the 1980s (see Figure 1). This youthful childbearing may well have contributed to the maintenance of our relatively high TPF<sub>R</sub>. For example, if we take an extreme assumption that there had been no teenage births in 1981 then the TPF<sub>R</sub> for England and Wales would have been 1.65 instead of 1.80 and the TPF<sub>R</sub> in 1991 would have stood at 1.66 as compared with 1.82 and the analogous rates in 1996 would have been 1.59 instead of 1.74. Women who become mothers in their teens are also the most likely to proceed to higher order births and are more likely to have a larger family sizes than women

who commence childbearing at older ages (Kiernan, 1995). The contribution of teenage parenthood to the maintenance of higher levels of fertility in the United Kingdom needs to be off-set by the evidence that these young ages are the least auspicious for embarking on parenthood. These young parents compared with those who become parents at older ages are likely to have accumulated less education or occupational capital prior to becoming parents and thus are likely to be more disadvantaged. This is the case: a substantial proportion of these young parents depend on state welfare to support themselves and their children. The British Government regard the current level of teenage fertility as being too high and is committed to reducing the number of teenage pregnancies. However, timing is not the whole story in explaining the relatively high TPR's observed for Britain.

**Figure 1 about here.**

#### **A strong two-child norm**

In the United Kingdom there is a strong preference for two children as espoused in attitude surveys and can moreover be clearly observed in family size distributions.

**Tables 2 and 3 about here**

As can be seen in Table 2, two-thirds of the United Kingdom respondents to the 1989 Eurobarometer Survey (European Commission, 1991) stated that two children was their ideal number per family and that compared with many other European countries one child is not a favoured number. As well as stating a preference for two children, a majority of British couples also attain their ideal. In Table 3 we show the family building patterns up to age 35

and age 45 for the most recent cohorts to have attained these ages( Armitage and Babb, 1996). It is clear that the proportions of women remaining childless has increased amongst the more recently born cohorts. It is also clear that the proportion of women with only one child has remained relatively steady amongst those born since the 1940s. The most common family size is two children, followed by a three child or higher order family. Hobcraft (1996) has estimated that during the fertility decline of the 1980s amongst married couples who had a first child that 86-88 per cent of these couples went on to have a second child, and this percentage was very similar to the proportions that went on to have a second birth during the period of the baby boom during the 1960s. Overall about 80 per cent of mothers who have a first child have a second child. Thus, in the United Kingdom it is normative for couples who have one child to proceed to a second child, but why there is such a strong preference for at least two children has never been satisfactorily explained.

Thus demographic explanations for the UK's relatively high level of fertility probably lie in the youthful pattern of childbearing and particularly to the strong adherence to a two-child norm. We now proceed to examine the social, economic and policy context of parenthood in Britain.

## **HIS AND HER TRANSITIONS TO PARENTHOOD**

In the public sphere of the labour market and private sphere of domestic life, the implications of becoming a parent can be markedly different for men and women. Women working after marriage has been normative in Britain since the 1950s. Women's increasing attachment to the labour market during motherhood is a more recent development and the increasing attachment to the labour market when children are very young is an even more recent

phenomenon (McCran et al 1996). Mothers are tending to return to the labour market sooner after the birth of their babies and increasingly unlikely to take extensive periods out of the labour market to care for their children on a full-time basis. Nevertheless there continue to be differences in the employment profiles of men and women. The typical employment profile for men could be described as arch-shaped: employment rates rise as young men complete their full-time education and enter the labour market. Having entered the labour force most men remain there more or less continuously (in the absence of unemployment and sickness) until they retire. In contrast the employment pattern profiles of women are more varied primarily arising from the advent of motherhood and its repercussions. Mothers compared with fathers tend to have lower participation rates, are less likely to have continuous employment careers and as we will see are also more likely to work part-time.

### **Rise of dual-earner couples**

In Britain, an increasing proportion of women entering the labour market, continuing to work after marriage and returning to employment after having had a child has meant that the traditional model of "breadwinner husband and homemaker wife, is much less common (See Figure 2). In fact one of the most significant changes in the working patterns of families has been the fall in the number of families living solely on the man's salary, and the rise of the dual-earner couple families. In 1995/96, 62 per cent of married couple families of working age with dependent children were in employment compared with around 50 per cent in the early 1980s. In sharp contrast, the proportion of families where only the husband was working fell from around 40 per cent in the early 1980s to 26 per cent in 1995/6.

**Figure 2 about here**



## **Economic activity**

One of the fundamental changes in the structure of the British labour market over the last few decades has been the increased participation of women, particularly the extent to which they have taken up part-time work. In 1979, the proportion of women of working age (16-59 years) was 59 per cent in 1996 it was 67 per cent. Moreover, in 1996, women represented 44 per cent of the labour force of working age.

Women's employment patterns in the United Kingdom are largely explained by their responsibility for young children. As we see in Table 4 mothers of children aged under 5 are far less likely to be in paid work than women without young children. Furthermore, when mothers of young children are in paid work they are more likely than other women to work part-time.

**Table 4 about here**

In the United Kingdom, it is the age of the youngest child rather than the number of children that is the major factor as to whether a mother participates in the labour market. As the youngest child becomes older, particularly when the youngest child reaches age 5 which is the compulsory school starting age in Britain, mothers are increasingly likely to be in employment, and in particular, are more likely to be in full-time work. Women with young children, those under school age are the least likely to be in paid work, but interestingly it

is this group of women where the biggest growth in labour participation has occurred over the last decade.

### **Returning to work faster**

Mothers in Britain have been returning to work sooner after the birth of their first child (see Figure 3). The proportions of women in older generations, for example those aged 60-64 in 1994, only 14 per cent had returned to work within the a year of the birth of their first child compared with 37 per cent of those aged 25-34 years in 1994.

### **Figure 3 about here**

Women who return to work within a year of the birth of their baby in the majority of cases (around 60 per cent) they returned to work for the same employer. The more highly educated was the mother the more likely she was to return to the same employer: with 70 per cent of mothers with high level qualifications doing so compared with around 50 per cent of mothers with no qualifications. Women reported that they mainly returned to work for financial reasons. Over 1 in 2 mothers said that they returned to work because they needed to earn money to pay for essentials, or to pay for extras, or stated that one income was insufficient to support the family. But financial reasons was not the whole story with respect to mothers returning to work. At least, 1 in 4 of the mothers said they returned to work for reasons related to their own self-fulfilment: such as enjoying work or wanting to pursue their career (Office of National Statistics, 1997).

Paid employment is the main means by which families support themselves financially and plays a crucial role in how they conduct their lives. The worlds of work and the family are often interdependent. Work can impact on family life by limiting the time available for being with other family members and for carrying out family tasks, duties and responsibilities and conversely, family responsibilities may act as a constraint on labour market participation. Women more so than men, for a variety of reasons including historical and cultural, tend to be constrained from fully participating in the public sphere by family responsibilities.

The Family and Working Lives Survey carried out by the Department of Employment in 1994/95 asked couples with children whether the presence of their children had affected their working arrangements. Around two-thirds of mothers, but only one sixth of fathers said that it had. Mothers said that their hours of work and type of work had been affected and 10 per cent expressly mentioned that they felt they had missed out on promotion. Fathers also mentioned some constraints, such as having to take the children to school or not being able to work away from home. However, the impact of having children for them was small compared with the impact on mothers (Office of National Statistics, 1997).

### **Hours of work**

British men compared with other European men in the EU have the highest average number of working hours (see Table 5 ) whereas British women have below average number of hours in employment than other European women. Moreover, British fathers also work longer hours on average than those men who do not have dependent children. For example according to data from the 1996 Labour Force Survey (shown in Table 6), fathers worked on average 47.1 hours per week as compared with an average of 43 hours amongst non-

fathers. This may be due to the fact that men with dependent children are at a stage where career advancement is critical (men in their thirties) or they need to work longer hours in order to earn extra money to support their children. Women on the other hand were more likely to work less hours on average per week if they had children: 27 hours as compared with 34 hours amongst those without children.

**Table 5 and 6 about here**

## **CHILDCARE**

If mothers of pre-school children return to work they need to arrange some form of child-care. When children start nursery school (typically at age 4) or primary school (compulsory from age 5), there still remains the problem of covering school holidays and the gaps between the start and end of the adult's working day (school hours typically runs from (9.00 hours to 15/16.00 hours). Moreover, young children aged 3 and 4 typically attend state provided nursery schools on a part-time basis.

### **Provision**

In contrast with the centralised and universal system of childcare found in Scandinavian countries, the system in the United Kingdom is a mixed set of provision provided by a variety of different agencies. Ninety per cent of childcare is unsubsidised (Employment Committee, 1995). Parents either pay for private childcare; receive some support from employers (in practice this is a very small number); use relatives (the most common arrangement); or adopt working hours that ensure that there is always a parent at home, usually the mother, to look after the child.

In the 1994 British Social Attitudes Survey mothers of children under age 12 who were in the labour market were asked how they arranged for their children to be looked after whilst they were at work (Thompson, 1995). As we see in Table 7 most working mothers used other family members, in the main their spouse or grandparents, to care for their children whilst they were at work. In the case of those with a pre-school child: 69 per cent did so. The use of other forms of child-care varied according to the age of their youngest child. Amongst mothers with pre-school children the next most common form of care after family care was the use of child-minders. Childminders are typically mothers of young children who care for the children of other parents in their own homes. Most are registered with the local authority and have to meet certain statutory requirements with respect to space and facilities. Amongst mothers with school age children the second most popular option after care by a family member is confining work to the school hours.

**Table 7 about here**

The growth in women's employment amongst women with dependent children has occurred without government intervention in support of childcare. Most European Union countries have at least a policy objective of universal publicly-funded nursery education for children under age 3. The United Kingdom is one of the few countries, along with Ireland, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, that does not (Hantrais and Letablier, 1996). In the United Kingdom government funded childcare for those under age 3 is very low (less than two per cent). Public provision of childcare is limited to deprived families whilst the provision for other parents has been regarded as the private responsibility of parents.

Not only are there issues of access to child care there are also issues of costs. Childcare, relative to earnings is expensive. Some estimates suggest that amongst parents who pay for childcare that the costs represent at least 25 per cent of the mother's earnings (Marsh and McKay, 1993). There is no tax relief for child care expenditure and none planned as it is deemed to be prohibitively expensive. There is some tax concessions to employers who provide work-place nurseries but this only covers 1 in 300 children (Employment Committee, 1995).

### **Maternity leave, Parental leave and care of sick children**

Until the advent of the Labour government the United Kingdom was opposed to European Community legislation on policies for statutory maternity leave, parental leave, working hours, and childcare and at the time of writing the British government had not signed up to the Community Charter for the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers and the Agreement on Social Policy. During the 1980s and 1990s, the British government argued against the introduction of directives on the rights of part-time workers, parental leave and state provision of childcare on the grounds that regulations would impinge on the private lives of individuals and also impose a heavy burden on employers. Since the 1950s, the family-employment relationship has largely been seen as a private matter for individuals to manage by themselves or in conjunction with their employers (Hantrais and Letablier, 1996).

The United Kingdom was the only member state without universal right to maternity leave for women in paid employment when the directive on pregnant women was adopted by the EC in 1992. This changed in 1995 and from then all mothers had a statutory right to 14 weeks maternity leave and those who met certain requirements were entitled to 18 weeks

Statutory Maternity Pay. There is no statutory right to paternity leave although the House of Commons Employment Committee (Employment Committee, 1995) recommended that the government introduce one, preferably paid and of the order of five days. There are other supportive leave arrangements which have been implemented to a greater or lesser degree in other countries within the EU, to allow parents to combine responsibilities of employment and childcare. Parental leave following the birth of a child allows both parents to share in the care and up-bringing of their children. The United Kingdom is one of only three countries in the EU without a universal system of parental leave: the government stance has been that this should be an area for negotiation between employers and employees. The other form of leave initiated by several EU countries is Family Leave: a short term leave to enable parents to take time off work when their children are sick and when the usual care arrangements breakdown. There is no statutory entitlement to such leave but the Trades Union Congress is urging its members to negotiate family leave with a target of five days paid leave per annum. The Equal Opportunities Commission sees the advantages of family leave as not only helping parents, in the main mothers, who are called away from work at short notice to look after their children, but family leave also has the advantage for employers in reducing the tension between employer and employee on such occasions. It may also prevent employers taking unauthorised days off or misusing their own sick leave entitlement. However, there are number of universal payments or credits made to mothers. All mothers receive child-benefit which is a single flat rate paid per child with an additional increment for the first child in recognition of the expenses incurred in having the first child. This benefit is normally paid to mothers with children aged 16 or under or aged 16 to 18 and in full-time education. This benefit is not subject to tax. Nowadays, there are no specific tax allowances for children in Britain. As well as child benefit payments women with caring

responsibilities who take time out of employment to bring up children or to care for disabled adults are provided with Home Responsibilities Protection which provides pension credits for the years they are out of the labour market, up to a maximum of twenty years.

## **GENDER ROLES**

The majority of British men and women under retirement age are in the labour market and contribute to family incomes. Yet the belief that men should be the breadwinner, on balance, still persists.

### **The Homemaker-Breadwinner model**

For example respondents in the 1991 British Social Attitudes Survey were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the following statement " A husband's job is to earn the money; a wife's job is to look after the home and family " (Kiernan, 1992). As we see in Table 8 women are more likely than men to disagree with the statement, but female dissenters are still a minority. One in three men and women support the traditional homemaker-breadwinner model, whilst around one in four are neutral. Whether such neutrality represents ambivalence, uncertainty or indifference is unknown. There is no strong evidence from earlier surveys in the series to support the notion that men and women are increasingly likely to disagree with the statement. In 1991, 43 per cent of both men and women disagreed with it, compared with 1 in 3 in 1984 and 1987.

**Table 8 and 9 about here**



The average picture does however, disguise large sub-group differences. Broadly as Table 9 shows, younger people and those with more education were more likely to reject the traditional roles of men and women. Although women are slightly more likely to disagree with the statement than men, the differences between the responses of men and women of different ages, with one exception, are broadly similar. Women under age 55 years and men under age 45 are less traditional than their older counterparts. Highly educated women and men, those who completed their education at age 18 or later are two to three times as likely to disagree with the proposition.

#### **Attitudes to women working and the family life cycle**

As we saw earlier women's employment patterns are largely explained by their responsibility for young children. Mothers of children under age five are far less likely to be in paid work than women without young children. And when mothers of young children are in paid work they are far more likely than other women to work part-time.

In Table 10 we consider men's and women's attitudes to women working according to their life-cycle stage, namely: between marrying and having children; when there is a child under school age; after the youngest child starts school; and after the children leave home. Respondents were asked whether women should work full-time, part-time or stay at home during these phases.

**Table 10 about here**

As we see from Table 10 there was general agreement amongst both sexes that women should go out to work full-time before the advent of parenthood and after their children are grown up. But when there are children at home attitudes change. Only a minority (around one in five) thinks that mothers with school-age children should work full-time, and there is near universal agreement that women should not work full-time when they have pre-school age children.

### **The Domestic Domain**

In Britain and most other European countries over the last decade or so there has been a clear change in sex role attitudes with men and women increasingly espousing more egalitarian views (Kiernan, 1996). Given such changes is there any evidence that in the domestic domain, where it is seemingly a simple matter of private negotiation between men and women, that couples nowadays are sharing more domestic responsibilities and tasks? In couple households where wives are not employed or work part-time it would seem logical in terms of maximising household efficiency that the wife should specialise more in domestic tasks. By the same logic, we would expect full-time homemakers to perform more domestic tasks than women who work part-time. However, in households where both partners work full-time one might expect the division of labour to be more equitable, unless one partner works much longer hours than the other. Here we examine the extent to which the division of labour within the household varies according to the employment status of the wife.

Respondents were asked who was "mainly responsible for general domestic duties" in the household (see Table 11). In married couple households (including cohabiting couples) the great majority, 76 per cent, stated the woman was responsible and 19 per cent said the duties

were shared equally between them. Men were more likely to say that duties were shared equally, 23 per cent, compared with 15 per cent of women. This discrepancy between the sexes may arise for a variety of reasons, for example, a genuine unfamiliarity with how much work is done and who actually does it, and perceptions that may be coloured by stereotypical views of who does what or ought to do what. The responses according to employment status are also shown in Table 11.

### **Table 11 about here**

Households where both partners work full-time are relatively more likely than other couples to share responsibility for domestic tasks, but the situation is still far from equitable, as only 1 in 4 such households share such duties. There are indications that the proportions who share responsibility for domestic tasks in these dual worker families may be increasing, in the analogous survey for 1987 survey only 1 in 5 couples did so (Witherspoon, 1988). Women who work part-time hold an intermediate position between the full-time workers and homemakers in the extent to which their partners share responsibilities. The majority of couples in the "other" category are mainly retired, 2 out of 3 contain a partner aged 60 or older. These partnerships are more akin to full-time working couples in the extent to which they share in the domestic sphere.

### **Who performs household tasks?**

The 1991 British Social Attitudes Survey also asked about the division of household tasks in married couple families. From Table 12 we see that in 1991 men were more likely to do the household repairs and that women did the cooking, cleaning and laundry; whilst shopping,

dishwashing and financial matters were relatively more unisex. The pace of change in the sharing of individual household tasks has changed very little since the beginning of the 1980s when this type of information was first collected.

#### **Table 12 about here**

A more detailed breakdown of the 1991 responses for families in which the husband worked and the wife worked full-time, part-time or in the home provided additional insights into the interior of family life. We see from Table 12 that men are more likely to share and participate in virtually all the tasks if their wife works full-time. Although one might have expected women who work part-time to fall midway between women in full-time work and the homemakers, it turned out they were much closer to the homemakers. This may be partly because part-time work can refer to a wide range of hours worked per week. Women who work fewer hours are likely to have more time to devote to domestic tasks than those who work longer hours. There is one important feature of domestic life where employed women differ from women not in paid work, namely in the organisation of household finances. In families where women are not earning an income then husbands are more likely to take responsibility for financial matters. The similarity of responses for women in part-time and full-time employment would seem to suggest that it may not be the level of earnings that affects the control of financial resources as much as whether or not the woman earns at all.

Survey data from a range of European countries suggest that looking after children is frequently a more popular activity amongst fathers than the more routine housekeeping tasks

(Kempeneers and Lelievre, 1992). For example in Britain in 1991, as can be seen in Table 13 one in three fathers said they shared equally in the care of sick children, rising to one in two amongst families where both parents work, and child discipline was shared in the majority of families (Kiernan, 1992).

**Table 13 about here**

### **ATTITUDES TO FAMILY LIFE**

In Britain although family structures may have undergone some change it is noteworthy that families continue to play an prominent part in people's lives. We saw earlier the important role played by relatives, in the main grandparents, in childcare and the responses in Table 14 highlight the importance of family ties in other realms. For example, we see that only 13 per cent of people said they would rather spend time with their friends than with their family, and only 7 per cent said that their friends were more important than members of their family. Moreover, parents expect to continue to help their children even when they have grown-up and that the family is still regarded as an important source of assistance. This evidence suggests that family remains a central focus of people's lives in Britain.

**Table 14 about here**

### **CONCLUSION**

In the United Kingdom even in the absence of State support, as we saw above, mothers have been increasingly joining the labour market. However, they have tended to leave the workforce when they have young children and return part-time, making their own

arrangements for childcare; in the main within their families either by working when their husband is at home, or making use of grandparents to care for children. Part-time working may be a pragmatic solution under such circumstances but it also has implications for promotion, access to social security rights and occupational pensions. Although some employers, particularly large international companies or the public sector, may offer arrangements for career breaks, job sharing, part-time working and workplace nurseries, the level of provision does not compensate for the lack of public facilities and guarantees. Moreover, a recent review of attitudes to work (Thompson, 1995) shows that whether or not mothers go out to work is a social choice which reflects their own values about the roles they play as mothers and workers rather than necessarily the availability of childcare subsidies. Families in Britain have reached their own pragmatic solution to combining work and family life that could be characterised as having at its heart a strong preference for part-time work which allows the combination of family responsibilities with paid work without the stresses incurred with trying to combine full-time employment with the rearing of children. In Britain, generally speaking women continue to be mothers first and workers second which may be an important factor underpinning our relatively high level of fertility.

## Footnote

(1) The United Kingdom includes England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. Great Britain includes England and Wales, and Scotland. Most of the data we use refer to Great Britain.

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Table 1 Total fertility rates in EU member states, 1960-1995

	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995
Austria	2.69	2.70	2.29	1.82	1.62	1.46	1.46	1.39
Belgium	2.56	2.62	2.25	1.74	1.68	1.51	1.62	1.54*
Denmark	2.54	2.61	1.95	1.92	1.55	1.45	1.67	1.80
Finland	2.72	2.48	1.83	1.68	1.63	1.65	1.78	1.81
France	2.73	2.84	2.47	1.93	1.95	1.81	1.78	1.70
Germany	2.37	2.50	2.03	1.48	1.56	1.37	1.45	1.24*
Greece	2.28	2.30	2.39	2.38	2.21	1.68	1.39	1.40
Ireland	3.76	4.03	3.93	3.40	3.25	2.50	2.12	1.87*
Italy	2.41	2.66	2.42	2.20	1.64	1.39	1.30	1.17
Luxembourg	2.28	2.42	1.98	1.55	1.49	1.38	1.61	1.68
Netherlands	3.12	3.04	2.57	1.66	1.60	1.51	1.62	1.53
Portugal	3.17	3.14	3.02	2.58	2.18	1.72	1.57	1.41
Spain	2.86	2.94	2.90	2.80	2.20	1.63	1.34	1.18
Sweden	2.20	2.42	1.92	1.77	1.68	1.74	2.13	1.74
United Kingdom	2.71	2.87	2.45	1.81	1.90	1.79	1.83	1.71*
Europe 15				1.96	1.82	1.59	1.56	1.43*

Source: Eurostat Demographic Statistics 1995

\*Eurostat estimate.

TABLE 2

## The ideal number of children per family, 1989

<i>Country</i>	<i>0</i> %	<i>1</i> %	<i>2</i> %	<i>3</i> %	<i>4 or more</i> %	<i>Mean</i>
<i>Belgium</i>	5	18	52	21	3	2.01
<i>Denmark</i>	3	9	65	20	4	2.13
<i>West Germany</i>	7	14	58	18	3	1.97
<i>Greece</i>	2	13	42	33	11	2.42
<i>Spain</i>	4	22	55	15	3	1.94
<i>France</i>	3	19	47	28	4	2.13
<i>Ireland</i>	2	9	33	30	27	2.79
<i>Italy</i>	2	9	61	24	4	2.2
<i>Luxembourg</i>	3	21	56	19	3	1.99
<i>Netherlands</i>	3	5	65	22	5	2.23
<i>Portugal</i>	3	21	55	16	4	2.01
<i>United Kingdom</i>	2	10	67	15	6	2.14
<i>EC12</i>	4	14	57	21	4	2.1

Source: Eurobarometer 32, Commission of the European Communities, 1990.

TABLE 3

## Family building of women in successive birth cohorts in England and Wales.

Women born in:	Percentage of women with various exact numbers of live-born children											
	At age 25			At age 35			At age 45					
	Children 0	1	2	3 or more	Children 0	1	2	3 or more	Children 0	1	2	3 or more
1924	45	33	17	6	18	25	30	27	16	23	28	32
1929	45	31	17	7	17	22	30	31	15	20	29	36
1934	39	31	21	9	12	17	33	38	11	16	32	41
1939	35	28	24	13	12	14	36	38	11	13	36	40
1944	34	27	27	13	12	14	42	32	10	13	42	34
1949	40	25	25	10	15	14	43	27	13	13	43	30
1954	48	22	22	8	20	13	40	27				
1959	55	19	19	8	23	14	35	28				
1964	60	17	16	7								
1969	61	16	16	6								

Source: Population Trends No 84, 1996

TABLE 4

## Economic activity status of mothers (1): by age of youngest child, Spring 1996

<i>United Kingdom</i>	<i>Age of youngest child</i>			<i>All mothers (1)</i> <i>%</i>
	<i>0-4</i> <i>%</i>	<i>5-10</i> <i>%</i>	<i>11-15</i> <i>%</i>	
<i>Working full-time</i>	17	22	34	22
<i>Working part-time</i>	31	43	41	37
<i>Unemployed (2)</i>	5	5	4	5
<i>Inactive</i>	46	30	21	35
<i>All mothers (1) (=100%) (millions)</i>	3.1	2.2	1.5	6.8

1 - Mothers aged 16 to 59 with children aged under 16.

2 - Based on the ILO definition.

Source: Labour Force Survey, Office for National Statistics

TABLE 5

Average weekly hours worked by men and women in EU member states, 1995

	<i>Men</i>	<i>Women</i>
<i>Austria</i>	39.1	34.5
<i>Belgium</i>	38.3	32
<i>Denmark</i>	36.8	31.9
<i>Finland</i>	38.2	35.7
<i>France</i>	39.7	34
<i>Germany</i>	39.3	32.6
<i>Greece</i>	40.9	37.8
<i>Ireland</i>	40.5	33.5
<i>Italy</i>	39.5	34.6
<i>Luxembourg</i>	40.5	33.6
<i>Netherlands</i>	36.1	25
<i>Portugal</i>	42.6	37.8
<i>Spain</i>	40.7	36
<i>Sweden</i>	40.1	34.1
<i>United Kingdom</i>	43.6	30.7
<i>Europe 15</i>	40.1	32.8

Sources: Eurostat, *Statistics in Focus*, 1996.

TABLE 6

Average hours (1) worked per week: by parental status and gender, Spring 1996

<i>United Kingdom</i>	<i>Parents (2)</i>		<i>Non-parents (3)</i>	
	<i>Males</i>	<i>Females</i>	<i>Males</i>	<i>Females</i>
<i>Working full-time</i>	47.9	41	45.9	41.2
<i>Working part-time</i>	19.8	18.1	16	17.7
<i>All in employment</i>	47.1	26.9	43	33.7

1 - Total usual hours including paid and unpaid overtime and excluding meal breaks worked by males aged 16 to 64 and female aged 16 to 59 in employment.

2 - With dependent children.

3 - With children.

Source: Labour Force Survey, Office for National Statistics

TABLE 7

## Childcare used by working mothers

	ALL 1994 %	Age of youngest child (1994)	
		under 5 %	5 to 12 %
<i>A relative looks after them (including husband/partner)</i>	62	69	57
<i>Mother works only while children are at school</i>	23	7	37
<i>Child minder</i>	15	25	7
<i>Children look after themselves until mother gets home</i>	4	-	8
<i>A friend or neighbour looks after them</i>	13	3	23
<i>Day nursery</i>	6	14	-
<i>Mother's help or nanny looks after them at home</i>	6	9	3
<i>Mother works from home</i>	4	2	6
<i>Work-place nursery</i>	2	2	1

Source: British Social Attitudes Survey 1994.

TABLE 8: *Attitudes to the breadwinner/homemaker model by sex*

A husband's job is to earn the money; a wife's job is to look after the home and family.

	<i>All</i> %	<i>Men</i> %	<i>Women</i> %
<i>Strongly agree/ Agree</i>	33	35	31
<i>Neither agree nor disagree</i>	21	23	20
<i>Strongly disagree/ Disagree</i>	44	41	47

Source: *British Social Attitudes Survey 1991*



TABLE 9: *Attitudes to breadwinner/homemaker model by age, qualifications and employment status.*

A husband's job is to earn the money; a wife's job is to look after the home and family.

*% disagreeing or strongly disagreeing*

	<i>Men</i>	<i>Women</i>
<i>Total</i>	41	47
<i>Age group:</i>		
18-34	65	68
35-44	54	54
45-54	30	53
55-59	29	31
60 or older	13	19
<i>Highest educational qualification:</i>		
Degree/Professional	53	63
A' level	57	61
O' level/CSE	34	54
Other/None	28	32
<i>Man works and...</i>		
Women works full-time	58	72
Women works part-time	49	45
Women not in paid work	33	40

*Source: British Social Attitudes Survey 1991*

TABLE 10: *Attitudes to work at different stages of the family life cycle.*

% saying women should work...

	<i>Full-time</i>	<i>Part-time</i>	<i>Not at all</i>
<i>After marrying and before there are children</i>	82	7	1
<i>When there is a child under school age</i>	5	33	52
<i>After the youngest child starts school</i>	21	63	6
<i>After the children leave home</i>	72	14	1

*Source: British Social Attitudes Survey 1991*

TABLE 11: Responsibility for domestic tasks by sex and employment status.

Respondents living in households where...

Who is responsible for general domestic duties?	All		...man works, woman works full-time		...man works, woman works part-time		... man works, woman not in work		Other households	
		%		%		%		%		%
Mainly woman	75		67		83		89		66	
Shared equally	16		24		13		6		21	

Source: British Social Attitudes Survey 1991

TABLE 12: *Responsibility for household tasks by type of task.*

Households where the man works and...

<i>Who:</i>	<i>All Households</i>	<i>...woman works full-time</i>	<i>...woman works part-time</i>	<i>...woman is not in paid work</i>
	<i>%</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>%</i>
<b>does household shopping?</b>				
<i>mainly man</i>	8	4	5	5
<i>mainly woman</i>	45	42	51	57
<i>shared equally</i>	47	53	44	37
<b>makes evening meal?</b>				
<i>mainly man</i>	9	7	5	3
<i>mainly woman</i>	70	60	75	81
<i>shared equally</i>	20	32	20	16
<b>does evening dishes?</b>				
<i>mainly man</i>	28	28	20	18
<i>mainly woman</i>	33	24	41	37
<i>shared equally</i>	37	46	38	42
<b>does household cleaning?</b>				
<i>mainly man</i>	4	5	-	-
<i>mainly woman</i>	68	63	82	82
<i>shared equally</i>	27	30	18	17
<b>does washing and ironing?</b>				
<i>mainly man</i>	3	3	-	1
<i>mainly woman</i>	84	78	91	91
<i>shared equally</i>	12	17	9	8
<b>repairs household equipment?</b>				
<i>mainly man</i>	82	84	85	81
<i>mainly woman</i>	6	3	7	8
<i>shared equally</i>	10	10	8	10
<b>organises household bills and money?</b>				
<i>mainly man</i>	31	27	29	40
<i>mainly woman</i>	40	44	41	36
<i>shared equally</i>	28	28	30	23

Source: *British Social Attitudes Survey 1991*

TABLE 13

## Households where man works and...

	<i>All house- holds</i>	<i>...woman works full-time</i>	<i>...woman works part-time</i>	<i>...woman is not in paid work</i>
<i>Who:</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>%</i>
<b>looks after sick children?</b>				
<i>mainly man</i>	1	3	2	-
<i>mainly woman</i>	60	44	51	80
<i>shared equally</i>	39	52	48	20
<b>teaches children discipline?</b>				
<i>mainly man</i>	9	13	9	9
<i>mainly woman</i>	17	13	15	22
<i>shared equally</i>	73	74	76	70

Source: British Social Attitudes Survey 1991.

TABLE 14


## Attitudes (1) towards the family, 1995

	<b>Strongly agree/ agree %</b>	<b>Neither agree nor disagree %</b>	<b>Disagree/ strongly Disagree/ %</b>	<b>Can't choose/ not answered %</b>	<b>All %</b>
<i>I'd rather spend time with my friends than with my family</i>	13	23	59	5	100
<i>On the whole, my friends are more important to me than members of my family</i>	7	12	76	4	100
<i>Once children have left home, they should no longer expect help from their parents</i>	12	13	72	3	100

1 - People aged 18 and over were asked how much they agreed or disagreed with each statement, on a 5-point scale ranging from 'strongly agree' to 'strongly disagree'.


Source: British Social Attitudes Survey.

# Teenage fertility rates




Council of Europe: 1994  
 1993 rates or latest available

Married couples with dependent children by number of earners





Mothers who returned to work within one year of the birth of their first child in Great Britain, 1994-95



BELOW-REPLACEMENT FERTILITY  
IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (EU-15):  
FACTS AND POLICIES, 1960-1997

by

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Meeting organized by the  
National Institute of Population and Social Security Research  
Tokyo, 15-16 December 1997

Below-Replacement Fertility in the European Union (EU-15) :  
Facts and Policies, 1960-1997

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"Demography is destiny". Such a sentence seems at first glance strong or a bit exaggerated but is historically true for human entities like nations, civilizations, religions, or even commercial blocks like the E.U., NAFTA, ASEAN, etc. In the short run, demographic trends have no impact, but in the long run, they have a cumulative, multiplicative effect : for example a population with a constant Net Reproduction Rate (average number of surviving daughter per mother) of 1,5 such as Germany under BISMARCK's rule tends to multiply its number by 10 in about two centuries ; conversely, a population with a constant Net Reproduction Rate of 0,7 such as Germany under KOHL's regime tends to divide its number by 10 in about two centuries. In other words, the same population can end the period of simulation (two centuries) with a ratio of 1 to 100. With the present example, the population of Germany in 1900 (about 60 million inhabitants) would have exploded to reach 600 million in 2100 under the traditional fertility conditions prevailing one century ago ; reciprocally the same population would shrink to only 6 million in 2100 if the present fertility pattern had been applied all over the 1900-2100 period. Fertility shapes the fate of a population (growth and structure).

The case of Europe is the most illustrative in point. Throughout the 18th and the 19th century and until the 1930s, the pace of population growth was faster in Europe than in the "Third World" (Asia, Africa, Latin America) : this era was the era of undisputed European supremacy : territorial expansion, political domination (colonization of the New Worlds : the Americas, Australia, Siberia, etc and occupation of old civilizations : Caucasia, central Asia, Africa, Middle East, India, Indochina, etc), unprecedented emigration (more than 50 million emigrants) namely during the peak of the European population explosion (1850-1913), economic leadership. Retrospectively, who could have imagined that a small island lost in the fog (England) could have been number one throughout the nineteenth century and until the interwar period ? It is impossible to understand such a paradox without introducing the population factor into the strategic equation. The population of England increased sixfold between 1750 and 1900 (it was the fastest growth in the world at the time with the Russian one), and provided a massive emigration to Northern America, Oceania and other regions (more than 8 million emigrants) ; English became the first western language and took the place of the formerly predominant French Language ; the USA (England's daughter) become the only remaining superpower at the end of the XX century. Here again, population figures

deserve to be mentioned : the population of the US was only 9 million in 1820, it reached 150 million in 1950 and is now (end of 1997) 270 million ; the USA are n° 3 in terms of population after China and India (1.3 and 1 billion respectively) which are handicapped by a big technological gap.

Since the 1930s and especially since world war II, the second phase (decline) of the European cycle has began. The reverse mechanism is at work ; the divergence is growing between a potentially shrinking Europe and expanding numbers in continents of the so-called "third world". The European fertility had fallen to low levels while the benefits of mortality decline had rapidly spread all over developing continents, thus creating a huge population explosion (the rate of population growth culminated at 2,5 % per year during the 1960s), whereas the speed of population growth in Europe was relatively slow and regularly diminishing. Between 1930 and 1997, the share of the population of Europe (not comprising the former Soviet Union) fell from 18 % to 8 % of the total world population : added to the European civil wars of the century, this was a major argument for the construction of a European Community. The corresponding (or contemporary period) is a period of relative economic and political decline : the decolonization process began with the independence of India (1947), then extended to Africa (by 1960), to generalize until the splitting of the former Russian-Soviet empire (1989-1991). After the process of europeanization of the planet (1492-1942), the process of de-europeanization is under way (1942-1997) ; similarly, after the centuries of forced russification under the czars and the soviet rule, the era of derussification (emigration of former colonizers in the newly independent states, back to the slavie republics) is open. Once again, the fertility differential is a key explanatory factor in that historical shift. Europe which was traditionally the first continent of emigration is presently (since the beginning of the 1980s) becoming the first continent of immigration : the region has no more surplus to export ; the labor scarcity in some sectors is so acute that wages are high and thus attractive for people living in poor settings of Africa or Asia (high fertility, massive unemployment, low pay).

Since fertility differentials are -along with technology and ideology- one of the major engines of history, this paper will focus on this demographic component of the change in societies. We will successively :

- 1) Summarize global population and fertility trends in the European Union (EU-15) and in its major member countries over the period 1960-1996. A more precise view will be given on the geography of fertility inside the E.U., showing the surprising contrast between the Mediterranean countries like Spain or Italy (total fertility rate of 1.15-1.20 child per woman in 1996, an unprecedented world record) and the Nordic countries like Sweden (in Sweden, the TFR never fell below 1.6 and even experienced a recovery to the replacement level at the end of the 1980s).

2) Analyse and discuss a list of possible "causes" and "consequences" of below-replacement fertility (consequences may become causes in the long run, thus generating and exponential spiral of population implosion) ; at this stage, we will try to identify strategic -or reversible- factors which offer a margin for action by policymakers.

3) Study the preliminary conditions for an effective policy response and fertility change : public awareness, political legitimacy and willingness, latent demand for family policy (as measured by the difference between the desired family size and the real family size), improvement of women's and children's status, etc. Finally, on the basis of historical evidence we will show that -if family policy is adapted in terms of social orientation and economic content to the public expectation- it offers a wide margin for action, thus creating a potential for fertility recovery bringing the TFR close to the replacement level. Fertility is elastic ; it can be reduced by family planning programmes where it is considered as "too high" (according to Population Enquiries conducted by the United Nations) ; it can also be stimulated by social policies where it is considered as "too low".

## I. The diagnosis : a permanent disequilibrium

### 1) Births in Europe

On the eve of first world war, the average annual number of births in Europe was 10 million for a total population of 300 million inhabitants ; by the year 1995, this number has dropped to 6 million for a corresponding population of 500 million ; hence, the population has increased by 2/3 while the number of births fell by 40 %. Such a decline was structural and even rather linear ; the following data represent the number of births (in thousands) from decade to decade throughout the XXth century :

1910 : 9 900	1960 : 7 980
1920 : 9 500	1970 : 7 600
1930 : 8 700	1980 : 6 860
1940 : 7 900	1990 : 6 240
1950 : 8 040	1996 : 5 900

The post world war II baby boom was limited both in time, space and magnitude ; it occurred only among the western allies and its duration was usually short (15 to 20 years). In 1960 as well as in 1950, the number of births in Europe was

similar to its 1940 level : around 8 million ; the idea of fertility cycle has no meaning at all for Europe as a whole. The 1940s and the 1950s marked a stagnation, not an upswing ; then the secular movement resumed steadily and it is very uneasy to predict the bottom line since we have no comparable reference in our past. The total fertility rate for Europe with or without the european part of the former soviet union is 1.4 in 1996 ; this is the lowest in the world. For Europe alone the birth deficit -defined by the difference between the number required for replacement and the number observed- reaches 2 million per year.

## 2) The demographic landscape of the EU-15

The EU-15 is a commercial unit comparable in numbers with the NAFTA : 370 million inhabitants. But the dynamics is quite different ; the pace of population growth of NAFTA is ten times higher than that of the EU-15 ; the age pyramid of Northern America is still relatively young, at least rectangular at the basis, thus incorporating a future potential increase. Conversely, on the other side of the Atlantic, in Western Europe, the number of youth has severely dropped with the risk of exponential decrease in the future when the corresponding birth cohorts will reach childbearing ages. Within the present borders, the population of NAFTA could reach 500 million by the year 2030 while it should diminish or, at best, remain constant in the EU-15 ; the important contrast in age structure is also crucial for the economic future of the two entities.

The rate of population growth is slowing down and now close to zero ; immigration is the unique factor which has a dampening effect on this slackening process. Between the mid-1960s and the mid nineties, the natural increase fell by more than two million, from 2,56 million in 1965 to 0,33 million in 1995. As the number of deaths is approximatively constant, this phenomenon is due essentially to the fall in the number of births, which declined by more than one third in only three decades (6,1 million in 1965 ; 4,0 million in 1995). Despite the fact that the EU has 100 million more inhabitants than the US (370 versus 270 millions) the number of births is similar (3,915 million in the US in 1996). During the latest years, for the first time in the history of the Community the contribution of immigration to population growth is stronger (and much stronger) than the impact of natural increase (which in turn, is stimulated by past immigration) : table 1. The lesson is clear : the EU is entering a new historical stage, the age of migratory dependency.

This movement of convergence towards population stagnation is similar for all individual member countries. In order to simplify the presentation, we produce population figures for the five largest countries (France, Germany, Italy, Spain and U.K.) which together comprise 80 % of the total population of EU-15. The German

population tends to stabilize around 80 million, the French, Italian and British a bit below 60 million and the Spanish one a bit below 40 million (table 2) ; the cumulated population of these five countries could peak at about 300 million and then if present fertility trends persist begin to shrink.

### 3) The variation in the number of births : a key for management

In the UK as well in Italy, the annual number of births was close to 1 million in the mid 1960s ; it has fallen by a quarter in the UK and nearly one half in Italy. In Germany, the absolute decline is still more impressive : 1,3 million in 1965 about 0,8 million in 1995, the difference is 500 000 births per year (table 3). The case of France differs for two reasons : the fertility decrease was not so steep as in neighbouring countries of continental Europe and the age structure has a protective impact ; there were more baby boomers at childbearing ages. These crude data on birth figures deserve a special attention : they shape the age structure and they are finally the most essential variable for political authorities, at all levels (local, regional, national, international). Under present conditions of very low mortality, they determine the number of pupils, of students, the number of future inflows in the labor market, the number of consumers, of taxpayers, etc. ; they have a decisive impact on long range variations in demand, on investment (infrastructure, housing), and on corresponding sectorial labor needs (teachers, doctors, builders, etc). For businessmen, marketing lays on people and money. We will come further to that point.

### 4) International differences in total fertility rates

To design a population policy, the decision-maker has to use an index which is not biased by the age structure and which reflects the sheer propensity to have kids : the total fertility rate. The indicator is permanently calculated for the purpose of international comparisons and it is widely produced to show the impact of a given programme of action (anti-natalist or pro-natalist plan). Table 5 shows the trends are atypical. In most of the "big" countries of the EU, the total fertility rate fell by 1 to 1.4 child on average per woman ; in Spain, the decline is much sharper : 2.9 at the beginning of the sixties, only 1.15 in 1996, hence a fall of 60 %. There is no more mediterranean or catholic fertility, since Italy and Spain experience the lowest fertility ever seen in the history of mankind. The comparison between Northern and Southern Europe through the examples of Sweden and Italy is worth to be meditated ; until the 1970s the swedish fertility rate was lower than its Italian counterpart and it was under the EU curve (figure 1). Now the opposite is true ; new generations of swedish women have more children than corresponding Italian

women ; the budget cutting initiated in 1992 (to follow the Maastricht criteria) by the swedish authorities had a negative impact both on family support and youth employment ; part of the recent decline in the swedish fertility (2.1 in 1990 ; 1.6 in 1996) is likely due to this short-run political effect. Still, the swedish fertility remains superior to the Italian one or the EU-average. Besides let us consider another characteristic of the swedish pattern : the country was one of the very few countries along with France and the UK, where the total fertility rate never fell below the level of 1.6 children per woman. One historian of the welfare state would be tempted to remind that the public leaders of these three countries had similar fears of population decline in the 1930s and that the creators of the social security systems (BEVERIDGE in England, LAROQUE in France, and MYRDAL -Nobel Prize winner in Sweden) had comparable views -i.e. pro-natalist- on population matters and implemented a family-oriented social policy at the time of the second world war. This explicit demographic preoccupation progressively eroded or vanished in the following decades but family support was a non negligible component of the welfare state.

A carefull look at data suggests that there is no clearcut correlation between family formation/dissolution patterns and the fertility level. The percentage of "illegitimate" births is minimal in Mediterranean Europe (around 1 out of 10 in Italy or Spain), whereas it reaches approximately 1/3 in France and the UK and is over 1/2 in Sweden ; this percentage tends to rise steadily from year to year in spite of sizeable short-term fertility fluctuations namely in Sweden and France ; the case of Germany is however noticeable since the percentage is stabilized (around 1/6) : marriage and the family are protected by the Constitution and the number of births has been halved in the Eastern part, where "illegitimacy" was massive (table 6). Countries with so-called traditional family structures (high marriage rate, low divorce rate, low "illegitimacy" rate, etc) like Italy or Spain were totally "detraditionalised" in terms of fertility and this in a very short time span (less than two decades). Their birth dearth has skyrocketed to a wholly unpredicted level ; no official population forecast either national or international had anticipated a total fertility rate of 1.2 for any country, a fortiori for Mediterranean countries which are still commonly viewed as "laggards", and usually family-oriented. This outcome is probably the biggest surprise of European demographics at the end of the present century.

Besides this inversion of the geography of fertility between Southern and Northern Europe, another puzzling -and little studied- secular phenomenon has to be stressed : the peculiarity of both British and French fertility since the middle of the eighteenth century (table 7). The British and French societies were the first to have earlier nation states and, as a consequence, a possibility of foreign influence ; the



French Revolution (and the following troubles and wars) marked the beginning of the secular fertility decline and weakened the relative economic position of the country, while the industrial revolution in England encouraged family formation (earlier marriage, higher fertility). During all the nineteenth century, the fertility gap between the two rival nations was hugely detrimental to France (figure 2). Throughout the entire 1800-1880 period the difference was ranging between 1,3 and 1,8 children per woman : that is the same value as the difference between the prevailing present fertility and zero. As already mentioned above, this fertility differential had tremendous implications on foreign policy and on the fate of European colonies ; France lost its former leadership in favor of England ; its language regressed all over Europe and contrary to the English never acquired a world status ; French emigration was very limited. By contrast, from the beginning of the nineteenth century, British emigrants exported their ideas, their ideals, and their language on all continents. In "Northern" America (North of the Rio Grande), only 3 % of the whole population uses French as a communication language in daily life (namely in Quebec).

## II. Possible causes and consequences of sustained below-replacement fertility

### 1) The determinants

The factors lying behind the fertility decline are manifold ; demographers do not have a clear causal framework, only intuitions on a puzzle of changes affecting all spheres of daily life ; it is basically a demographic revolution directly linked to all facets of modernization and globalization. Some of these determinants are included in the classical theory of the demographic transition ; this is the case of the following ones : the fall of premature mortality, which depressed child demand ; the urbanization and densification process (people abandon villages to live in crowded areas where space and time become scarce) ; illiteracy has virtually disappeared ; the diffusion of malthusian culture (fear of food shortage, job shortage, etc) ; the shift in occupational structure (reproduction is limited to biological aspects not to location, profession or lifestyle).

Other factors emerged since the initial formulation of the demographic transition theory ; they can be related to post-modernity and the persistence of obstacles to fertility ; the list could be endless, but for the sake of simplicity, let us select only five : a) The new anti-natalist biological technologies (pill, condom, IUD, safe abortion and sterilization, contragestion : RU 486, etc). b) social atomization and related feminism (new generations of women are highly educated, sometimes with

higher degrees than their partners and they cannot accept subordination. c) The implementation of collectivized pension benefits (under prevailing rules, DINKS-Double Income No Kids- couples enjoy high pension benefits ... mostly paid by children of large families) ; the old-age security has been totally disconnected from personal fertility. d) The explosion of mobility or generalized nomadism : travelling is part of modern lifestyle ; for career necessity, geographical mobility is often required and since the share of bi-active couples (father and mother on the job) is expanding, this works against family formation and harmony, except in very high income brackets. e) The youth loss of majority. In all traditional societies with high mortality/high fertility regimes, the vast majority of people was made of children and young adults below the age of 30 ; now, we experience an inversion of the age pyramid ; the majority of people progressively tends to belong to the age group 50 and plus (present and potential retirees) ; policy-makers adjust to this shift and in most advanced countries of the West, we face a growing intergenerational inequity (relative prosperity and income security for the elderly ; unemployment, job insecurity, declining wages among young adults, or potential parents).

The baby-bust is however not a fatality ; many determinants of the recent fertility decline are reversible such as consumerist preferences, materialistic/individualistic lifestyles, state-driven welfare states, youth economic deprived status (decline in the value of assets or housing). But the main point is that the desired family size is commonly close to the replacement level, whatever the member country of the EU-15 considered ; young couples predominantly still wish to have two children ; this is the prevailing preference for half to two-thirds of them) and sometimes three children (second choice). As we know, the reality is far from this wish, namely in countries where the obstacles to childbearing are maximal (Italy, Spain) and the economic sacrifices made by the mothers viewed as unbearable ; this contradiction between the cultural setting (family orientation, respect for tradition) and the economic circumstances (high youth unemployment, gender discrimination on the labor market, rising opportunity cost of children, etc) has a devastating impact on fertility. Young women invent alternatives to family building (permanent celibacy, career-centered life, new leisure patterns, etc).

## 2) The consequences

The impact of the reversal of the age pyramid is going far beyond the usual description, which was commonly based on the assumption that below-replacement fertility was transitory and limited. But this is not the case : the post transitional fertility is permanently depressed and the birth deficit is massive.

The direct -mainly financial- consequences of this change are well-known and widely recognized ; they have been explored by various institutions like the IMF, the OECD, the Bundesbank and national planning agencies ; they relate to pension and health costs and show similar results. This is a matter of pure arithmetics : the number of retirees will grow rapidly (usually double) in the next three or four decades, while the number of potential contributors will shrink.

But the indirect, less visible and deeper, consequences are more complex and have more to do with psychology than with sheer numbers. It is probably difficult to imagine what the future of inverted age-pyramid societies will be like. However some solid insights can be made, such as the following :

- The consolidation of the PRESTON's hypothesis on the deterioration of the relative economic status of the younger segment of the population : the percentage of people living below the poverty line is increasing among young adults and their children, whereas it diminishes among the elderly or mature adults. The demographic squeeze tends to play a rôle in this shift, since the political power of young parents is fading. But other mechanism are at work like the economic globalization which reinforced the competition between younger generations of very different countries, particularly among semi-skilled or non skilled workers on the one hand, and the present technological revolution, on the other hand ; automation and new information technologies are massively labor-saving, hence growing difficulties to get a long-term job in the internationalized or export oriented sectors of the economy.

- The fall in the number of young households and in the member of children has a major depressive impact on internal demand and economic competitiveness. The growth of cities and of their markets was due to rural out-migration and natural increase ; now, rural exodus has ended and depleted birth cohorts reach the peak ages for demand (housing, equipment, building, infrastructure) ; the need for new houses, furnishure, schools, roads, cars, etc, shrinks, especially in mature economies like those of the West or Japan where the consumption level is already very high. The issue of competitiveness is similar : the direct and indirect cost (pension, health, taxes) of labor rises in aging societies and this movement generates a permanent migration of capital, a delocalisation of enterprises. Foreign capital is highly volatile, depending on short-term profit perspectives ; one can bet that shrinking markets could lose their potential attractiveness. Confidence vanishes among investors ; one can also guess that greying societies are more past-oriented than future -oriented, hence less dynamic.

- A stronger need for immigrants. New generations were educated in small and rather well-off families ; they do not accept any more to perform dirty and demanding tasks. Since many of these tasks cannot yet be mechanized or robotized,

employers have to recruit, legally or not, foreign labor. This phenomenon occurs in all below-replacement societies, whether European, American, or Asian, it is motivated by economic considerations, but raises fundamental issues on the national identity, social cohesion and integration of foreigners. In the first stages of depopulation (slow decrease), immigration can have a sizeable effect of numbers (it can delay and limit the population decline) but its impact on ageing is marginal, negligible ; thus, demographically speaking, immigration is not a response to the birth dearth. The question is to repair, to re-rectangularize the age pyramid : this would logically, mechanically imply a massive immigration of children, without their parents ; immigration should explicitly be selective by age with a proper balance between the sexes of the kids. Because the deficit is stronger among younger kids (babies). The younger the children, the stronger preference for them. Who could implement such a drastic solution, contrary to basic human rights and recalling universally condemned racist (or agist) practices like the slave trade ?

### III. Legitimacy and efficiency of population policy

#### 1) Legitimacy

The rationale behind a fertility reduction plan and a fertility increase programme is basically the same ; it is to ensure a societal equilibrium, by filling the gap between the number of desired children and the number of existing children. Where the fertility is "too high", the proportion of unwanted , not desired children is important and there is, according to the coined expression, a "latent demand for family planning". Conversely, where the fertility is "too low", many desired children never come to the world : there are obstacles to family formation and growth ; there is a corresponding "latent demand for family support". One of the key aspects of this response is the equalization of women's status ; historical and cross-sectional data suggest that there is a negative correlation between fertility and women's status, ; this is partially true and not valid any more in the latest stages of development, namely in post-transitional societies. In fact, the relation describes a U curve : in feminist societies like in Scandinavia, the fertility rate is not so depressed as compared to machist societies of Southern Europe. Having a child is an irreversible choice, a life-long commitment ; it requires time, energy and money ; most of the effort is done by the mothers ; the sacrifice is heavy for women who have often invested more in education than their partner ; if there is no measure alleviating the burden -in terms of money, time, childminding facilities- of young mothers, most of them stick to the one-child pattern. Feminism and pro-natalism work together. The

main reason for public intervention (state, regional, local bodies and private sector : corporations, enterprises) is to alleviate women's burden and improve their condition.

A second key motivation is the public interest : the wellbeing of future generations is jeopardized by the collapse of fertility, the survival of civilizations is also threatened and such an argument is essential in an international community which stresses the respect of cultural originality (or ethnic difference) and the value of "biodiversity". In any given country with an initial rectangular age structure, the perpetuation of very low fertility patterns along the European or Japanese lines results in the progressive extinction of new birth cohorts. Just about after a century, the application of the present total fertility rate of Italy to the French population would create an exponential decrease in the number of births falling from 750 000 to approximately 100 000 (Fig. 3). The issue is critical ; the willingness to keep population constant or to avoid depopulation would imply a total renewal of the human stock by massive immigration ; the picture is clear : under such circumstances, the natives would represent only a small minority. Are the present citizens and their private and public leaders in the business and political community ready to face this historical challenge ? In the name of equity and solidarity, the couples who take the responsibility to have children should be rewarded and not penalized, as it is the case in terms of social status and standard of living ; the survival of the cultural heritage and the viability of the welfare system are in their hands and this deserves more than lipservice. Beyond that consideration on equality, any pluralistic democracy has to preserve the possibility of free choice for all individuals ; when it deals with the number of children, free choice is purely theoretical : the cumulated cost of a child for his parents in terms of time, energy and money from birth to adulthood is huge ; it is a massive investment in human capital, the return of this investment is also huge, but it is no given back to the investors (the parents) ; it is absorbed by private companies, the state, pension funds and various organisations.

Many intellectuals tend to associate population policy and dictatorship or imperialism ; this is an oversimplified view. Pro-natalist policies were implemented by "rightist" (HITLER, FRANCO, MUSSOLINI etc) or "leftist" dictators (STALIN, CEAUCESCU, HONECKER, etc) at a time characterized by the scarcity of democracies ; but pro-natalist policies were also launched in democracies like France or Sweden. A similar argument could be used for anti-natalist policies : strong family programmes were imposed under authoritarian regimes, either military or communist, all over the developing continents ; the most extreme case is that contemporary China. The underlying problem concerns the respect of human rights ; this is a matter of political regime. Whether anti- or pro-natalist, a population policy

can work in a democracy, provided (i) it is given a real financial, political priority (ii) and it is built in accordance to social demand (improvement of working mother's daily life, greater economic consideration for children, compensation of the cost of children : family allowances, tax rebates, grants, parental leave, etc). If it is adapted to the needs of parents, and well explained to citizens, it is likely to become popular, even among the elderly ; they feel frustrated if they do not have grand-children when they grow in age.

## 2) Efficiency

There are many paradoxes among conventional demographic thinking. One of them relates to the impact of population policies ; the message that family "planning" (reduction) programmes work is well received and even fashionable among experts and the international community. Very few statisticians would dare to say that the fertility decline is a matter of "timing" and that the state policy did not alter the ultimate number of births, but only ... delayed them ! The argument is regularly opposed to experts who suggest social measures to stimulate fertility where is too low : "you will waste money : young couples will anticipate their family formation to take advantage of the benefits, but they will not change their ultimate family size". This view is fashionable, but strongly biased.

All the historical evidence shows the opposite fact. When a pro-natalist policy is well designed, it is efficient. Let us list some well-known examples : France was not really a victor of the second world war, but the country paradoxically experienced a stronger and longer baby-boom than other continental Allied. Since France was, until then, the country with the lowest fertility in the world for many decades ; there is no other convincing explanation than the vigor of the family policy of the time : by the year 1950, the share of expenditures devoted to children in the total social budget was 40 % (as compared to 10 % in 1996). At the same period (1945-1957) the German State of Saar was under the French rule, thus benefitting from the generous family policy of the time (high family allowances, important tax deductions) : the fertility rate was the highest of all German regions ; then the territory of Saar was ceded back to Western Germany, where family incentives were small ; the fertility dropped to the lowest level of all German regions. An other famous case, also borrowed from the Germany history is that of the former Eastern part of Germany : the GDR was facing heavy emigrations consequences, below-replacement fertility and depopulation ; by 1996, the government implemented a pro-natalist policy ; the fertility difference between the two parts of Germany began to grow markedly ; but this policy was dismantled after the reunification : working mothers, which were the social norm, lost their social protection and the fertility rate

fell by half in only two years (1,50 in 1990 ; 0,86 in 1992) there is nothing comparable in world peacetime history. Among birth cohorts fully affected by the family policy from 1976 onwards, like the 1955 female birth cohort, the percentage of women remaining childless is only 6 % in Eastern Germany, whereas it is 19,4 % in West Germany ; for the same birth cohort, the share of women having two children is 54 % in East Germany, instead of 37 % in West Germany.

The strongest lesson can be derived from present western Europe. The fertility differential between north and south that has emerged in the last two decades, is linked to the contrasting status of women. In a country like Italy, girls now have higher average levels of schooling than boys ; the age-old division of labor between the man (the provider) and woman (the mother tending the home) is no longer accepted. Now, young women wish to have other roles in life than that of spouse or mother, but the labor market is rigid, demanding, with very few opportunities of part-time jobs in the private sector. These young women no longer accept the family arrangements their mothers or grandmothers considered natural ; they have invested a lot in education, they have other expectations and ambitions ; having experienced equality during childhood, adolescence and early adulthood, they are looking for financial autonomy and they cannot tolerate subordination. The link between these attitudes and fertility behavior is direct (TFR has fallen to 1.2). A woman who engages in repeated childbearing runs the risk of being relegated to roles from which young women struggle to escape. By contrast, Sweden presents the highest level ever registered for the female labor force participation rate in a high-income industrialized country. But about half of jobs held by women are part-time, thus limiting the conflict between economic activity and fertility. For most women in Sweden, as in other advanced societies, career and family are both important ; Swedish social arrangements help assure that these two objectives can be balanced ; the paid parental leave, attributed from the first child currently replaces 80 % of the former wage or salary of either parent for at least one year ; access to creches is nearly universal ; family allowances are relatively high ; women have a strong presence in political bodies : thus their voice is heard and, through them, the interests of mothers and children are asserted. Empowerment of women ensures against a very low birth rate : in spite of severe budget cuttings in the social protection of families, the Swedish fertility rate remains much higher (1.6 in 1996) than the Italian or the Spanish one. It is the essence of the feminist paradox in advanced societies.

## Conclusion

The logics behind the population policy in basically the same for "too high" or "too low" fertility countries. As a mediator and protector of national interest, the state has to help people to realize their wishes and, as a consequence, to reduce the gap between the desired number of children and the real one. Appropriate measures as shown by public opinion polls can be implemented, in order to remove the obstacles to family reduction or to family increase. If this measures, as usual in common politics, are based on social demand and well explained to the electorate, they will presumably become popular, namely among women ; such a guess is certainly stronger in a society having a deep sense of identity (like the Japanese one), than in a different social fabric. In any case, the resistance motivated by the potential cost a such a policy is not convincing at all in the long run ; it only shows a preference for blockage, for immobility (or future depopulation) ; the cost of population overageing would be much higher than the cost of a sound family policy. Even in Sweden, where the social protection of children in the best in the OECD region, the share of social expenditures devoted to children represents only 1/6 of the total budget (table 7) ; the family policy is the core of human investment and a key to the future.

Jean-Claude CHESNAIS



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


Figure 1 : Total Fertility Rate in Italy, Sweden and EU-15 (1960-1996)

Average number of children per woman






Figure 3 THE FUTURE OF THE POPULATION OF FRANCE FROM 1993 TO 2093 UNDER DIFFERENT FERTILITY ASSUMPTIONS



a: 1,2 (italian-spanish pattern)  
 b: 1,5 (german pattern)  
 c: 1,8 (franco-british pattern)  
 d: 2,1 (replacement level)  
 e: 2,4 (baby-boom)






Table I : Population (million), natural increase and net migration (thousands)  
in the BU-15, 1960-1995

Year	Population* (million)	Births**	Deaths	Natural increase	Net migration
		B	D	B - D	
1960	314,8	5 784	3 386	2 398	43
1965	328,6	6 097	3 542	2 555	80
1970	340,0	5 495	3 679	1 816	- 390
1975	348,6	4 748	3 793	955	295
1980	354,6	4 630	3 737	893	588
1985	358,5	4 275	3 765	510	156
1990	363,7	4 379	3 721	658	1 030
1995**	371,6	3 980	3 650	330	600

\* As January 1st  
\*\* The peak was reached in 1964 with a total number of birth of 6,25 million  
\*\* Preliminary data  
Source : Eurostat : Population statistics 1996, Luxembourg, 1996.

Table 2 : Population of the five largest member countries of the EU-15 (millions), 1960-1996

Year	France	Germany (United)	Italy	Spain	U.K.	Total
1960	45,5	72,5	50,0	30,3	52,2	250,5
1970	50,5	78,3	53,7	33,6	55,5	271,6
1980	53,7	78,2	56,4	37,2	56,3	281,8
1990	56,6	79,1	56,7	38,8	57,5	288,7
1996	58,3	81,8	57,4	39,3	58,8	295,6

Source : Eurostat, op.cit.

Table 3 : Number of births (thousands) in France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the U.K. , 1960-1995

Year	France	Germany	Italy	Spain	U.K.	EU-15
1960	816	1 362	910	660	918	5 784
1965	862	1 325	990	674	997	6 097
1970	848	1 048	901	661	904	5 495
1975	745	782	828	669	698	4 748
1980	800	866	640	571	754	4 630
1985	768	814	577	456	751	4 275
1990	762	906	569	401	799	4 379
1995*						3 980

\* Provisional estimates  
Source : Eurostat

Table 4 : Total Fertility Rate (average number of children per woman)  
in France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden and the UK, 1960-1996

Year	France	Germany	Italy	Spain	Sweden	U.K.	EU-15
1960	2,73	2,37	2,41	2,86	2,20	2,72	2,59
1965	2,84	2,50	2,66	2,94	2,42	2,89	2,72
1970	2,47	2,03	2,42	2,90	1,92	2,43	2,38
1975	1,93	1,48	2,20	2,80	1,77	1,81	1,96
1980	1,95	1,56	1,64	2,20	1,68	1,90	1,82
1985	1,81	1,37	1,42	1,63	1,74	1,79	1,60
1990	1,78	1,45	1,34	1,34	2,13	1,83	1,57
1996*	1,70	1,30	1,20	1,15	1,60	1,75	1,40

\* Provisional estimates  
Source : Eurostat



Table 5 : Net reproduction rate, 1900-1996 : France, Germany, Italy, U.K

Period	France	Germany (present territory)	Italy	U.K.
1901-1910	0,97	1,48	1,38	1,23
1921-1930	0,93	0,90	1,31	0,93
1931-1940	0,89	0,88	1,17	0,83
1941-1950	1,10	0,83	1,08	1,03
1951-1960	1,26	1,01	1,04	1,11
1961-1970	1,29	1,12	1,15	1,28
1971-1980	0,98	0,74	0,98	0,92
1981-1990	0,88	0,70	0,68	0,87
1991-1995*	0,80	0,60	0,59	0,83
* Provisional data				

Table 6 : Total fertility rate (average number of children per woman), England and France since the mid-XVIIIth century (1750-1996)

Period	England*	France	Difference	Period	England*	France	Difference
1750-59	4,77	5,41	- 0,64	1881-90	4,36	3,25	+ 1,11
1760-69	4,88	5,21	- 0,33	1891-1900	3,76	2,93	+ 0,83
1770-79	5,21	5,07	+ 0,14	1901-10	3,27	2,69	+ 0,58
1780-89	5,24	5,13	+ 0,11	1911-20	2,62	1,95	+ 0,67
1790-99	5,67	4,92	+ 0,75	1921-30	2,20	2,36	- 0,16
1800-09	5,77	4,44	+ 1,33	1931-40	1,79	2,11	- 0,32
1810-19	6,08	4,38	+ 1,70	1941-50	2,20	2,55	- 0,35
1820-29	5,98	4,18	+ 1,80	1951-60	2,35	2,71	- 0,36
1830-39	5,25	3,75	+ 1,50	1961-70	2,72	2,72	0,00
1840-49	5,00	3,57	+ 1,43	1971-80	1,93	2,06	- 0,13
1850-60	4,97	3,43	+ 1,54	1981-90	1,79	1,82	- 0,03
1861-70	5,19	3,50	+ 1,69	1991-95	1,76	1,70	+ 0,06
1871-80	4,92	3,43	+ 1,49	1996	1,71	1,72	- 0,01

\* England and Wales for the period 1850-1980, U.K. from 1981 on wards  
Sources : 1) CHESNAIS, J.C. : The demographic transition..., Oxford University Press, 1992, chapter XI, for historical statistics 1750-1940.  
2) Vital statistics of each country since 1940.

Table 7 : Percentage of out of wedlock births in France, Germany, Italy  
Spain, Sweden and the U.K., 1960-1995

Year	France	Germany	Italy	Spain	Sweden	U.K.	EU-15
1960	6,1	7,6	2,4	2,3	11,3	5,2	5,1
1965	5,9	5,8	2,0	1,7	13,8	7,3	5,0
1970	6,9	7,2	2,2	1,4	18,6	8,0	5,6
1975	8,5	8,5	2,6	2,0	32,8	9,0	6,8
1980	11,4	11,9	4,3	3,9	39,7	11,5	9,6
1985	19,6	16,2	5,4	8,0	46,4	18,9	14,9
1990	30,1	15,3	6,5	9,6	47,0	27,9	19,6
1995*	36,8	15,4	8,3	11,5	52,0	32,5	23,0

\* Provisional estimates  
Source : Eurostat

Table 8 : Total social expenditure per inhabitant (in U.C.U.),  
and percentage spent for child support\* in France, Germany, Italy,  
Spain, Sweden and the U.K., 1994

Country	Social expenditure per head	Share of family support (%)
France	5 500	9,6
Germany	5 514	7,6
Italy	4 312	3,6
Spain	3 020	1,7
Sweden		16,6
U.K.	4 649	

Sources : 1) Eurostat : Basic statistics 1996  
2) Statistical Yearbook, Sweden  
\* not including health, education or housing

**On the Basic Viewpoint Regarding the Trend Toward  
Fewer Children**

**-- A Society of Decreasing Population: Responsibilities and  
Choices for the Future --**

**The Council on Population Problems  
of the Government of Japan**

**October, 1997**

**(Provisional Translation)**

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

- I. Introduction
  - The Trend Toward Fewer Children Should Serve As a Warning to Our Society --
  
- II. The Current State of the Fertility and the Population Prospects
  - A Population Decrease Is Now on Its Way --
  
  - 1 The Continuing Decline in the Number of Births
  
  - 2 The Unavoidable Depopulation of Japan
  
- III. The Effects of Fewer Children -- Negative Effects Mostly
  - 1 Effects on the Economy
    - (1) The Decrease in the Labor Force Population and its Subsequent Effects on the Economic Growth -- The possibility of a declining economic growth rate
    - (2) Effects on the Levels of Living -- The Possibility of a Hovering Net Income for the Working Population --
      - [1] Increasing Burdens for the Working Population In an Aging Society
      - [2] Hovering Net Income for the Working Population
  
  - 2 Effects on Society
    - (1) Transformation of the Family -- An Increase in the Number of Never married People and Households Without Children
    - (2) Effects on Children -- Concerns About Effects on the Healthy Growth of Children
    - (3) Transformation of the Community -- The Difficulty of Providing Basic Social and Health Services to Residents
  
- IV. Underlying Factors and the Background of the Trend Toward Fewer Children
  - 1 Underlying Factors For the Trend Toward Fewer Children
    - (1) A Rise in the Proportion Never Married (The Trend Toward Later Marriage and a Rise in the Celibacy Rate) -- The Burden of Child Rearing and of Reconciling Child Rearing Responsibilities with Work are Contributing to the Rise in the Proportion Never Married --
      - [1] The Current State of the Rise in the Proportion Never Married
      - [2] Factors for a Rise in the Proportion Never Married
        - 1. The Burden of Child Rearing and of Reconciling Child Rearing With Work
          - [A] Inflexible Employment Practices and the Corporate Culture
          - [B] Inflexible Attitudes Concerning the Social and Familial Roles of Men and Women
          - [C] Social Isolation of Mothers, Causing Them Feel Lonely and

Worried

- [D] Work Situations, Such as Long Commuting Times
  - [E] Easy-to-Use Nursery Care Services Are Not Widely Available
  - [F] An Increase in the Opportunity Costs Associated With Marriage and Child Rearing
  - 2. Changes in Attitudes Toward Marriage and in the Value System
    - [A] The Improving Economic Power of Women
    - [B] Liberation of Sexual Behaviors and the Outsourcing of Homemaking Services
    - [C] Changes in the Value of Children
    - [D] Weakening of Marriage as a Social Norm
    - [E] Desire for the Freedom Which is Associated With Single Life
  - 3. Hesitation Toward Having a Married Life Which is Independent of One's Parents
    - [A] The Comfort of Life at Home With One's Parents
    - [B] Maintaining the Same Levels of Living Prior to Marriage
  - 4. Others
    - [A] Female Dominant and Reliable Contraceptives Have Not Been Widely Used
    - [B] Marriage Squeeze for Men in Sparsely Populated Rural Villages
- (2) A Gap Between the Average Number of Children and the Ideal Number of Children for a Couple -- In Addition to the Burden of Child Rearing and of Reconciling Child Rearing With Work, the Economic Burden is Also a Factor In Not Having the Ideal Number of Children
- [1] The Gap Between the Average Number of Children and the Ideal Number of Children for a Couple
  - [2] Factors Behind the Gap Between the Average Number of Children and the Ideal Number of Children for a Couple
    - 1. Increased Direct Costs and Opportunity Costs Related to Child Rearing
    - 2. The Desire to Provide Children With a Better Life
    - 3. Others
      - [A] In Case of Infertility
      - [B] Concerns Over Childbirth Later in Life
- 2 Background for the Factors Leading to Trend Toward Fewer Children—the Diversification of Lifestyles of Individuals and Women's Advancement in Society on the One Hand, Inflexible Attitudes Concerning the Division of Social and Familial Roles Between Men and Women and Employment Practices Which Prevent the Advancement of Women on the Other —
- (1) Emergence of the Diversified Lifestyles of Individuals as Our Society Matures
  - (2) Women's Advancement in Society vis-a vis Inflexible Attitudes Toward the Division of Social and Familial Roles Between Men and Women and the Employment Practices Which Prevent Their Advancement, and the Existence of a Corporate Culture Which Supports Such Attitudes and Practices
    - [1] Women's Advancement in Society and the Decline in Fertility
    - [2] Factors Which Prevent Women From Leading Diversified Lifestyles

- (3) Hesitation to Leave a Comfortable Life Behind in One's Quest for Independence
  - [1] Hesitation to Leave One's Parents Even After Becoming an Adult
  - [2] One Perspective: Such Lifestyles May Threaten the Conventional Way of Life
  - [3] Another Perspective: Such Lifestyles Are the Result of Greater Freedom Concerning Marriage
- (4) Concerns About Today's and Future Society

## V. Responses to the Depopulation of Society as a Result of Trend Toward Fewer Children

- 1 Addressing the Impact of the Decrease in the Number of Children
  - (1) Addressing its Economic Impact
    - The necessity to tear down age- and gender-based barriers and create a new employment environment --
    - [1] Creating an Employment Environment Where Everyone who Wishes to Work Can Find Employment
      - 1. Improving the Employment Environment for the Elderly, People With Disabilities and Women
      - 2. Creating an Employment Environment Free of Age- and Gender-based Barriers
      - 3. Reexamining Fixed Conventional Employment Practices Under the Lifetime Employment and Seniority-based Wage System
      - 4. Resolving the Mismatch Between Supply and Demand in the Labor Force
    - [2] Maintaining the Vitality and Competitiveness of Businesses and the Vitality of Individuals
      - 1. Creating New Industrial Sectors With Higher Added Value
      - 2. Creating an Internationally Attractive Business Environment
      - 3. Keeping the National Burden Below a Certain Level, as Well as Realizing a Fiscal Structure Which Is Suitable for an Aged Society With Fewer Children
    - [3] Establishing an Equitable and Stable Social Security System
      - 1. Achieving Equity in Terms of Both the Benefit and Burden Between the Working Population and Future Generations and Resolving Concerns for the Future
      - 2. Preventing People From Becoming Ill and Bedridden, and Encouraging the Social Participation of the Elderly
  - (2) Addressing its Social Impact -- The Need to Strengthen Our System of Local Governments and Improve the Content of Education --
    - [1] Strengthening the Local Government System and Revitalizing Local Communities
      - 1. Strengthening the Local Government System
      - 2. Revitalizing Local Communities
    - [2] Education That Nurtures Children's Creativity and Sociability, and Healthy Upbringing
      - 1. Nurturing Creative Talent



2. Arrangements That Nurture Children's Social Skills
- 2 Addressing the Factors Underlying the Trend Toward Fewer Children
    - (1) The Pros and Cons of Addressing the Factors Underlying the Trend Toward Fewer Children -- Removing the Impediments to Marrying and Having Children –
      - [1] Positions Against Addressing the Underlying Factors
        1. Specific Viewpoints
        2. Opinions on the Viewpoint That Leaves the Fertility Decision Up to the Individuals
        3. Opinions on the Viewpoint That Sees the Fertility Issues in the Context of Global Population Problem
        4. Opinions on the Viewpoint Which are Doubtful About the Effectiveness of Policy Measures
      - [2] Positions for Addressing the Underlying Factors
      - [3] Society's Responsibility in the Child Rearing Process
      - [4] Issues to Be Aware of in Addressing the Factors Underlying the Trend Toward Fewer Children
      - [5] The Relationship Between Addressing the Underlying Factors and Receiving Foreign Immigrants
    - (2) How to Address the Factors Underlying the Trend Toward Fewer Children -- Correcting the Fixed Division of Roles Between Men and Women and the Inflexible Employment Practices, and Effectively Promoting Support for Child-rearing –
      - [1] Correcting the Fixed Division of Roles Between Men and Women and Inflexible Employment Practices
        1. Correcting the Public's Perspectives, Social Practices and Systems
          - A) Reexamining the Systems, the Public's Perspectives and the Corporate Culture
          - B) Promoting the Idea of Reconciling Work With Family Life
        2. Issues to Be Discussed in the Near Future
          - A) Social Practices Regarding Work Treated as the Top Priority
          - B) Concerning Female Employment
          - C) Concerning Diversity in Work Arrangements
          - D) Inequities in Treatment Among Full-time Employees, Part-time Employees and the Non-employed
      - [2] Comprehensive and Effective Promotion of Various Child-Rearing Support Measures
        1. Promoting the Angel Plan
          - A) Efforts to Support Working Parents in Their Efforts to Raise a Family
          - B) Support in Raising Children at Home
          - C) Creation of a Housing and Living Environment Which Is Supportive of Child Rearing
          - D) A More Flexible Education System and Promoting the Healthy and Wholesome Growth of Children
          - E) Reducing Child Rearing Costs

2. Important Points From the Perspective of Addressing the Factors Underlying the Trend Toward Fewer Children
    - A) Addressing the increasing opportunity cost of raising children
    - B) Supporting Working Parents in Their Efforts to Raise a Family
    - C) Dealing with Issues Related to the Spread of Nuclear Families and Progress in Urbanization
    - D) Measures to Alleviate the Economic Burden of Child Rearing
    - E) Rediscovering the Joy and Pleasure of Child Rearing
    - F) Measures to support the employment of female workers who have infants/toddlers
  3. Issues to Be Studied
    - A) Issues on improving the employment environment
    - B) Issues on Child Rearing Support
- [3] Issues Requiring Further Discussion
1. Response to Those who Cannot Have Children due to Infertility
  2. Diversified Family Styles

VI. Conclusion -- Making Our Society With Its Decreasing Population a "Relaxing, Accommodating and Caring Society" –

## **I. Introduction -- The Trend Toward Fewer Children Should Serve As a Warning to Our Society --**

### **[A Population Decrease For Our Society Is Now on its Way]**

The total fertility rate of Japan has fallen dramatically in recent years. To describe this ongoing drop in the national fertility, the phrase "the 1.57 shock" was coined in 1990. This rate continued to drop in subsequent years, substantially bypassing the level required to maintain the current population in the long-term. This means that as the lower fertility further reduces the number of children, our society will also see a decrease in the working age population, and ultimately, a decrease in the overall population. Thus, a population decrease will be observed in our society.

In addition, the continuing below-replacement fertility (the trend toward fewer children) coupled with the extension in the average life span, is accelerating the aging of the population. Japan will soon become a society with fewer children and an aged population, the first of its kind in history -- a society where the demographic composition of the young and the elderly will be quite different from those of the past.

The lower fertility and continued population aging could have a serious impact on the structure and well-being of Japan's society and economy in a number of ways. This trend is deeply related to the way in which our society is structured. We should interpret these trends as a warning to our society.

### **[For the Sake of Future Generations We Must Have a Clear Vision of the Future ]**

It is essential that we have a clear vision of what kind of a society we would deem desirable for future generations in Japan. We must then clearly determine how we should endeavor to realize such a vision. Most importantly, we must clearly understand that this problem is one which faces the entire nation. This is one of the primary responsibilities of the present generation for future generations.

It is envisioned that the impending decrease in population is much more threatening to our society than assumed in the past. In order to meet this challenge, we must carry out drastic reforms such as the ongoing structural reforms of the economy, social security system, government finance system and others. In the face of this challenge, we cannot afford to be optimistic, however, about the future of a society with a decreasing population even if we are successful in implementing these structural reforms.

Consequently, it is critically important that we probe into the underlying factors of the trend toward fewer children from a broad perspective. We must understand that these factors are deeply related to questions about how our entire society should be structured, including such issues as the inflexible attitudes toward the roles of men and women and employment practices. Along with the structural reforms mentioned above, we must make compelling efforts to grapple with other reforms which will have an impact on virtually all aspects of Japanese society, by

creating a gender-equal society in which independence and self-realization of individual men and women can be achieved.

### **[Discussions Held at the Council on Population Problems to Date]**

With this perspective, the council has listened to opinions from leading figures in various fields and it has also held "Citizens' Forums on a Society With Fewer Children," which were held nationwide, beginning in February of this year. Based on the results gained from these hearings and forums, we summarized some basic viewpoints on the appropriate responses to the trend toward fewer children and the resulting decrease in our population. We would like to present a report on this issue for the purpose of encouraging discussion throughout the nation.

## **II. The Current State of the Fertility and the Population Prospects -- A Population Decrease Is Now on Its Way --**

### **1. The Continuing Decline in the Number of Births**

The Japanese fertility has fallen dramatically in recent years. The total fertility rate (TFR) (see note.) was stable at around 2.1 from 1965 to 1974, but it dropped to 1.42 in 1995, substantially bypassing the 2.08 threshold which is the level required to maintain the current population in the coming years.

With such a decline in fertility, the number of births, which was over two million in the early 1970's, dropped to approximately 1.2 million in 1995 – a level which is about 60% of the previous level. With the continuing decline in the number of births, the number of children of aged 14 and younger, those who will lead our country into the next age, has been decreasing since the early 1980's. This number, which was over 27 million and which accounted for 24% of the population in those days, has now dropped to approximately 20 million or just 16% of the population.

At the same time, population aging in Japan is in progress at a rate which no other country has ever experienced. The population aged 65 and older was hovering at around 7% in early 1970's, but jumped to about 15% in 1995, effectively doubling in about 25 years. The number of years spent to reach this level was much shorter in Japan compared to the 114 years needed in France, 82 years in Sweden, and the relatively shorter 46 years in England and 42 years in Germany.

As a result, the demographic structure of Japan has significantly changed in recent years.

[Note] This is the sum of the fertility by age for women aged 15-49; the average number of children born to a woman over the course of her lifetime, assuming that a woman gives birth to a child throughout her life with the age-specific fertility rates observed in that year. Therefore, we need to bear in mind that, in general, with the age of marriage on the increase, there is a corresponding increase in the age at which women have their first child, and this is one of the causes for the drop in the total fertility rate. When the age of marriage eventually stabilizes, in turn stabilizing the child delivery age for the first child, the total fertility rate should recover to some extent.

## **2. The Unavoidable Depopulation of Japan**

According to an announcement in January, 1997 entitled "Population Projections for Japan (National Institute of Population Problems and Social Security Research)," the medium variant for the working age population will drop, thereby steadily decreasing the total population. This conclusion is based on a prediction that the fertility will recover from the present level to some extent, but will not reach the population replacement level, and that with such a low fertility, the trend toward fewer children will progress.

In more specific terms, the working age population (see note) has been getting smaller after reaching a peak in 1995. Subsequently, the total population is predicted to reach a peak in 2007, then begin to decrease. It is also predicted that the total population will stand at about 100 million in 2050, about 20% less than the present population of about 126 million, while the population aged 65 and older, combined with the extended average life span, will account for 27% in 2025 and 32% of the total population in 2050.

[Note] The working age population in this context relates to the population aged 15 to 64 based on the traditional practices. There is another opinion, however, that this definition does not correspond to the actual status of our society and that it is more appropriate to define the working age population as the population aged 20 to 64. Additionally, when the working age population is defined as described above, the peak is expected to be reached in 1998. In either case, it will decrease before a decrease is observed in the total population.

Further, even with the high variant based on the assumption that the future fertility will be considerably higher than the current level, it is predicted that the trend toward fewer children will continue to predominate.

The low variant for the total population is 92 million, a figure which is below the level of 100 million, about a 30% decrease in the current population, assuming even the current fertility cannot be maintained.

Based on such an outlook for the future (namely, an unavoidable progress in the trend toward fewer children), the council studied the possible effects as well as the underlying factors and background of the trend, and the appropriate responses to deal with the decreasing population.

### **III. The Effects of Fewer Children -- Negative Effects Mostly**

#### **[Predictions Under the Existing Systems]**

Assuming that current trends continue without a reform of the existing systems, the following are predicted to be the principal effects.

#### **1. Effects on the Economy**

**(1) The Decrease in the Labor Force Population and its Subsequent Effects on the Economic Growth -- The possibility of a declining economic growth rate**

### **[The Decrease in the Labor Force Population]**

A continuing trend toward fewer children will lead especially to a decrease in the working age population, resulting in a shrinking labor force population.

According to the Labor Ministry's June, 1997 estimates of future labor force population, the current labor force population of about 67 million will begin to decrease in 2006, shrinking to about 63 million by the year 2025.

### **[Changes in the Age Structure of the Labor Force Population]**

At present, workers aged 60 and older constitute about 13% of the total labor force population. Assuming that current policies to promote the employment of the elderly are effective, the age structure of the labor force will undergo major changes, and this percentage is expected to reach about 21% by the year 2025.

Given that a large percentage of elderly workers prefer to work shorter hours (although there are individual differences), there is concern that such changes in the age structure of the labor force will lead to a decrease in the labor supply when actual working hours are taken into consideration. Under these circumstances, a further concern is the effect on the supply of labor in areas such as long-term care and nursing, for which demand is expected to increase as the population ages.

### **[The Possibility of a Declining Economic Growth Rate]**

A reduced or limited labor force will inhibit increases in labor productivity, and will also inhibit investment as saving rates decline due to an increase in the percentage of retired workers who ordinarily tend to spend their savings.

If the labor supply in fact decreases and labor productivity stagnates, it is possible that economic growth will tend to decrease in the future.

### **(2) Effects on the Levels of Living -- The Possibility of a Hovering Net Income for the Working Population --**

Along with the slower economic growth due to a shrinking labor supply and stagnant labor productivity as mentioned under (1), the increase of the burden of social security expenses, which cannot be avoided as the population ages, will have a serious impact on the levels of living.

### **[1] Increasing Burdens for the Working Population In an Aging Society**

As the trend toward fewer children continues and the average life span grows, the elderly will eventually make up a larger percentage of the population, resulting in an aged society with few children. As a result, the burden for the working population will increase in areas of social security including pensions, medical care and social services, and this will be a major factor in increasing the transfer of income between generations.

According to the Health and Welfare Ministry's September, 1997 projections of benefits and the burden of payments for social security, social security benefits, which amounted to 65 trillion yen in fiscal 1995, will rise to between 216 and 274 trillion yen in nominal value by 2025, while the percentage of national income devoted to social security benefits is expected to rise from 18.5% to between 29.5% and 35.5%.

Even if public expenditures other than social security remain at their current level (about 20%) as a percentage of national income, the future ratio of the national burden (the burden of taxation and social security) as a percentage of national income will exceed 50% (between 50% and 56%) if the current system remains in effect.

We also need to consider the fact that fiscal deficits will increase the ratio of public burden in the future.

## **[2] Hovering Net Income for the Working Population**

If the various structural reforms now under discussion are not implemented and current trends continue, the alarming prediction has been made that a decline in the growth of per capita income and an increase in the ratio of the so-called national burden could possibly cause a decrease in net income for the working population, which is the balance of gross income remaining after subtracting taxes and social insurance premiums.

A society where the working population is not rewarded for their efforts with an improved level of living, may face the serious risk of having its economic and social vitality undermined in the areas of both productivity and consumption.

## **2. Effects on Society**

### **(1) Transformation of the Family -- An Increase in the Number of Never-married People and Households Without Children**

The fundamental unit of our society is the family, and family structures are undergoing major changes and diversification as the number of never-married people and households without children increases, and the trend toward fewer children continues. In particular, the increase in the number of never-married people implies an increase in the number of people who do not build a family at all, raising the possibility of a fundamental change in the very concept of "family." In addition, the increase in the number of single elderly people leads to increased demand for long-term care and other forms of social support. As the number of households without children grows, the result could be a severing of family lineages, and a potentially diminished awareness of ancestors.

### **(2) Effects on Children -- Concerns About Effects on the Healthy Growth of Children**

There is the concern that as the number of children decreases, the healthy growth of our country's children may be adversely affected. For example, it may be difficult to nurture social skills in children if they are overprotected and have few opportunities to interact with other children, especially children of different ages.

### **(3) Transformation of the Community -- The Difficulty of Providing Basic Social and Health Services to Residents**

Many communities are already experiencing a loss of population, and this phenomenon is expected to spread as the trend toward fewer children continues and the population decreases naturally, becoming a national issue rather than just an issue for some specific communities. The number of depopulated areas is also expected to increase. Thus, it is expected that by the year 2025, the aging and depopulation which has been so noticeable in rural villages will have spread to wider areas, with about a third of the population in most prefectures being 65 years old or more.

There is concern that under the existing systems of local administration, these trends may hinder the operation of our social services and health insurance systems, for example, making it difficult for municipalities to provide basic social and health services to their residences.

In the future, rapid aging is also expected to occur in large urban areas, bringing a variety of associated problems to the fore.

#### **[Generally Negative Effects Are Indicated]**

As shown above, although there are varying opinions about the transformation of the family, the effects of the trend toward fewer children are often seen as being generally negative.

However, it should be remembered that there are some who point out positive effects as well, including benefits in daily living. Examples of such benefits would be: decreased environmental impact, a less restricted living environment due to improvements in the problems of population density in large urban areas and elsewhere (such as housing and land space and traffic congestion), increases in the per capita social capital, and educational benefits such as being able to allocate more resources per student and relaxation of competition in school entrance examinations.

In response to these views, it has been pointed out that these are short-term impacts, that people's lives will be more restricted if the levels of living drop due to decreased economic growth, and that rather than increasing in quality, educational services will in fact become more limited as the population shrinks.

In any case, it is certain that the trend toward fewer children will have immeasurable effects on many aspects of our society.



#### **IV. Underlying Factors and the Background of the Trend Toward Fewer Children**

It is essential that we analyze the underlying factors and background behind the trend toward fewer children as a basis for studying how we can cope with a society with a decreasing population which results from that trend.

##### **1. Underlying Factors For the Trend Toward Fewer Children**

###### **(1) A Rise in the Proportion Never Married (The Trend Toward Later Marriage and a Rise in the Celibacy Rate) -- The Burden of Child Rearing and of Reconciling Child Rearing Responsibilities with Work are Contributing to the Rise in the Proportion Never Married --**

The tendency of people to marry later is an important factor in the decline in the fertility in recent years, and this in turn, is contributing to the trend toward fewer children. Though the increasing celibacy rate has not yet had a significant impact on the recent decline in fertility so far, it is estimated that this will likely become a major factor for a drop in the fertility in the long run.

###### **[1] The Current State of the Rise in the Proportion Never Married**

###### **[Changes in the Proportion Never Married by Age]**

The number of people who have never been married is increasing in terms of their percentage of the entire population. This is true for both men and women, indicating the tendency of people to marry at a later age. This is particularly remarkable among men aged 25-34 and women aged 20-29. The mean age at first marriage is becoming higher for both men and women. Additionally, the celibacy rate (the proportion of people never married at aged 50) is on the rise.

###### **[The Effect on Fertility]**

The ratio of births outside of marriage is about 1% in Japan, which is a great deal lower than the figure in some foreign countries (around 50% in Sweden and Denmark, and over 30% in England and France). Marriage constitutes a precondition for giving birth in most cases in Japan. In addition, the older a woman is, the lower her fertility (the possibility of becoming pregnant) becomes, although individual differences may apply. There is also a certain age limit inherent in the capability to conceive and give birth. Taking those factors into consideration, the progressing trend of later marriage is the main factor in the recent decline in the nation's fertility. Furthermore, it is predicted that the continuing rise in the celibacy rate will become a major factor in further reducing fertility in the future.

###### **[2] Factors for a Rise in the Proportion Never Married**

###### **[A Rise in the Proportion Never Married Despite a Strong Desire for Marriage]**

Pressure from society such as to consider a person a responsible adult only after marriage or to view marriage as a norm has been fading away. Also, a traditional view that one should get married at least to some extent out of one's sense of duty for their family line and parents is being replaced by a more individualistic view. The nature and structure of modern day marriage is considered a matter that should be left to the individual. Thus, the public attitude toward marriage has become increasingly liberal. On the other hand, approximately 90% of the men and women who have never been married say that they intend to "marry some day" when asked about their own marriage prospects. Although Japan exhibits a much stronger tendency for both men and women to perceive 'the marriage of a woman' as a positive development than other countries, the proportion never married is increasing.

According to the results of public opinion surveys on the causes for the increasing incidence of later marriage and public attitudes toward children, the following were pointed out as main underlying factors for the rise in the proportion never married.

## **1. The Burden of Child Rearing and of Reconciling Child Rearing With Work**

### **[A] Inflexible Employment Practices and the Corporate Culture**

Inflexible employment practices which justify (under the lifetime employment system that has been supporting job security) long working hours, transfers of employees to remote regions, etc. and expect workers to prioritize their work over their family, continue to persist in our country. Also the organizational culture of companies and administrative organizations among others (referred as the "corporate culture" hereinafter), which supports such practices has been maintained. At the same time, with women's advancement in society, working women consider it convenient to stay single in order to continue to hold the job that they like.

### **[B] Inflexible Attitudes Concerning the Social and Familial Roles of Men and Women**

There are deep-rooted and inflexible attitudes with regard to the roles of men and women. Generally, these attitudes embrace the notion that it is natural for men to take the role of worker and for women to focus on homemaking/child rearing. Additionally, the time spent by Japanese men to participate in homemaking/child rearing is extremely short when compared with their counterparts in other countries. This reflects the fact that men's participation in those areas is not making progress. These factors are the cause for women associating marriage with a substantial burden. At present, the burden of long-term care for the elderly, which is expected to expand in the future, is mostly borne by women if the elderly live at home. This brings forth yet another aspect of the burden to be faced for by women in our society.

Further, men have strong attitudes toward the divided roles between men and women. Therefore, in most cases, they are not willing to choose marriage and

having children if that means that they should go all the way to participate in homemaking/child rearing.

### **[C] Social Isolation of Mothers, Causing Them Feel Lonely and Worried**

Along with the progress in the development of nuclear families and urbanization, it is becoming difficult for mothers to receive the support they need for child rearing from their relatives and neighbors. This, in addition to the situation above, places mothers in an isolated position and often forces them to deal with feelings of loneliness and anxiety. The psychological and physical burden in child rearing is made much more severe because of this, especially during infancy, when it requires a great deal of work.

In addition, communities were once regarded as safe places for children to play, and one could scold the children of other families when they misbehaved. However, the loss of these community bonds has further increased the burden and anxiety among parents even during the period when a child is in school.

### **[D] Work Situations, Such as Long Commuting Times**

The progress in urbanization and the increase in the number of people who work for others (as opposed to being self-employed) have created adverse work situations such as long commuting times and inflexible working hours. This has placed an even more severe burden on couples who are rearing children.

### **[E] Easy-to-Use Nursery Care Services Are Not Widely Available**

Nursery care services which meet working women's needs are difficult to find.

### **[F] An Increase in the Opportunity Costs Associated With Marriage and Child Rearing**

Under the circumstances described above, with an increase in the average wage for women, there are now more benefits which might be lost (the so-called "opportunity costs" of marriage and child rearing) as a result of giving up continued employment and choosing marriage and child rearing instead.

## **2. Changes in Attitudes Toward Marriage and in the Value System**

### **[A] The Improving Economic Power of Women**

Progress in women's employment outside the home has improved the economic position of women in our society. As a result, women do not feel it is as essential as they once did to marry to assure their future income security. In addition, women can feel more fulfilled by their work.

### **[B] Liberation of Sexual Behaviors and the Outsourcing of Homemaking Services**

With the liberation of sexual behaviors and the outsourcing of homemaking services, men's need for marriage has weakened.

### **[C] Changes in the Value of Children**

Due to the presence of a substantial pension system in Japan, changes in the attitudes toward supporting one's parents, among other factors, the importance of children as successors for the family and as a means of support for one's retired life has weakened. As the need to have children as a source of support for their retired period has lessened, the necessity for marriage to serve that purpose has also decreased.

### **[D] Weakening of Marriage as a Social Norm**

With a decrease in likelihood of the general public to view marriage as the norm, it is easier to choose a lifestyle, in which one is not expected to marry, or to choose not to rush into marriage, especially in urban areas.

Further, the pressure from society for marriage has weakened, and arranged marriages have become less common. At the same time, there are a number of young people who have difficulty in socializing with the opposite sex. For example, 40% of young people say they "do not have friends of the opposite sex."

### **[E] Desire for the Freedom Which is Associated With Single Life**

Various services have become more available and offer enhanced convenience in daily living, and a culture representing the young generation has been prospering. These factors have made single life more attractive, resulting in the stronger pursuit of the freedom which single life offers.

## **3. Hesitation Toward Having a Married Life Which is Independent of One's Parents**

As the reason for choosing single life, the top reason given by both men and women is "I have not met a suitable partner." Although what constitutes a "suitable partner" seems to involve various elements, the following situations for the current young generation can be considered as factors for a rise in the proportion of people who have never married.

### **[A] The Comfort of Life at Home With One's Parents**

Living with parents who have assets and economic strength allows one to enjoy (a) the financial support of their parents, or to live basically for free even when one is earning income, (b) their parents' care including meals and laundry, and at the same time, (c) your own room and no interference from parents. Such a free and comfortable life causes some people to become hesitant about marriage which calls for becoming independent of one's parents.

### **[B] Maintaining the Same Levels of Living Prior to Marriage**

As for the conditions women consider and emphasize in choosing their marriage partner, economic strength is second to personality. Under the circumstances described in [A], if women who desire to be a full-time homemaker do not want a lower level of living after marriage, the men they choose need to have a substantially high income. This is considered to be one of the elements that can make the conditions for marriage more difficult to satisfy for men.

#### 4. Others

**[A] Female Dominant and Reliable Contraceptives Have Not Been Widely Used**  
Since no female dominant and reliable contraceptives have been widely used in Japan, it is difficult for women to take decisive control over their reproductive life. Women's concerns about their reproductive health over a lifelong period and about losing a control of the direction of their life tend to keep them from marrying.

**[B] Marriage Squeeze for Men in Sparsely Populated Rural Villages**  
It can be difficult for men who are to succeed to the family business in sparsely populated rural villages to find a partner even if they wish to marry.

#### **(2) A Gap Between the Average Number of Children and the Ideal Number of Children for a Couple -- In Addition to the Burden of Child Rearing and of Reconciling Child Rearing With Work, the Economic Burden is Also a Factor In Not Having the Ideal Number of Children**

##### **[1] The Gap Between the Average Number of Children and the Ideal Number of Children for a Couple**

The ideal number of children for a couple is 2.6 according to fertility surveys, while the average number of children is 2.2, indicating that a certain gap exists between the number of children people want and the number they ultimately have.

The figures for both the average number of children and the ideal number of children for a couple have remained relatively similar since around 1975. Therefore, it cannot be said that this gap between the two numbers has directly triggered the recent decline in fertility in a strict sense. However, we have decided that this issue should be analyzed in studying how we should respond to the impending decrease in population.

##### **[2] Factors Behind the Gap Between the Average Number of Children and the Ideal Number of Children for a Couple**

The results of fertility surveys on the reasons for not having the ideal number of children point to the burden of child rearing and of reconciling child rearing with work as described in [2]-1 under (1). The economic burden related to child rearing, shown in the following, can be also pointed out as a reason.

#### **1. Increased Direct Costs and Opportunity Costs Related to Child Rearing**

The direct costs related to child rearing have increased. Particularly, the idea that children should be a successor to carry on for the family and that children provide support to their parents in their retired life has weakened. By contrast, the idea that having children gives purpose to one's life and that children brighten a home has become stronger. The direct costs spent on child rearing have increased, because caring for and spending money on children, including the provision of a good education, have become costly. Further, as stated in the above, the benefits which might be lost as a result of giving up continued employment and choosing

marriage and child rearing instead (opportunity costs for child rearing) have increased.

## **2. The Desire to Provide Children With a Better Life**

Some people believe that it is preferable for parents who want to provide their children with a better life to have fewer children, so they can be assured of having enough money to provide them with a good education and to enable them to inherit their parents' real estate.

## **3. Others**

### **[A] In Case of Infertility**

There are cases, where infertility can disable a woman from having children despite her desire for motherhood.

### **[B] Concerns Over Childbirth Later in Life**

There are concerns over giving birth to a child at an advanced age.

There are some who presume that an increase in the stress related to the extreme competition in our society and the liberation of sexual values might have reduced the level of libido (the energy which fuels sexual desire) between spouses/ They say that this could be also viewed as a factor in couples having less than the ideal number of children.

### **[Those Women Who Pursue Continued Employment After Marriage and Childbirth Are Not in the Majority]**

In examining the underlying factors for the reduction in the number of children, as pointed out above, we should bear in mind the following: (a) although women's desire to work is getting stronger, a good number of women still wish to be a full-time homemaker in the customary Japanese tradition in which wives tend to have control over the spending for the family, and (b) although an increasing number of women try to pursue both work and homemaking/child rearing, women who pursue continued employment are not the majority in the present severe environment for employment.

## **2. Background for the Factors Leading to Trend Toward Fewer Children—the Diversification of Lifestyles of Individuals and Women's Advancement in Society on the One Hand, Inflexible Attitudes Concerning the Division of Social and Familial Roles Between Men and Women and Employment Practices Which Prevent the Advancement of Women on the Other —**

### **[A Situation Faced by All of Japanese Society]**

Based on the previous analysis of the underlying factors for people having fewer children, what we find in the background is the increasingly diverse lifestyles of individuals, which can be observed in almost any country which has a vibrant, growing economy, as illustrated below. Also, the trend is deeply related to the situation faced by all of Japanese society, where the expansion of material

production and consumption has been prioritized and has been enjoyed by people in an atmosphere of rigidly divided roles between men and women in both family and corporate activities.

### **(1) Emergence of the Diversified Lifestyles of Individuals as Our Society Matures**

As a society matures from the economic perspective, it is almost natural for individuals to seek a diversified lifestyle. This phenomenon has been commonly seen in most developed countries. The rise in the proportion of people who have never been married can be considered as one of the indications of this phenomenon.

### **(2) Women's Advancement in Society vis-a vis Inflexible Attitudes Toward the Division of Social and Familial Roles Between Men and Women and the Employment Practices Which Prevent Their Advancement, and the Existence of a Corporate Culture Which Supports Such Attitudes and Practices**

#### **[1] Women's Advancement in Society and the Decline in Fertility**

The decline in fertility has come about, to a large extent, as women have made significant social advancements. At first individuals seek a diversified lifestyle as described in (1), and then they tend to view marriage and child rearing as a major hurdle.

#### **[2] Factors Which Prevent Women From Leading Diversified Lifestyles**

However, we should not allow ourselves to think that women's social advancement itself is the problem. Despite the fact that women's desire to lead a diversified lifestyle should be realized, we should recognize that marriage and child rearing are sometimes viewed as restricting an individual's freedom, and can cause some women to feel a sense of burden and anxiety toward marriage and child rearing. This is due to the Japanese people's inflexible attitudes toward, and practices thereof, the divided roles between men and women. These attitudes allow people to become comfortable with the idea that men should play the role as the worker and women should involve themselves in homemaking and child rearing only. The deeply-rooted employment practices and corporate culture which prioritizes work over family is also responsible for the stress felt by many women. We should conclude that this attitude is, in itself, part of the problem.

Furthermore, this suggests the need for a review of our country's inflexible and rigid employment practices such as male-centered lifetime employment and seniority-based wage system, which discourages changing jobs and finding other employment, and which regards women as short-term employees.

### **(3) Hesitation to Leave a Comfortable Life Behind in One's Quest for Independence**

#### **[1] [Hesitation to Leave One's Parents Even After Becoming an Adult]**

In the aforementioned cases in which single adults are living with their parents and enjoying a comfortable life, they are hesitant to leave their parents to pursue

an independent life, though they may wish to one day get married and have children. Sometimes parents are too attached to their adult children to encourage them to seek independence.

As symbolized by this situation, we could probably say that the trend of people having fewer children is partially attributable to living a lifestyle that does not prioritize economic and psychological independence due to one's desire for a comfortable life and vague concerns about living an independent family life, along with the social acceptance of such a lifestyle. Some have pointed out that the trend of having fewer children may also be attributable to an increasing number of young people who tend to avoid close relationships with others for fear of being hurt from the relationship. Others have pointed out that while the instance of arranged marriages is declining in number, neither have people's perspectives nor has the cultural environment matured enough to value the goal of a man and a woman fostering their own relationship based on mutual feelings of love and respect.

#### **[2] One Perspective: Such Lifestyles May Threaten the Conventional Way of Life**

Concerns have been expressed about the above-mentioned lifestyle and the social acceptance of it, as they may threaten the conventional sense of a normative lifestyle and society. Traditionally, the notion that people could grow up, become independent from one's parents and raise a family at one's own responsibility has been taken for granted.

#### **[3] Another Perspective: Such Lifestyles Are the Result of Greater Freedom Concerning Marriage**

On the other hand, others believe that we should not focus on the negative aspect of the phenomenon, for the result is greater freedom concerning marriage and people taking more time to find the best potential spouse without hurrying into marriage.

#### **(4) Concerns About Today's and Future Society**

Still others feel that the recent drop in fertility may be a reflection of a nationwide feeling that we have reached a dead end, concerns over their post-retirement life including pension and long-term care, and vague concerns regarding the stresses in society that have led to the problem of bullying and deterioration in public safety and order within the community.

### **V. Responses to the Depopulation of Society as a Result of Trend Toward Fewer Children**

#### **[Quite Serious Conditions Arriving in the Mid-21st Century]**

Opinions greatly vary concerning how we should view a situation involving a decreasing population, such as the one which is expected to emerge in the future. We also should be aware that all quantitative projections are made based on certain predefined assumptions.



As we discussed earlier, however, it is beyond doubt that the trend toward fewer children will bring about an immeasurable impact on various aspects of our society. Even if the ongoing structural reforms are fully implemented, we cannot have a very optimistic projection of our society in 2025. All the more, as Japan is expected to see a trend toward even fewer children and continued population aging, it is foreseeable that Japan will face a quite serious situation in many aspects by the mid-21st century.

### **[Urgent Efforts Are Required to Address the Issues Associated With a Decreasing Population]**

As Japan is surely going to experience a situation it has never experienced before where the population constantly decreases and population aging continually progresses, for the sake of future generations, we must have a vision for the coming society. We must therefore urgently study how to respond to the challenges posed by the issues associated with the decreasing population by addressing both the impact of the trend toward fewer children and the underlying factors for this trend.

#### **1. Addressing the Impact of the Decrease in the Number of Children**

As we discuss the measures needed to deal with the issues associated with the decreasing population, we must ensure that measures in various fields are carried out to minimize the negative impact caused by the trend toward fewer children.

##### **(1) Addressing its Economic Impact**

-- The necessity to tear down age- and gender-based barriers and create a new employment environment --

##### **[1] Creating an Employment Environment Where Everyone who Wishes to Work Can Find Employment**

###### **1. Improving the Employment Environment for the Elderly, People With Disabilities and Women**

To ensure that our future society with a decreasing population will be vibrant, we need to alleviate the decrease in the labor force population. A reduced labor supply will trigger demand for additional workers from among women and the elderly. Hence, it is important that we provide an environment where women can easily find employment and the elderly and people with disabilities, who have not always been able to utilize their ability despite their willingness to work, can be employed and work energetically.

###### **2. Creating an Employment Environment Free of Age- and Gender-based Barriers**

Moreover, the future direction is to provide an employment environment where everybody who wishes to work can find employment and can choose a suitable working arrangement from among a variety of options. Specifically, we are being called on to create a new employment environment that is free of all age and gender barriers. With regard to the improved employment environment for women, it is

particularly important that we expand measures to support working mothers in their efforts to raise children, so that the employment of women will not lead to a further decline in the fertility.

### **3. Reexamining Fixed Conventional Employment Practices Under the Lifetime Employment and Seniority-based Wage System**

In light of the ongoing aging of the population, issues surrounding the employment of elderly people are of particular importance. Despite the heightened willingness among elderly people to work, age limitations for employment and the mandatory retirement age system in conjunction with lifetime employment and seniority-based wage system have created impediments to employing the elderly. The time has come for us to reexamine these fixed conventional employment practices that do not offer a variety of employment arrangements.

In reexamining these employment practices, we should endeavor to create a society where elderly people can continue to work according to their willingness and ability, as long as they are healthy and eager to work, thus enjoying the opportunity to achieve self-realization and to contribute to society.

### **4. Resolving the Mismatch Between Supply and Demand in the Labor Force**

In addition to the issues addressed above, we also need to provide employment information and opportunities for ability development so that we can resolve the mismatch between supply and demand in the labor force which is anticipated to increase due to changes in the age composition of the labor force population in the future, and thus to create an efficient society.

## **[2] Maintaining the Vitality and Competitiveness of Businesses and the Vitality of Individuals**

### **1. Creating New Industrial Sectors With Higher Added Value**

In order to maintain Japan's economic vitality in the future, we need to further improve our labor productivity. To this end, we should promote innovation and manpower development to create fields in new industries with high added values, in addition to implementing those measures to alleviate the decrease in the labor force population mentioned in [1].

### **2. Creating an Internationally Attractive Business Environment**

In an age of full-fledged international competition when businesses choose countries as bases for their operations, it is important for us to create an internationally attractive business environment. To this end, we need to correct the high cost structure in Japan through radical deregulation in the fields of distribution, energy and information/telecommunications, reexamine corporate organizational structures for optimum utilization of management resources, create quality employment opportunities, and change business practices that tend to restrict competition.

### **3. Keeping the National Burden Below a Certain Level, as Well as Realizing a Fiscal Structure Which Is Suitable for an Aged Society With Fewer Children**

The ratio of taxation and the social security burden will inevitably rise due to the progress of the population aging and the trend toward fewer children. It is important, however, that we contain the so-called national burden below a certain level in the national economy to create the optimum balance between the national and personal burden so that the vitality and willingness of individuals and businesses will not be impaired.

Moreover, we need to work toward achieving a healthy fiscal balance to avoid exerting an unreasonable fiscal burden on future generations. At the same time, we need to reexamine the rigid expenditure structure to realize a fiscal structure that is suitable for an aged society with fewer children.

#### **[3] Establishing an Equitable and Stable Social Security System**

##### **1. Achieving Equity in Terms of Both the Benefit and Burden Between the Working Population and Future Generations and Resolving Concerns for the Future**

Though the social security burden will inevitably increase due to there being fewer children and more elderly people, we should be dedicated to steadily responding to concerns over long-term care and other new challenges. At the same time, we should endeavor to optimize benefits and achieve the proper cost sharing in pensions and the health insurance systems, including the health services system for the elderly, so as to achieve equity in terms of both the benefit and burden between the working population and future generations. In particular, we should make the public pension system more stable so that we do not impose an excessive burden on future generations due to demographic changes.

Efforts to resolve public concerns over long-term care and pensions for the future are also important in the context of facilitating an environment where people can bear and raise the next generation in an atmosphere of security.

##### **2. Preventing People From Becoming Ill and Bedridden, and Encouraging the Social Participation of the Elderly**

It is also important to avoid becoming sick and falling into a condition that requires care. This can be pursued through health promotion measures, enhancing preventive medicine and rehabilitation, and improving personal living habits. If these efforts are successful, we can decrease the burden of health expenditures and the long-term care cost.

It is also important that we promote various means of social participation in old age including volunteer activities within the local communities.

##### **(2) Addressing its Social Impact -- The Need to Strengthen Our System of Local Governments and Improve the Content of Education --**

## **[1] Strengthening the Local Government System and Revitalizing Local Communities**

### **1. Strengthening the Local Government System**

In order to maintain high standards for the delivery of basic social and health services to residents, we must make local governments responsible for the smooth delivery of these services. With this understanding, we should reinforce the local government system by promoting, for example, the consolidation of municipalities and inter-municipal administrations.

### **2. Revitalizing Local Communities**

We will face the challenge of somehow revitalizing our local communities, while the population is decreasing in most regions. We should respond to the various needs of the residents, and create autonomous, high-quality local communities with the active participation of the residents themselves. To this end, we need to promote cooperation among communities and employ other inter-municipal measures that go beyond the geographic borders of existing units of local administrations.

## **[2] Education That Nurtures Children's Creativity and Sociability, and Healthy Upbringing**

### **1. Nurturing Creative Talent**

Today's school education in Japan tends to be focused on the one-way provision of knowledge. We need to change this by improving the contents and methods used by our educational system by, for example, offering students more opportunities to learn and think by themselves, emphasizing experiential learning and respecting individuality. Such improvements in education are expected to contribute to the nurturing of creative talent.

### **2. Arrangements That Nurture Children's Social Skills**

Families, local community residents and various related organizations and groups should understand and cooperate with one another in providing places and opportunities for their children to enjoy enriching experiences. At the same time, we need to create a social arrangement that will support group activities for children and other functions that nurture their social skills. This effort will help to resolve parents' concern over public security and order within the community.

### **[Discussions at Related Councils, etc.]**

So far we have presented the main measures and their underlying viewpoints from the perspective of responding to the effects of the trend toward fewer children. We believe it would not be appropriate to discuss these measures singularly from the viewpoint of dealing with the impact of this trend.

Therefore, starting with the promotion of various ongoing structural reforms, we should further our discussions on various measures shown above with related specialized councils and meetings, bearing in mind the social impact of the trend toward fewer children. And based on the result, proper measures should be taken.

## **2. Addressing the Factors Underlying the Trend Toward Fewer Children**

### **(1) The Pros and Cons of Addressing the Factors Underlying the Trend Toward Fewer Children**

-- Removing the Impediments to Marrying and Having Children --

#### **[1] Positions Against Addressing the Underlying Factors**

##### **1. Specific Viewpoints**

There are those who believe that the response to the decreasing population should be limited to addressing the impact of the trend toward fewer children and should not deal with the underlying factors. The points raised by these people include:

A) It is up to individuals whether they decide to marry and have children or not.

B) The decrease in the number of children in Japan would be rather desirable in light of global population increase.

C) The effectiveness of measures involving personal matters such as marriage and childbirth is not very promising.

##### **2. Opinions on the Viewpoint That Leaves the Fertility Decision Up to the Individuals**

With regard to the viewpoint expressed in 1. A), our view is that we agree on the need to "remove the barriers which prevent people who desire to marry and have children from doing so" in principle, in light of the fact that the majority of single adults desire to be married and, once they get married, desire to have an average of 2.6 children ideally.

##### **3. Opinions on the Viewpoint That Sees the Fertility Issues in the Context of Global Population Problem**

Concerning 1.B), it is true that the global population is growing. But Japan is not aiming to increase its population. It is simply attempting to avoid a conspicuous population decrease. Based on this and the need for Japan to contribute to the global society in the future on the premise of the current framework of the global society, we do not think that taking measures to address the factors is something that should be criticized.

##### **4. Opinions on the Viewpoint Which are Doubtful About the Effectiveness of Policy Measures**

About 1. C), we believe that, if we are successful in removing the factors which inhibit marriage and childbirth, we can expect a certain degree of recovery in the fertility. This has been demonstrated in the experiences of the northern European

countries and other nations that have achieved an advanced level of gender equality. Many of these countries now experience higher fertility than the figures recorded in the 1980's.

## **[2] Positions for Addressing the Underlying Factors**

Looking into the mid-21st century, Japan will face a quite serious situation with regard to the decreasing population, even after it has implemented bold measures to deal with the impact of the trend toward fewer children. It would be naturally beneficial for individuals who want to be married and have children to do so, if the factors that inhibit them from doing so are removed. This would also be beneficial for our society as it might help us avoid a phenomenal population decrease.

Hence, this council's basic viewpoint is that we need to address the factors underlying the trend toward fewer children as well as address the impact that a reduction in the number of children will have on our society.

However, the ways to address the factors underlying the trend should not be viewed as population increase measures such as those taken before and during the World War II. The fundamental premise is that no measures should be taken that may ruin the diversity of individual lifestyles for both males and females, for instance, by limiting individual's self-determination concerning pregnancy or childbearing.

## **[3] Society's Responsibility in the Child Rearing Process**

We need to recognize that children are assets of society; they are the people who will become the pillars of tomorrow. Taking into account this recognition and the fact that economic support for the elderly has been socialized in the form of a public pension system and their long-term care will be increasingly supported socially through the introduction of the public long-term care insurance system, we need to advance our belief that raising children is not only a private or family responsibility, but also the responsibility of our entire society.

Some are concerned that this perspective may undermine the fundamental understanding that parents are responsible for raising their children.

In either case, we need to promote a national discussion on this point as this is an important issue that relates to not only how we think about families but also how we should decide the extent of society's support for child rearing and how much the public sector should be involved in this process.

## **[4] Issues to Be Aware of in Addressing the Factors Underlying the Trend Toward Fewer Children**

Moreover, we need to be attentive to the following remarks that have been pointed out.

1. We must not put psychological pressure on those who do not want to have children or those who cannot have children though they may want to.

2. This topic should be discussed among people in all walks of life in our country.
3. We should learn to recognize gender-based prejudice in our culture and make an effort to end such prejudice. For example, we should not assume that women should remain at home.
4. We must avoid discussing population issues from the eugenic perspective.

#### **[5] The Relationship Between Addressing the Underlying Factors and Receiving Foreign Immigrants**

Some argue that, before discussing the ways to address the factors underlying the reduction in the number of children, we should first clarify a national policy on the propriety of permitting immigration as a means of responding to the impact of the decreasing population, specifically the decrease in the working population.

Even if we were to consider accepting foreign immigrants as a means of responding to the population decrease, however, it would not be practical to receive immigrants at a rapid pace and on a large enough scale to supplement the lowered fertility. Also, it is inappropriate to formulate national policy on the acceptance of foreigners as a given premise simply due to our domestic circumstances. Regardless of our nation's immigration policy, we believe that our society needs to deal with the factors underlying the trend toward fewer children.

#### **(2) How to Address the Factors Underlying the Trend Toward Fewer Children -- Correcting the Fixed Division of Roles Between Men and Women and the Inflexible Employment Practices, and Effectively Promoting Support for Child-rearing --**

##### **[Addressing the Factors Which Hinder Marriage and Childbirth]**

When discussing how to address the factors underlying the trend toward fewer children, we should neither restrict the self-determination of individuals regarding pregnancy and childbirth, as stated before, nor should we take actions to compromise the diversity of individual lifestyles regardless of gender.

Therefore, on the one hand, we should reexamine the overall structure of our society, as mentioned below, in our efforts to the problem. On the other hand, it is important that we work to change the public's perspectives, social practices and institutions which serve to hinder marriage and childbirth. Only through this approach can we remove the barriers to marriage and childbirth for those who desire this lifestyle. It is also essential to comprehensively and effectively promote measures to support child rearing.

#### **[1] Correcting the Fixed Division of Roles Between Men and Women and Inflexible Employment Practices**

##### **1. Correcting the Public's Perspectives, Social Practices and Systems**

## **A) Reexamining the Systems, the Public's Perspectives and the Corporate Culture**

As part of our efforts to address the factors underlying the trend toward fewer children, we should endeavor to reexamine and correct the fixed division of roles between men and women in present-day Japan. We must help people, and women in particular, overcome the social barriers which prevent them from choosing their own lifestyle, and the inflexible employment practices which prioritize work over family responsibilities.

In so doing, some say that it is up to the individual to choose their lifestyle and that the government should not directly intervene in these matters, but it should limit any revisions of the system to changes of a neutral nature so that inequalities in the tax and social insurance premium burdens will not be created.

Clearly, it is up to the individual to choose a lifestyle in which the fixed division of roles between men and women is honored or in which one prioritizes work above all else. However, now that such lifestyles have become the norm and are preventing people from choosing other lifestyles, such situations can no longer be regarded merely as a matter of personal choice. In addition, such practices have been nurtured within our society for a long time, and are pervasive. Thus, it would be difficult in reality to expeditiously reform these practices by simply correcting the system of tax and social insurance premium burdens.

## **B) Promoting the Idea of Reconciling Work With Family Life**

Therefore, in order to correct the fixed division of roles between men and women and the problems associated with Japanese employment practices, we need to reevaluate not only these systems, but also the public's perspectives and the corporate culture that support these systems, so that we can move in the direction of encouraging people to reconcile their work life with their family life and become more flexible in their approach to work.

## **2. Issues to Be Discussed in the Near Future**

Based on such an understanding, we have the following issues to examine in the near future in the areas of system structure and practices.

### **A) Social Practices Regarding Work Treated as the Top Priority**

- Long hours of overtime work, working on weekends/holidays, and not taking full advantage of paid vacation
- Personnel practices which have a negative impact on the promotion, among other things, of the people taking maternity leave or child-care leave
- Long after-work hours spent due to social obligations with colleagues and/or clients, and after-hours work at home

### **B) Concerning Female Employment**

- The practice of resigning upon marriage or childbirth



- Limited full-time employment options available to middle-age and older women if they want to go back to the labor market

**C) Concerning Diversity in Work Arrangements**

- Lifetime employment system and mechanisms that support it: i.e. wage scale, promotion system, lump-sum retirement allowance, etc.
- Practice of hiring predominantly new school graduates at one time of year

**D) Inequities in Treatment Among Full-time Employees, Part-time Employees and the Non-employed**

- Dependent allowances (for spouses) offered by companies
- Deduction for a spouse for income-tax purposes
- Position of a dependent spouse within the pension and health insurance systems

**[2] Comprehensive and Effective Promotion of Various Child-Rearing Support Measures**

**1. Promoting the Angel Plan**

As a measure designed to support child-rearing, the "Basic Direction for Future Child Rearing Support Measures" (Angel Plan) has been promoted. Priority measures have been implemented focusing on the following basic directions:

**A) Efforts to Support Working Parents in Their Efforts to Raise a Family**

- Creating an employment environment which allows workers to work without worry while raising children, including the implementation of a child-care leave system and the promotion of shorter working hours
- Enhancing nursery care services by, for example, expanding and improving nursery care for younger children, while promoting diversification and higher flexibility in the nursery care system, including improving and reviewing the current nursery system

**B) Support in Raising Children at Home**

- Reinforcement measures to support child rearing, including the creation of an environment that supports the concept of a gender-equal society
- Developing a maternal and child health and medical care system in which women can give birth to their children without worry, and promoting a network (coordination system) to care for children within their community

**C) Creation of a Housing and Living Environment Which Is Supportive of Child Rearing**

- Securing housing that is suitable to the various lifestyles of our citizens by promoting an adequate supply of quality housing
- Developing playgrounds, sports facilities, social education facilities and cultural facilities to support the sound growth of children and to provide a safer living environment for children

**D) A More Flexible Education System and Promoting the Healthy and Wholesome Growth of Children**

- Amending our educational system in ways which will decrease the psychological burden associated with child rearing.
- Promoting the creation of family and social environment which allows children to nurture rich human qualities by, for example, providing opportunities for them to experience diversity in their daily life and cultural experiences, volunteer activities and other forms of contact in the community among children themselves and between children and the elderly

#### **E) Reducing Child Rearing Costs**

- Taking measures to decrease the financial burden on families associated with child rearing, and studying the types of support measures that can be taken for the society as a whole.

## **2. Important Points From the Perspective of Addressing the Factors Underlying the Trend Toward Fewer Children**

From the perspective of addressing the factors underlying the trend, as explained earlier, we should pay special attention to the following points in our efforts to implement various child rearing support measures.

#### **A) Addressing the increasing opportunity cost of raising children**

In the context of progressive social advancement for women with their increasing average wage, the opportunity cost of raising children, or the benefits which might be lost as a result of giving up continued employment and choosing to raise children instead, is increasing. In light of this situation, it is particularly important that we improve the employment environment to support working parents in their efforts to raise a family and to secure a variety of nursery care services, etc.

#### **B) Supporting Working Parents in Their Efforts to Raise a Family**

Some believe that such support measures would be limited in terms of their effectiveness, because the number of women who desire to pursue both work and child rearing is limited only to the most career-oriented women.

Based on various opinion polls, however, the percentage of women who prefer to continue working is steadily increasing. The same survey results also indicate that, had the maternity and child-care leave systems and nursery care services been well established, a considerably greater number of women would desire to continue working.

The expansion of female employment will be called for more as a response to the decreasing labor force. In this regard, we must all the more steadily promote measures that support working parents in their efforts to raise a family as a part of the efforts to address the impact of the trend toward fewer children.

#### **C) Dealing with Issues Related to the Spread of Nuclear Families and Progress in Urbanization**

It is also important that we endeavor to alleviate the psychological and physical burdens associated with child care at home as people's concern for security in the

community increases and they experience greater difficulty in securing child-care support from relatives and neighbors due to the spread of nuclear families and progress in urbanization.

#### **D) Measures to Alleviate the Economic Burden of Child Rearing**

The immense economic burden associated with child rearing, such as educational and other necessary costs, is one of the reasons that couples choose not to have the number of children they would otherwise like to have. Because of this, opinions have been raised that, in addition to greater social support for child rearing, we need to investigate measures to alleviate the economic burden of child rearing by improving the child allowance and alleviating the tax burden in order to achieve equity in light of the number of dependent children.

Some believe that measures to support working parents in their efforts to raise children would be far more effective than measures to alleviate economic burdens if we are to boost the fertility.

It is necessary to examine the significance, feasibility, and effects of these measures from an integrated and multi-faceted perspective

#### **E) Rediscovering the Joy and Pleasure of Child Rearing**

Due to the emphasis on the hardships of raising children and the difficulty of reconciling work and child care, some are afraid that the inherent joy and pleasure of child rearing may have been forgotten by people. Others are concerned that the traditional "work only" lifestyle has deprived fathers of precious opportunities to experience the joy and pleasure of child rearing.

Though it is true that various hardship and difficulties come with child rearing, it is also true that child rearing brings a certain measure of joy and pleasure, which needs to be rediscovered. To this end, it would be beneficial for both men and women to learn and understand the pleasure and significance of raising a family through continuing education and other various opportunities.

#### **F) Measures to support the employment of female workers who have infants/toddlers**

Some believe that mothers should dedicate themselves to child rearing when the children are infants and toddlers to ensure their sound growth, and that therefore it is not desirable to support the employment of female workers who have children in those age groups.

However, if fathers as well as various nursery care services and local community members can work together to provide child care along with mothers, that would be more desirable for the sound growth of children, because they would receive loving care from many more people than just their mothers. Historically speaking, moreover, it was during the time (and thereafter) when urbanization progressed and working as employees, rather than as the self-employed, became the norm among workers that mothers began to devote themselves to child rearing, carrying

most of the burden by themselves. For example, back in the days when agriculture was the main industry of our society under the extended family system, mothers along with fathers were engaged in productive labor.

Taking all these into consideration, we believe that measures to support the employment of female workers who have infants/toddlers should not be denied. It goes without saying that the maximum care should be given to the welfare of children, and every effort should be made to ensure their welfare.

### **3. Issues to Be Studied**

Based on those points, the following issues require further study and deliberation.

#### **A) Issues on improving the employment environment**

- Promoting the social acceptance of the official child care leave system (encouraging people to utilize child care leave benefits), and encouraging private companies to introduce additional child care leave system on their own initiative (extending the length of the leave period and improving child care leave benefits)
- Creating an environment where child care leave is easy to use for employees by securing substitute workers
- Improving support for nursery care services in the workplace
- Introducing more flexible working hours and more diversified working arrangements such as flex time and making workplaces closer to the workers' home or allowing workers to work at home through such arrangements as telecommuting and satellite offices (offices established by companies in places that are closer to employees' homes to alleviate their burden of commuting).
- Securing good treatment and working conditions for part-time workers
- Encouraging diversified employment paths, and various options to allow workers to change employment paths after returning to work from their leaves
- Active utilization of temporary contracted workers

#### **B) Issues on Child Rearing Support**

- Responding to the demand for nursery care services, especially for younger children
- Support designed for those who cannot use public nursery care services
- Providing diversified nursery care services, including those services during extended hours, on weekends/holidays and for sick children
- Providing after-school care services for school-age children
- Developing housing near the workplace and granting priority admission for families with children into housing near their workplace
- Measures to alleviate the psychological and physical burdens on full-time housewives (or house-husbands ) who care for their children through the use of temporary nursery care services
- Creating community support mechanisms for child rearing such as the provision of counseling on child rearing targeted to full-time housewives and to those parents who have concerns about raising children or who feel isolated from the rest of society
- Establishing a system of counseling and information services related to education at home

- Investigating measures to alleviate the economic burden of child-rearing households
- Examining what measures should be taken in the pension system

In discussing these subjects, we need to evaluate the effects of ongoing and new measures, revise them when necessary, and ensure the most effective promotion methods.

With regard to improving the employment environment, it is important that we make sure that this effort does not lead to discouraging companies from employing those who wish to reconcile their work and family lives.

### **[3] Issues Requiring Further Discussion**

#### **1. Response to Those who Cannot Have Children due to Infertility**

It is estimated that a significant number of men and women do not have children due to infertility problems, despite their desire to have children. This subject involves issues of bioethics, such as in the case of artificial insemination, and thus, requires careful discussion. While being very careful not to pressure those who cannot have children due to physical reasons, we need to consider the promotion of research into infertility treatment.

Moreover, in the context of health damage due to frequent artificial abortions and the rare use of women-centered contraceptive methods, we need to study the best ways to support women in their effort to take the initiative in maintaining their reproductive health over a course of their life.

#### **2. Diversified Family Styles**

We need to expand discussions on whether popularizing the option of wives and husbands having different last names or adopting assumed names, and increasing the social tolerance toward the cohabitation of unmarried couples and other unconventional family styles would lead to a recovery in the marriage rate and, subsequently the fertility over the long run.

In this regard, some suggest that because the question of whether we should permit different last names for a wife and a husband is crucial to the structure of Japanese society, we need to carefully think this issue through.

On the issue of children born outside marriage, we should encourage a national discussion considering its various aspects including the fact that Japan's Civil Code upholds the concept of marriage by virtue of law. At the same time, we should make every effort to correct the disadvantageous treatment of the children outside the marriage in the current system and eliminate social prejudice against them.

## **VI. Conclusion -- Making Our Society With Its Decreasing Population a "Relaxing, Accommodating and Caring Society" --**

Considering the many immeasurable effects that the trend toward fewer children will have on our nation's society as a whole, it is necessary to take a broad view of the background and underlying factors of the trend, and to look seriously at governmental policies for dealing with it.

### **[The Trend Toward Fewer Children is Connected to the Current and Future Conditions of Our Society as a Whole]**

Although this trend has many underlying factors, it is basically deeply connected to the general condition of Japanese society, which has reaped the benefits of a drive toward economic growth and development in the context of rigid gender divisions in family life and corporate culture. The trend also seems to reflect anxieties about the future of society, as well as the perception that it is a burden for an individual to bear and raise a child.

### **[Building a Society With Hope for the Future]**

This situation will require still deeper discussion, research and surveys, involving the input of individual citizens, families, communities and companies as well as the national and local governments. We should take it seriously as a warning for Japanese society, and try to build a society in which individuals can feel hope for the future without feeling that it is a burden to bear and raise a child.

### **[Addressing the Realities Faced by a Society With Fewer Children]**

In a society with a decreasing population, the institutions and conventional practices which were formed during the preceding era of continuous population growth need to be reevaluated. First, it will be necessary to steadily implement ongoing structural reforms in the areas of our economy, social security system and fiscal system, in order to cope with the effects of the trend toward fewer children.

At the same time, in dealing with the underlying factors of the trend, it is necessary that we reevaluate the current condition of Japanese society as a whole, which has come to look upon bearing and raising children with a sense of burden and anxiety. Governmental policies and other measures for dealing with the underlying factors of the trend toward fewer children extend to the areas of labor, social services, public health, medical care, social security, education, housing and taxation among others. However, the focus is on reforming rigid gender divisions and employment practices, and providing support to allow parents to combine child rearing and work. It will be necessary to steadily implement these policies and use them as a basis for developing a suite of related policies.

### **[Creating a New Employment Environment Free of Age and Gender Barriers]**

In particular, from the standpoint of dealing with both the effects and the underlying factors for the trend toward fewer children, it is extremely important for

companies and other employers to reform the rigid employment environment of the mandatory retirement ages, life-long employment and seniority wage systems, in order to create a new employment environment free of age and gender barriers, in which all individuals, including women and the elderly, can be employed according to their willingness to work. This is the most fundamental way to address a society with a decreasing population.

#### **[New Community and Corporate Cultures Based on a New View of the Family]**

The efforts work toward the goal of a gender-equal society in which men and women respect each other, bringing each other joy and love, and in which the independence and self-realization of individuals (both men and women) is compatible with contribution to others. We must build a new community culture in which the isolation and anxieties of raising a child at home are dealt with based on a new vision of the family in which men and women share both the responsibilities and pleasures of child rearing, and a new corporate culture in which the duties of work, housework, child rearing and long-term care are balanced, and the willingness and ability to work are fully exploited. This also means that we will attempt to build a new framework for our society, which tries to achieve social solidarity in its effort to nurture the next generation.

#### **[An Accommodating and Caring Society]**

The society thus achieved will be one in which consideration is given to combining work and child rearing, and in which men and women can both make full use of their abilities, resulting in a new efficiency to meet the needs of a society with a declining population. Along with hope for increased fertility, this will be a society in which there will be renewed hope for marriage and child rearing, and in which husbands and wives will share the intrinsic pleasures and joys of child rearing in an accommodating and caring society, .

#### **[A Society Which Allows Security and Hope for the Future]**

We on the council believe that the most important measure for dealing with a society of a decreasing population is to allay the anxieties that the Japanese people have toward the future, and through our efforts, to build a society in which they can have a sense of security and hope for the future.

When considering Japan's population problems, however, we must not forget to look at population issues on a global scale. The world's population has doubled, increasing from about 2.5 billion in 1950 to 5.7 billion today, and it is expected to grow to about 10 billion by the 2050s. We also need to consider the effects that this population growth will have on the global environment and global resources, and address such environmental and resource issues.

With regard to the issue of foreign labor, there are some concerns about its socio-economic impact on our society, and there is a need for adequate, straightforward discussion of the pros and cons and ways and means in the proper fora, rather than closing one's eyes to its ramifications.

### **[The Nature of This Report]**

This report is a summary of the background and underlying factors of the trend toward fewer children, and the various views and points of argument concerning ways for dealing with a society with a decreasing population caused by the trend toward fewer children.

As mentioned in the Introduction, it is fundamentally the Japanese citizen who has the responsibility as well as the freedom to choose how to view the trend toward fewer children and the advent of a society with a decreasing population, and to decide what Japan's society should be in the future.

We hope that this report will provide a starting point for a national discussion of these important social challenges. We hope that it will be discussed widely in all fields and by all levels of society, so that a national consensus will be formed concerning the coming society with a decreasing population, and that broad, national efforts by businesses, local communities, families and individuals as well as the national and local governments will achieve progress in building a new Japanese society for the future.



平成 8 年

人口動態統計（確定数）の概況

厚生省大臣官房統計情報部

担当係 : 人口動態統計課 年報第1・2係

TEL : 03-3503-1711 (内線:4340 4341 4342)

03-3595-2814 (ダイヤルイン)

平成8年人口動態統計（確定数）の概況の正誤表

頁	表名	欄	行	誤	正
13	出生第2表-1	8	上から2	571 508	574 054
〃	〃	〃	〃 3	443 430	444 571
〃	〃	〃	〃 4	191 617	187 930

厚生省大臣官房統計情報部

担当係：人口動態統計課 年報1・2係

TEL：03-3503-1711（内線：4340 4341 4342）

# 目 次


調 査 の 概 要	-----	2
結 果 の 概 要		
総 覧		
第 1 表	人口動態総覧 -----	3
第 2 表-1	人口動態総覧の年次推移 -----	4
第 2 表-2	人口動態総覧（率）の年次推移 -----	6
第 3 表-1	人口動態総覧，都道府県（13大都市再掲）別 -----	8
第 3 表-2	人口動態総覧（率），都道府県（13大都市再掲）別 -----	10
出 生		
第 1 表-1	母の年齢階級別にみた出生数の年次推移 -----	12
第 1 表-2	母の年齢階級別にみた出生率の年次推移 -----	12
第 2 表-1	出生順位別にみた出生数の年次推移 -----	13
第 2 表-2	出生順位別にみた出生率の年次推移 -----	13
第 3 表	出生順位別にみた母の平均年齢の年次推移 -----	13
第 4 表	出生時の身長別にみた性別出生数 -----	14
第 5 表	出生時の体重別にみた性別出生数 -----	14
第 6 表	単産-複産（複産の種類・出生-死産の組み合わせ）別分娩件数 -----	14
死 亡		
第 1 表	死因順位（第10位まで）別にみた性別死亡数・ 死亡率（人口10万対） -----	15
第 2 表	主な死因別にみた年齢階級別死亡数・死亡率（人口10万対） -----	16
第 3 表	悪性新生物の主な部位別にみた性別死亡率（人口10万対）の 年次推移 -----	18
婚 姻		
第 1 表	初婚-再婚別・夫妻の組み合わせ別にみた婚姻件数の年次推移 -----	19
第 2 表	夫妻の国籍別にみた婚姻件数の年次推移 -----	19
第 3 表	夫妻の年齢階級別にみた初婚件数・初婚率（人口千対）の年次推移 -----	20
第 4 表	夫妻の平均婚姻年齢の年次推移 -----	20
離 婚		
第 1 表	同居期間別にみた離婚件数及び平均同居期間の年次推移 -----	21
第 2 表	夫妻の国籍別にみた離婚件数の年次推移 -----	21
別 表	日本における外国人の人口動態 -----	22
付 表	諸率の算出に用いた人口 -----	23

インターネット掲載のお知らせ

# 調 査 の 概 要

- 1 調査の目的 我が国の人口動態事象を把握し、人口及び厚生行政施策の基礎資料を得ることを目的とする。
- 2 調査の対象 「戸籍法」及び「死産の届出に関する規程」により届け出られた出生、死亡、婚姻、離婚及び死産の全数を対象としているが、本概況は、平成8年に日本において発生した日本人の事象を集計したものである。
- 3 調査の期間 平成8年1月1日から同年12月31日
- 4 調査の方法及び報告経路

市区町村長は、出生、死亡、婚姻、離婚及び死産の届出を受けたときは、その届書に基づいて人口動態調査票を作成し、これを保健所、都道府県を経由し、厚生大臣に送付する。



- 5 結果の集計 集計は、厚生省大臣官房統計情報部で行った。

## 利用上の注意

- 1 印刷公表している人口動態統計の資料は次のとおりである。

人口動態統計速報	人口動態統計月報	人口動態統計年報
数値：調査票を作成した数  集計客体：日本における日本人 日本における外国人 外国における日本人 (前年以前発生のものを含む) 公表：毎月 (調査月の約2か月後)	数値：概数  集計客体：日本における日本人 (前年以前発生ものを除く) 公表：毎月 (調査月の5か月後) ：毎年(年間合計) (調査年の翌年6月頃)	数値：確定数 (概数に修正を加えたもの) 集計客体：日本における日本人 日本における外国人 外国における日本人 (前年以前発生のものを含む) 公表：毎年 (調査年の翌年9月頃)

- 2 表章記号の規約

計数のない場合	—
統計項目のありえない場合	.
計数不明又は計数を表章することが不適当な場合	...
表章単位の2分の1未満の場合	0.0, 0.00

- 3 用語の解説

自然増加：出生数から死亡数を減じたもの  
 乳児死亡：生後1年未満の死亡  
 新生児死亡：生後4週未満の死亡  
 早期新生児死亡：生後1週未満の死亡  
 死産：妊娠満12週以後の死児の出産  
 周産期死亡：妊娠満22週以後の死産に早期新生児死亡を合わせたもの  
 なお、周産期死亡率は出産数(妊娠満22週以後の死産数に出生数を加えたもの)で除している。

## 結 果 の 概 要

(総 覧)  
第 1 表

### 人 口 動 態 総 覧

	実 数			率 <sup>3)</sup>		平均発生間隔	
	平成 8 年	平成 7 年	対前年増減	平成 8 年	平成 7 年	平成 8 年	平成 7 年
出 生	1 206 555	1 187 064	19 491	9.7	9.6	26"	27"
男	619 793	608 547	11 246	10.1	10.0	51"	52"
女	586 762	578 517	8 245	9.2	9.1	54"	55"
死 亡	896 211	922 139	- 25 928	7.2	7.4	35"	34"
男	488 605	501 276	- 12 671	8.0	8.2	1'05"	1'03"
女	407 606	420 863	- 13 257	6.4	6.6	1'18"	1'15"
乳児死亡	4 546	5 054	- 508	3.8	4.3	115'56"	104'00"
新生児死亡	2 438	2 615	- 177	2.0	2.2	216'11"	201'00"
自 然 増 加	310 344	264 925	45 419	2.5	2.1	...	...
死 産	39 536	39 403	133	31.7	32.1	13'20"	13'20"
自然死産	18 329	18 262	67	14.7	14.9	28'45"	28'47"
人工死産	21 207	21 141	66	17.0	17.2	24'51"	24'52"
周 産 期 死 亡	8 080	8 412	- 332	6.7	7.0	65'14"	62'29"
妊娠満22週以後の死産	6 333	6 580	- 247	5.2	5.5	83'13"	79'53"
早期新生児死亡	1 747	1 832	- 85	1.4	1.5	301'41"	286'54"
婚 姻	795 080	791 888	3 192	6.4	6.4	40"	40"
離 婚	206 955	199 016	7 939	1.66	1.60	2'33"	2'38"

	平 成 8 年	平 成 7 年
合計特殊出生率 <sup>2)</sup>	1.43 <sup>1)</sup>	1.42

注：1) 平成8年は「うるう年」であったが仮に「うるう年」でないとしてその補整を行うと合計特殊出生率は1.42となる。

2) 合計特殊出生率とは、15歳から49歳までの女子の年齢別出生率を合計したもので、1人の女子が仮にその年次の年齢別出生率で一生の間に生むとした時の子ども数に相当する。

3) 出生・死亡・自然増加・婚姻・離婚率は人口千対、乳児・新生児・早期新生児死亡率は出生千対、死産率は出産（出生＋死産）千対、周産期死亡・妊娠満22週以後の死産率は出産（出生＋妊娠22週以後の死産）千対である。

(総 覧)  
第2表-1 人口動態総覧の年次推移

年 次 <sup>1)</sup>	出 生 数	死 亡 数	(再 掲)		自然増加数
			乳児死亡数	新生児死亡数	
昭和22年	2 678 792	1 138 238	205 360	84 204	1 540 554
23	2 681 624	950 610	165 406	73 855	1 731 014
24	2 696 638	945 444	168 467	72 432	1 751 194
25	2 337 507	904 876	140 515	64 142	1 432 631
26	2 137 689	838 998	122 869	58 686	1 298 691
27	2 005 162	765 068	99 114	51 015	1 240 094
28	1 868 040	772 547	91 424	47 580	1 095 493
29	1 769 580	721 491	78 944	42 726	1 048 089
30	1 730 692	693 523	68 801	38 646	1 037 169
31	1 665 278	724 460	67 691	38 232	940 818
32	1 566 713	752 445	62 678	33 847	814 268
33	1 653 469	684 189	57 052	32 237	969 280
34	1 626 088	689 959	54 768	30 235	936 129
35	1 606 041	706 599	49 293	27 362	899 442
36	1 589 372	695 644	45 465	26 255	893 728
37	1 618 616	710 265	42 797	24 777	908 351
38	1 659 521	670 770	38 442	22 965	988 751
39	1 716 761	673 067	34 967	21 344	1 043 694
40	1 823 697	700 438	33 742	21 260	1 123 259
41	1 360 974	670 342	26 217	16 296	690 632
42	1 935 647	675 006	28 928	19 248	1 260 641
43	1 871 839	686 555	28 600	18 326	1 185 284
44	1 889 815	693 787	26 874	17 116	1 196 028
45	1 934 239	712 962	25 412	16 742	1 221 277
46	2 000 973	684 521	24 805	16 450	1 316 452
47	2 038 682	683 751	23 773	15 817	1 354 931
48	2 091 983	709 416	23 683	15 473	1 382 567
49	2 029 989	710 510	21 888	14 472	1 319 479
50	1 901 440	702 275	19 103	12 912	1 199 165
51	1 832 617	703 270	17 105	11 638	1 129 347
52	1 755 100	690 074	15 666	10 773	1 065 026
53	1 708 643	695 821	14 327	9 628	1 012 822
54	1 642 580	689 664	12 923	8 590	952 916
55	1 576 889	722 801	11 841	7 796	854 088
56	1 529 455	720 262	10 891	7 188	809 193
57	1 515 392	711 883	9 969	6 425	803 509
58	1 508 687	740 038	9 406	5 894	768 649
59	1 489 780	740 247	8 920	5 527	749 533
60	1 431 577	752 283	7 899	4 910	679 294
61	1 382 946	750 620	7 251	4 296	632 326
62	1 346 658	751 172	6 711	3 933	595 486
63	1 314 006	793 014	6 265	3 592	520 992
平成元年	1 246 802	788 594	5 724	3 214	458 208
2	1 221 585	820 305	5 616	3 179	401 280
3	1 223 245	829 797	5 418	2 978	393 448
4	1 208 989	856 643	5 477	2 905	352 346
5	1 188 282	878 532	5 169	2 765	309 750
6	1 238 328	875 933	5 261	2 889	362 395
7	1 187 064	922 139	5 054	2 615	264 925
8	1 206 555	896 211	4 546	2 438	310 344

注：1) 昭和47年以前は沖縄県を含まない。  
 2) 昭和23年、24年には自然・人工の不詳を含む。なお、\*印は概数である。  
 3) 妊娠満2週以後の死産に早期新生児死亡を加えたものである。  
 4) (参考)の周産期死亡数は妊娠満28週以後の死産に早期新生児死亡を加えたものである。  
 平成7年から、周産期死亡のうち死産については妊娠満28週以後から妊娠満22週以後に変更されたが、継続観察のため本数値を参考として掲載している。

死 産 数 <sup>2)</sup>			周 産 期 死亡数 <sup>3)</sup>	婚 姻 件 数	離 婚 件 数	(参考)	
総 数	自 然	人 工				周 産 期 死亡数 <sup>0)</sup>	年 次
123 837	...	...	...	934 170	79 551	...	昭和22年
143 963	*104 325	*31 055	...	953 999	79 032	...	23
192 677	*114 161	*75 585	...	842 170	82 575	...	24
216 974	106 594	110 380	...	715 081	83 689	108 843	25
217 231	101 237	115 994	...	671 905	82 331	99 865	26
203 824	94 508	109 316	...	676 995	79 021	91 527	27
193 274	89 751	103 523	...	682 077	75 255	85 932	28
187 119	87 201	99 918	...	697 809	76 759	79 776	29
183 265	85 159	98 106	...	714 861	75 267	75 918	30
179 007	86 558	92 449	...	715 934	72 040	75 706	31
176 353	86 895	89 458	...	773 362	71 651	70 502	32
185 148	92 282	92 866	...	826 902	74 004	72 625	33
181 893	92 688	89 205	...	847 135	72 455	69 912	34
179 281	93 424	85 857	...	866 115	69 410	66 552	35
179 895	96 032	83 863	...	890 158	69 323	65 063	36
177 363	97 256	80 107	...	928 341	71 394	62 650	37
175 424	97 711	77 713	...	937 516	69 996	60 049	38
168 046	97 357	70 689	...	963 130	72 306	56 827	39
161 617	94 476	67 141	...	954 852	77 195	54 904	40
148 248	83 253	64 995	...	940 120	79 432	42 583	41
149 389	90 938	58 451	...	953 096	83 478	50 846	42
143 259	87 381	55 878	...	956 312	87 327	45 921	43
139 211	85 788	53 423	...	984 142	91 280	43 419	44
135 095	84 073	51 022	...	1 029 405	95 937	41 917	45
130 920	83 827	47 093	...	1 091 229	103 595	40 900	46
125 154	81 741	43 413	...	1 099 984	108 382	38 754	47
116 171	78 613	37 558	...	1 071 923	111 877	37 598	48
109 738	74 618	35 120	...	1 000 455	113 622	34 383	49
101 862	67 643	34 219	...	941 628	119 135	30 513	50
101 930	64 046	37 884	...	871 543	124 512	27 133	51
95 247	60 330	34 917	...	821 029	129 485	24 708	52
87 463	55 818	31 645	...	793 257	132 146	22 217	53
82 311	51 083	31 228	36 190	788 505	135 250	20 481	54
77 446	47 651	29 795	32 422	774 702	141 689	18 385	55
79 222	46 296	32 926	30 274	776 531	154 221	16 531	56
78 107	44 135	33 972	28 204	781 252	163 980	15 303	57
71 941	40 108	31 833	25 925	762 552	179 150	14 035	58
72 361	37 976	34 385	25 149	739 991	178 746	12 998	59
69 009	33 114	35 895	22 379	735 850	166 640	11 470	60
65 678	31 050	34 628	20 389	710 962	166 054	10 148	61
63 834	29 956	33 878	18 699	696 173	158 227	9 317	62
59 636	26 804	32 832	16 839	707 716	153 600	8 508	63
55 204	24 558	30 646	15 183	708 316	157 811	7 450	平成元年
53 892	23 383	30 509	13 704	722 138	157 608	7 001	2
50 510	22 317	28 193	10 426	742 264	168 969	6 544	3
48 896	21 689	27 207	9 888	754 441	179 191	6 321	4
45 090	20 205	24 885	9 226	792 658	188 297	5 989	5
42 962	19 754	23 208	9 286	782 738	195 106	6 134	6
39 403	18 262	21 141	8 412	791 888	199 016	5 526	7
39 536	18 329	21 207	8 080	795 080	206 955	5 321	8

(総覧)  
第2表-2 人口動態総覧(率)の年次推移

年次 <sup>1)</sup>	出生率 (人口千対)	死亡率 (人口千対)	乳児 死亡率		自然 増加率 (人口千対)	死産率 <sup>2)</sup> (出 産 千)	自然 死産率 千
			乳児 死亡率 (出生千対)	新生児 死亡率			
昭和22年	34.3	14.6	76.7	31.4	19.7	44.2	...
23	33.5	11.9	61.7	27.5	21.6	50.9	*36.9
24	33.0	11.6	62.5	26.9	21.4	66.7	*39.1
25	28.1	10.9	60.1	27.4	17.2	84.9	41.7
26	25.3	9.9	57.5	27.5	15.4	92.2	43.0
27	23.4	8.9	49.4	25.4	14.4	92.3	42.8
28	21.5	8.9	48.9	25.5	12.6	93.8	43.5
29	20.0	8.2	44.6	24.1	11.9	95.6	44.6
30	19.4	7.8	39.8	22.3	11.6	95.8	44.5
31	18.4	8.0	40.6	23.0	10.4	97.1	46.9
32	17.2	8.3	40.0	21.6	8.9	101.2	49.9
33	18.0	7.4	34.5	19.5	10.5	100.7	50.2
34	17.5	7.4	33.7	18.6	10.1	100.6	51.3
35	17.2	7.6	30.7	17.0	9.6	100.4	52.3
36	16.9	7.4	28.6	16.5	9.5	101.7	54.3
37	17.0	7.5	26.4	15.3	9.5	98.8	54.2
38	17.3	7.0	23.2	13.8	10.3	95.6	53.3
39	17.7	6.9	20.4	12.4	10.7	89.2	51.7
40	18.6	7.1	18.5	11.7	11.4	81.4	47.6
41	13.7	6.8	19.3	12.0	7.0	98.2	55.2
42	19.4	6.8	14.9	9.9	12.7	71.6	43.6
43	18.6	6.8	15.3	9.8	11.8	71.1	43.4
44	18.5	6.8	14.2	9.1	11.7	68.6	42.3
45	18.8	6.9	13.1	8.7	11.8	65.3	40.6
46	19.2	6.6	12.4	8.2	12.6	61.4	39.3
47	19.3	6.5	11.7	7.8	12.8	57.8	37.8
48	19.4	6.6	11.3	7.4	12.8	52.6	35.6
49	18.6	6.5	10.8	7.1	12.1	51.3	34.9
50	17.1	6.3	10.0	6.8	10.8	50.8	33.8
51	16.3	6.3	9.3	6.4	10.0	52.7	33.1
52	15.5	6.1	8.9	6.1	9.4	51.5	32.6
53	14.9	6.1	8.4	5.6	8.8	48.7	31.1
54	14.2	6.0	7.9	5.2	8.3	47.7	29.6
55	13.6	6.2	7.5	4.9	7.3	46.8	28.8
56	13.0	6.1	7.1	4.7	6.9	49.2	28.8
57	12.8	6.0	6.6	4.2	6.8	49.0	27.7
58	12.7	6.2	6.2	3.9	6.5	45.5	25.4
59	12.5	6.2	6.0	3.7	6.3	46.3	24.3
60	11.9	6.3	5.5	3.4	5.6	46.0	22.1
61	11.4	6.2	5.2	3.1	5.2	45.3	21.4
62	11.1	6.2	5.0	2.9	4.9	45.3	21.2
63	10.8	6.5	4.8	2.7	4.3	43.4	19.5
平成元年	10.2	6.4	4.6	2.6	3.7	42.4	18.9
2	10.0	6.7	4.6	2.6	3.3	42.3	18.3
3	9.9	6.7	4.4	2.4	3.2	39.7	17.5
4	9.8	6.9	4.5	2.4	2.9	38.9	17.2
5	9.6	7.1	4.3	2.3	2.5	36.6	16.4
6	10.0	7.1	4.2	2.3	2.9	33.5	15.4
7	9.6	7.4	4.3	2.2	2.1	32.1	14.9
8	9.7	7.2	3.8	2.0	2.5	31.7	14.7

注：1) 昭和47年以前は沖縄県を含まない。

2) 死産率は死産数を出産数(死産数に出生数を加えたもの)で除している。なお、\*印は概数による率である。

3) 周産期死亡率は周産期死亡数を出産数(妊娠満2週以後の死産数に出生数を加えたもの)で除している。

4) 合計特殊出生率とは、15歳から49歳までの女子の年齢別出生率を合計したもので、1人の女子が仮にその年次の年齢別出生率で一生涯の間に生むとした時の子ども数に相当する。



人 工 死 産 率 対)	周 産 期 <sup>3)</sup> 死 亡 率 (出産千対)	婚 姻 率 離 婚 率 (人 口 千 対)	合 計 特 殊 出 生 率 <sup>4)</sup>	年 齢 調 整 死 亡 率 <sup>5)</sup> (人 口 千 対)		周 産 期 死 亡 率 <sup>6)</sup> (出 生 千 対)	年 次	
				男	女			
...	...	12.0	1.02	4.54	23.6	18.3	...	昭和22年
*10.9	...	11.9	0.99	4.40	19.3	15.4	...	23
*25.9	...	10.3	1.01	4.32	18.9	15.0	...	24
43.2	...	8.6	1.01	3.65	18.6	14.6	46.6	25
49.3	...	7.9	0.97	3.26	16.9	13.4	46.7	26
49.5	...	7.9	0.92	2.98	15.7	12.4	45.6	27
50.2	...	7.8	0.86	2.69	16.4	12.6	46.0	28
51.1	...	7.9	0.87	2.48	15.2	11.3	45.1	29
51.3	...	8.0	0.84	2.37	14.8	11.0	43.9	30
50.1	...	7.9	0.80	2.22	15.6	11.5	45.5	31
51.3	...	8.5	0.79	2.04	16.3	11.8	45.0	32
50.5	...	9.0	0.80	2.11	14.4	10.4	43.9	33
49.3	...	9.1	0.78	2.04	14.4	10.2	43.0	34
48.1	...	9.3	0.74	2.00	14.8	10.4	41.4	35
47.4	...	9.4	0.74	1.96	14.3	10.0	40.9	36
44.6	...	9.8	0.75	1.98	14.6	10.0	38.7	37
42.4	...	9.7	0.73	2.00	13.4	9.3	36.2	38
37.5	...	9.9	0.74	2.05	13.2	9.1	33.1	39
33.8	...	9.7	0.79	2.14	13.7	9.3	30.1	40
43.1	...	9.5	0.80	1.58	12.7	8.7	31.3	41
28.0	...	9.6	0.84	2.23	12.6	8.5	26.3	42
27.7	...	9.5	0.87	2.13	12.5	8.4	24.5	43
26.3	...	9.6	0.89	2.13	12.4	8.2	23.0	44
24.7	...	10.0	0.93	2.13	12.3	8.2	21.7	45
22.1	...	10.5	0.99	2.16	11.5	7.6	20.4	46
20.1	...	10.4	1.02	2.14	11.2	7.4	19.0	47
17.0	...	9.9	1.04	2.14	11.2	7.4	18.0	48
16.4	...	9.1	1.04	2.05	10.9	7.2	16.9	49
17.1	...	8.5	1.07	1.91	10.4	6.9	16.0	50
19.6	...	7.8	1.11	1.85	10.1	6.6	14.8	51
18.9	...	7.2	1.14	1.80	9.6	6.2	14.1	52
17.6	...	6.9	1.15	1.79	9.4	6.0	13.0	53
18.1	21.6	6.8	1.17	1.77	9.0	5.7	12.5	54
18.0	20.2	6.7	1.22	1.75	9.2	5.8	11.7	55
20.5	19.5	6.6	1.32	1.74	8.9	5.6	10.8	56
21.3	18.3	6.6	1.39	1.77	8.5	5.2	10.1	57
20.1	16.9	6.4	1.51	1.80	8.6	5.2	9.3	58
22.0	16.6	6.2	1.50	1.81	8.3	5.0	8.7	59
23.9	15.4	6.1	1.39	1.76	8.1	4.8	8.0	60
23.9	14.6	5.9	1.37	1.72	7.8	4.6	7.3	61
24.0	13.7	5.7	1.30	1.69	7.6	4.4	6.9	62
23.9	12.7	5.8	1.26	1.66	7.7	4.5	6.5	63
23.5	12.1	5.8	1.29	1.57	7.4	4.2	6.0	平成元年
23.9	11.1	5.9	1.28	1.54	7.5	4.2	5.7	2
22.1	8.5	6.0	1.37	1.53	7.4	4.1	5.3	3
21.6	8.1	6.1	1.45	1.50	7.4	4.0	5.2	4
20.2	7.7	6.4	1.52	1.46	7.3	4.0	5.0	5
18.1	7.5	6.3	1.57	1.50	7.1	3.8	5.0	6
17.2	7.0	6.4	1.60	1.42	7.2	3.8	4.7	7
17.0	6.7	6.4	1.66	1.43	6.8	3.6	4.4	8

5) 年齢調整死亡率は、人口構成の異なる集団間での死亡率を比較するために、年齢階級別死亡率を一定の基準人口(昭和60年モデル人口)にあてはめて算出した指標である。

6) (参考)の周産期死亡率は妊娠満28週以後の死産数に早期新生児死亡数を加えたものを出生数で除いたものである。(総覧第2表-1 注4)参照)

(総覧)

第3表-1 人口動態総覧，都道府県（13大都市再掲）別

都道府県	出生数			死亡数			(再掲)			新生児死亡数
	総数	男	女	総数	男	女	乳児死亡数			
							総数	男	女	
全 国	1 206 555	619 793	586 762	896 211	488 605	407 606	4 546	2 532	2 014	2 438
北海道	49 784	25 566	24 218	40 742	22 910	17 832	184	101	83	94
青森	13 955	7 295	6 660	12 542	6 955	5 587	60	34	26	36
岩手	12 845	6 641	6 204	11 870	6 508	5 362	40	22	18	11
宮城	22 155	11 323	10 832	15 743	8 695	7 048	70	42	28	37
秋田	9 744	5 018	4 726	11 104	6 085	5 019	33	22	11	21
山形	11 643	5 966	5 677	11 332	5 947	5 385	43	19	24	26
福岛	21 425	10 882	10 543	17 612	9 432	8 180	102	65	37	51
茨城	28 785	14 878	13 907	20 884	11 452	9 432	118	69	49	63
栃木	19 112	9 800	9 312	14 553	8 029	6 524	86	51	35	50
群馬	19 761	10 079	9 682	14 820	7 950	6 870	70	43	27	30
埼玉	68 695	35 305	33 390	36 608	20 439	16 169	264	140	124	128
千葉	55 415	28 382	27 033	33 939	18 899	15 040	181	110	71	86
東京都	97 954	50 423	47 531	77 356	42 696	34 660	368	205	163	190
神奈川	82 092	42 232	39 860	45 884	26 039	19 845	306	155	151	187
新潟	22 873	11 770	11 103	20 437	11 046	9 391	95	48	47	49
富山	10 272	5 177	5 095	9 187	4 899	4 288	48	26	22	27
石川	11 484	5 802	5 682	8 967	4 774	4 193	43	25	18	20
福井	8 330	4 315	4 015	6 617	3 411	3 206	41	19	22	27
山梨	8 949	4 528	4 421	7 014	3 843	3 171	40	22	18	24
長野	21 286	11 005	10 281	18 323	9 608	8 715	57	20	37	26
岐阜	20 546	10 509	10 037	15 326	8 402	6 924	75	45	30	33
静岡	36 081	18 538	17 543	26 089	14 231	11 858	118	60	58	60
愛知	73 377	37 529	35 848	42 231	23 123	19 108	272	167	105	144
三重	17 780	9 222	8 558	14 659	7 775	6 884	73	41	32	48
滋賀	13 897	7 114	6 783	8 646	4 605	4 041	59	33	26	32
京都	24 023	12 359	11 664	19 068	10 014	9 054	95	59	36	55
大阪	89 291	46 127	43 164	57 187	31 408	25 779	317	184	133	168
兵庫県	53 131	27 214	25 917	39 112	21 274	17 838	210	111	99	114
奈良	13 663	6 990	6 673	9 769	5 190	4 579	60	26	34	35
和歌山	10 131	5 200	4 931	9 747	5 174	4 573	27	15	12	18
鳥取	5 582	2 857	2 725	5 382	2 871	2 511	20	11	9	11
島根	6 828	3 544	3 284	7 501	3 915	3 586	34	18	16	16
岡山	19 143	9 791	9 352	16 193	8 740	7 453	62	38	24	31
広島	28 081	14 362	13 719	21 736	11 936	9 800	90	48	42	46
山口	13 351	6 885	6 466	13 947	7 520	6 427	52	29	23	23
徳島	7 390	3 767	3 623	7 602	4 043	3 559	25	18	7	12
香川	9 311	4 783	4 528	8 852	4 639	4 213	30	13	17	18
愛媛	13 739	7 040	6 699	13 295	7 021	6 274	60	29	31	31
高松	7 185	3 764	3 421	7 855	4 111	3 744	25	12	13	9
福岡	47 948	24 559	23 389	35 798	19 421	16 377	189	101	88	118
佐賀	8 941	4 610	4 331	7 517	3 928	3 589	44	32	12	28
長崎	15 182	7 720	7 462	12 938	6 801	6 137	54	27	27	32
熊本	18 035	9 342	8 693	14 723	7 859	6 864	87	47	40	50
大分	11 344	5 849	5 495	10 577	5 715	4 862	31	22	9	21
宮崎	11 792	6 097	5 695	9 320	4 981	4 339	46	24	22	24
鹿児島	16 858	8 616	8 242	16 531	8 716	7 815	48	26	22	19
沖縄	17 064	8 855	8 209	7 038	3 763	3 275	87	54	33	52
外国	302	163	139	68	41	27	2	2	-	2
不詳	.	.	.	1 970	1 771	199	5	2	3	5
(再掲)										
東京都区部	63 384	32 619	30 765	55 739	30 763	24 976	242	130	112	119
札幌市	16 339	8 389	7 950	9 512	5 383	4 129	55	35	20	31
仙台市	10 010	5 107	4 903	4 938	2 756	2 182	25	16	9	14
千葉市	8 446	4 318	4 128	4 274	2 508	1 766	27	12	15	15
横浜市	33 140	16 924	16 216	18 503	10 628	7 875	138	68	70	83
川崎市	13 160	6 810	6 350	6 260	3 692	2 568	44	20	24	27
名古屋市	21 158	10 807	10 351	14 356	8 023	6 333	79	49	30	44
京都市	13 204	6 832	6 372	10 573	5 464	5 109	51	28	23	26
大阪市	24 862	12 876	11 986	20 271	11 448	8 823	91	56	35	54
神戸市	12 668	6 474	6 194	10 102	5 559	4 543	36	16	20	19
広島市	11 828	6 041	5 787	6 509	3 652	2 857	34	16	18	17
北九州市	9 392	4 847	4 545	8 022	4 444	3 578	35	22	13	21
福岡市	13 422	6 869	6 553	6 898	3 838	3 060	56	26	30	39

注：都道府県別の表章は、出生は子の住所、死亡は死亡者の住所、死産は母の住所、婚姻は夫の住所、離婚は別居するまえの住所による。

自然増加数	死産数			周産期死亡数			婚姻件数	離婚件数	都道府県
	総数	自然	人工	総数	妊娠満期 22週以後の死産	早産 新生児死亡			
310 344	39 536	18 329	21 207	8 080	6 333	1 747	795 080	206 955	全 国
9 042	2 079	839	1 240	328	261	67	35 944	11 706	北海道
1 413	480	220	260	102	71	31	8 190	2 496	札幌市
975	504	184	320	66	59	7	7 223	1 715	青森市
6 412	898	337	561	142	109	33	14 065	3 284	岩手市
- 1 360	361	161	200	67	49	18	5 795	1 475	宮城県
311	436	184	252	100	79	21	6 196	1 408	山形市
3 813	782	352	430	168	131	37	12 133	2 966	福島市
7 901	915	432	483	232	188	44	17 558	4 354	茨城県
4 559	694	329	365	161	122	39	12 026	2 975	水戸市
4 941	587	272	315	126	102	24	11 994	3 106	栃木市
32 087	1 930	1 049	881	497	405	92	44 934	11 630	埼玉県
21 476	1 667	957	710	389	321	68	38 653	9 899	上野市
20 598	3 190	1 686	1 504	659	523	136	84 007	22 273	東武市
36 208	2 316	1 260	1 056	596	461	135	61 883	15 263	新井市
2 436	620	318	302	149	120	29	13 015	2 660	富山県
1 085	298	159	139	66	48	18	6 245	1 284	富山県
2 517	353	217	136	89	74	15	6 950	1 468	石川市
1 713	221	112	109	60	41	19	4 707	996	福井市
1 935	246	137	109	66	49	17	5 311	1 258	山梨県
2 963	540	290	250	127	110	17	12 783	2 732	長野県
5 220	582	261	321	127	104	23	12 086	2 577	岐阜県
9 992	1 074	551	523	227	189	38	23 117	5 795	静岡県
31 146	2 102	988	1 114	474	389	85	48 534	10 819	愛知県
3 121	553	259	294	124	85	39	11 031	2 660	豊田市
5 251	371	194	177	92	68	24	8 233	1 700	三河市
4 955	748	356	392	171	135	36	16 153	4 115	京都府
32 104	2 929	1 256	1 673	525	406	119	64 316	17 395	大津市
14 019	1 563	719	844	324	253	71	35 427	8 533	兵庫県
3 894	349	179	170	93	65	28	8 568	2 085	神和
384	294	133	161	71	55	16	6 310	1 816	山梨県
200	233	85	148	41	35	6	3 227	918	鳥取県
- 673	217	103	114	42	29	13	3 520	836	島根県
2 950	615	242	373	104	78	26	11 588	2 979	岡山県
6 345	816	338	478	146	113	33	17 565	4 506	広島県
- 596	420	215	205	78	61	17	8 207	2 379	山口県
- 212	249	100	149	59	48	11	4 434	1 201	徳島県
459	327	171	156	71	56	15	5 978	1 577	香川県
444	460	219	241	90	67	23	8 309	2 477	愛媛県
- 670	299	94	205	37	30	7	4 347	1 511	高知県
12 150	1 985	740	1 245	327	249	78	30 821	9 581	福岡県
1 424	360	136	224	59	39	20	4 578	1 216	佐賀県
2 244	662	242	420	97	74	23	8 146	2 391	熊本県
3 312	818	308	510	127	91	36	10 008	3 046	熊本市
767	466	188	278	75	57	18	6 476	2 044	大分県
2 472	593	168	425	71	50	21	6 679	2 152	宮崎県
327	786	269	517	89	78	11	9 320	2 726	鹿児島県
10 026	517	301	216	134	97	37	8 490	2 972	鹿嶋市
234	21	16	5	9	8	1	.	.	外 国
.	10	3	7	6	1	5	.	.	不詳
7 645	2 161	1 106	1 055	416	334	82	58 537	15 744	(再掲) 東京都区部
6 827	714	241	473	94	72	22	13 111	4 161	札幌市
5 072	411	144	267	63	50	13	7 159	1 458	仙台市
4 172	223	140	83	63	52	11	5 965	1 530	千代田市
14 637	934	510	424	266	208	58	25 585	6 170	横浜市
6 900	343	172	171	82	66	16	11 147	2 380	川崎市
6 802	673	311	362	136	109	27	15 154	3 909	名古屋市
2 631	400	181	219	90	75	15	9 507	2 554	京都市
4 591	1 009	402	607	165	127	38	20 568	5 954	大阪市
2 566	428	172	256	73	59	14	8 848	2 499	神戸市
5 319	335	132	203	56	44	12	7 841	2 006	広島市
1 370	368	133	235	71	53	18	6 522	2 248	北九州市
6 524	603	226	377	99	75	24	9 462	2 618	福岡市

(総覧)

第3表-2 人口動態総覧(率), 都道府県(13大都市再掲)別

都道府県	出生率	死亡率	乳児死亡率	新生児死亡率	自然増加率	死産率 <sup>1)</sup>	自然死産率
	(人口千対)	(人口千対)	(出生千対)	(出生千対)	(人口千対)	(出生千対)	(出生千対)
全国	9.7	7.2	3.8	2.0	2.5	31.7	14.7
北海道	8.8	7.2	3.7	1.9	1.6	40.1	16.2
青森	9.4	8.5	4.3	2.6	1.0	33.3	15.2
岩手	9.1	8.4	3.1	0.9	0.7	37.8	13.8
宮城	9.5	6.8	3.2	1.7	2.8	39.0	14.6
秋田	8.1	9.2	3.4	2.2	-1.1	35.7	15.9
山形	9.3	9.0	3.7	2.2	0.2	36.1	15.2
福島	10.1	8.3	4.8	2.4	1.8	35.2	15.9
茨城	9.8	7.1	4.1	2.2	2.7	30.8	14.5
栃木	9.7	7.4	4.5	2.6	2.3	35.0	16.6
群馬	10.0	7.5	3.5	1.5	2.5	28.8	13.4
埼玉	10.2	5.4	3.8	1.9	4.8	27.3	14.9
千葉	9.6	5.9	3.3	1.6	3.7	29.2	16.8
東京都	8.5	6.7	3.8	1.9	1.8	31.5	16.7
神奈川県	10.0	5.6	3.7	2.3	4.4	27.4	14.9
新潟	9.2	8.2	4.2	2.1	1.0	26.4	13.5
富山	9.2	8.2	4.7	2.6	1.0	28.2	15.0
石川	9.8	7.6	3.7	1.7	2.1	29.8	18.3
福井	10.2	8.1	4.9	3.2	2.1	25.8	13.1
山梨	10.2	8.0	4.5	2.7	2.2	26.8	14.9
長野	9.8	8.4	2.7	1.2	1.4	24.7	13.3
岐阜	9.9	7.4	3.7	1.6	2.5	27.5	12.4
静岡県	9.7	7.0	3.3	1.7	2.7	28.9	14.8
愛知県	10.8	6.2	3.7	2.0	4.6	27.8	13.1
三重	9.7	8.0	4.1	2.7	1.7	30.2	14.1
滋賀	10.8	6.7	4.2	2.3	4.1	26.0	13.6
京都府	9.3	7.4	4.0	2.3	1.9	30.2	14.4
大阪府	10.3	6.6	3.6	1.9	3.7	31.8	13.6
兵庫県	10.0	7.3	4.0	2.1	2.6	28.6	13.1
奈良	9.5	6.8	4.4	2.6	2.7	24.9	12.8
和歌山	9.4	9.1	2.7	1.8	0.4	28.2	12.8
鳥取	9.1	8.8	3.6	2.0	0.3	40.1	14.6
島根	8.9	9.8	5.0	2.3	-0.9	30.8	14.6
岡山	9.9	8.3	3.2	1.6	1.5	31.1	12.2
広島	9.8	7.6	3.2	1.6	2.2	28.2	11.7
山口	8.7	9.1	3.9	1.7	-0.4	30.5	15.6
徳島	8.9	9.1	3.4	1.6	-0.3	32.6	13.1
香川県	9.1	8.6	3.2	1.9	0.4	33.9	17.7
愛媛	9.1	8.9	4.4	2.3	0.3	32.4	15.4
高松	8.8	9.7	3.5	1.3	-0.8	40.0	12.6
福岡	9.7	7.3	3.9	2.5	2.5	39.8	14.8
佐賀	10.1	8.5	4.9	3.1	1.6	38.7	14.6
長門	9.9	8.4	3.6	2.1	1.5	41.8	15.3
熊本	9.7	7.9	4.8	2.8	1.8	43.4	16.3
大分	9.2	8.6	2.7	1.9	0.6	39.5	15.9
宮崎	10.0	7.9	3.9	2.0	2.1	47.9	13.6
鹿児島	9.4	9.2	2.8	1.1	0.2	44.5	15.2
沖縄	13.4	5.5	5.1	3.0	7.9	29.4	17.1
(再掲)							
東京都区部	8.0	7.0	3.8	1.9	1.0	33.0	16.9
札幌市	9.2	5.4	3.4	1.9	3.8	41.9	14.1
仙台市	10.2	5.0	2.5	1.4	5.2	39.4	13.8
千葉市	9.8	5.0	3.2	1.8	4.9	25.7	16.1
横浜市	10.0	5.6	4.2	2.5	4.4	27.4	15.0
川崎市	10.9	5.2	3.3	2.1	5.7	25.4	12.7
名古屋市	9.8	6.7	3.7	2.1	3.2	30.8	14.2
京都市	9.0	7.2	3.9	2.0	1.8	29.4	13.3
大阪市	9.6	7.8	3.7	2.2	1.8	39.0	15.5
神戸市	8.9	7.1	2.8	1.5	1.8	32.7	13.1
広島市	10.6	5.8	2.9	1.4	4.8	27.5	10.9
北九州市	9.2	7.9	3.7	2.2	1.3	37.7	13.6
福岡市	10.4	5.3	4.2	2.9	5.0	43.0	16.1

注: 1全国には住所が外国・不詳を含む。

2人口千対の率算出に用いた人口は付表「諸率の算出に用いた人口」を参照。

3合計特殊出生率の算出には、全国値は各歳別の日本人人口、都道府県値は5歳階級別の総人口を用いた。

人工死産率 対 )	周産期 <sup>2)</sup> 死亡率 (出産千対)	妊娠満22週 以後の死産率	早期新生児 死亡率 (出生千対)	婚 姻   離 婚 (人口千対)	合計特殊 出生率 <sup>3)</sup>	都 道 府 県
17.0	6.7	5.2	1.4	6.4	1.66	全 国
23.9	6.6	5.2	1.3	6.3	2.06	北海道
18.0	7.3	5.1	2.2	5.5	1.69	北海 道
24.0	5.1	4.6	0.5	5.1	1.21	青森 道
24.3	6.4	4.9	1.5	6.0	1.41	岩手 道
19.8	6.8	5.0	1.8	4.8	1.22	宮城 道
20.9	8.5	6.7	1.8	4.9	1.12	秋田 道
19.4	7.8	6.1	1.7	5.7	1.39	山形 道
16.3	8.0	6.5	1.5	6.0	1.48	福島 道
18.4	8.4	6.3	2.0	6.1	1.51	茨城 道
15.5	6.3	5.1	1.2	6.0	1.56	栃木 道
12.5	7.2	5.9	1.3	6.7	1.72	群馬 道
12.4	7.0	5.8	1.2	6.7	1.71	千葉県
14.9	6.7	5.3	1.4	7.3	1.92	東京都
12.5	7.2	5.6	1.6	7.6	1.86	東 京
12.9	6.5	5.2	1.3	5.2	1.07	神奈川 道
13.2	6.4	4.7	1.8	5.6	1.15	新潟 道
11.5	7.7	6.4	1.3	5.9	1.25	富山 道
12.7	7.2	4.9	2.3	5.7	1.21	石川 道
11.9	7.3	5.4	1.9	6.1	1.43	福井 道
11.5	5.9	5.1	0.8	5.9	1.25	山梨 道
15.2	6.2	5.0	1.1	5.8	1.24	長野 道
14.1	6.3	5.2	1.1	6.2	1.56	岐阜 道
14.8	6.4	5.3	1.2	7.1	1.59	静岡 道
16.0	6.9	4.8	2.2	6.0	1.45	愛知 道
12.4	6.6	4.9	1.7	6.4	1.33	三重 道
15.8	7.1	5.6	1.5	6.2	1.59	滋賀 道
18.1	5.9	4.5	1.3	7.5	2.02	京都 道
15.4	6.1	4.7	1.3	6.6	1.60	大阪 道
12.1	6.8	4.7	2.0	6.0	1.46	兵庫 道
15.4	7.0	5.4	1.6	5.9	1.69	奈良 道
25.5	7.3	6.2	1.1	5.3	1.50	和歌山 道
16.2	6.1	4.2	1.9	4.6	1.09	鳥取 道
18.9	5.4	4.1	1.4	6.0	1.53	島根 道
16.5	5.2	4.0	1.2	6.1	1.57	岡山 道
14.9	5.8	4.5	1.3	5.3	1.55	広島 道
19.5	7.9	6.5	1.5	5.3	1.45	徳島 道
16.2	7.6	6.0	1.6	5.8	1.54	香川 道
17.0	6.5	4.9	1.7	5.5	1.65	愛媛 道
27.4	5.1	4.2	1.0	5.3	1.86	高松 道
24.9	6.8	5.2	1.6	6.3	1.94	福岡 道
24.1	6.6	4.3	2.2	5.2	1.38	佐賀 道
26.5	6.4	4.9	1.5	5.3	1.55	長門 道
27.1	7.0	5.0	2.0	5.4	1.64	熊本 道
23.5	6.6	5.0	1.6	5.3	1.67	大分 道
34.3	6.0	4.2	1.8	5.7	1.83	宮崎 道
29.3	5.3	4.6	0.7	5.2	1.52	鹿児島 道
12.3	7.8	5.7	2.2	6.6	2.33	沖縄 道
16.1	6.5	5.2	1.3	7.4	1.98	(再掲)
27.7	5.7	4.4	1.3	7.4	2.35	東京都区部
25.6	6.3	5.0	1.3	7.3	1.49	札幌市
9.6	7.4	6.1	1.3	6.9	1.78	仙台市
12.4	8.0	6.2	1.8	7.7	1.86	千葉市
12.7	6.2	5.0	1.2	9.2	1.97	横浜市
16.6	6.4	5.1	1.3	7.0	1.82	川崎市
16.1	6.8	5.6	1.1	6.5	1.74	名古屋市
23.5	6.6	5.1	1.5	7.9	2.29	京都市
19.5	5.7	4.6	1.1	6.2	1.76	大阪市
16.7	4.7	3.7	1.0	7.0	1.80	神戸市
24.1	7.5	5.6	1.9	6.4	2.21	広島市
26.9	7.3	5.6	1.8	7.3	2.02	北九州市
						福岡市

注：1)、2)は総覧第2表-2の注2)、3)参照。

3) 合計特殊出生率とは、15歳から49歳までの女子の年齢別出生率を合計したもので、1人の女子が仮にその年次の年齢別出生率で一生の間に生むとした時の子ども数に相当する。

(出生)

第1表-1

## 母の年齢階級別にみた出生数の年次推移

母の年齢	昭和45年	50年	55年	60年	平成2年	6年	7年	8年
総数	1 934 239	1 901 440	1 576 889	1 431 577	1 221 585	1 238 328	1 187 064	1 206 555
～14歳	12	9	14	23	18	22	37	19
15～19	20 165	15 990	14 576	17 854	17 478	17 073	16 075	15 602
20～24	513 172	479 041	296 854	247 341	191 859	204 386	193 514	190 520
25～29	951 246	1 014 624	810 204	682 885	550 994	525 940	492 714	504 575
30～34	358 375	320 060	388 935	381 466	356 026	377 401	371 773	377 274
35～39	80 581	62 663	59 127	93 501	92 377	100 570	100 053	105 630
40～44	9 860	8 727	6 911	8 224	12 587	12 481	12 472	12 526
45～49	523	312	257	244	224	431	414	397
50～	25	7	1	1	-	3	-	-
不詳	280	7	10	38	22	21	12	12

第1表-2

## 母の年齢階級別にみた出生率の年次推移

母の年齢	昭和45年	50年	55年	60年	平成2年	6年	7年	8年
15～49歳 (合計特殊出生率)	2.13	1.91	1.75	1.76	1.54	1.50	1.42	1.43
15～19	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
20～24	0.52	0.51	0.39	0.32	0.24	0.21	0.20	0.20
25～29	1.05	0.93	0.91	0.89	0.70	0.63	0.59	0.56
30～34	0.43	0.36	0.35	0.44	0.47	0.49	0.47	0.49
35～39	0.10	0.08	0.07	0.08	0.11	0.13	0.13	0.14
40～44	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02
45～49	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

注：本表における母の年齢階級別にみた出生率は年齢階級内の母の各歳別出生率を合計したものであり、15歳～49歳の出生率の合計が合計特殊出生率である。

(出生)  
第2表-1 出生順位別にみた出生数の年次推移

出生順位	昭和45年	50年	55年	60年	平成2年	6年	7年	8年
総数	1 934 239	1 091 440	1 576 889	1 431 577	1 221 585	1 238 328	1 187 064	1 206 555
第1子	878 979	862 356	667 683	602 005	531 648	589 346	567 530	571 508
第2子	753 834	767 669	642 573	562 920	459 569	446 864	428 394	443 430
第3子以上	301 426	271 415	266 633	266 652	230 368	202 118	191 140	191 617

注：出生順位とは、同じ母親がこれまでに生んだ出生子の順序である。

第2表-2 出生順位別にみた出生率の年次推移

出生順位	昭和45年	50年	55年	60年	平成2年	6年	7年	8年
総数 (合計特殊出生率)	2.13	1.91	1.75	1.76	1.54	1.50	1.42	1.43
第1子	0.94	0.86	0.79	0.76	0.66	0.69	0.66	0.66
第2子	0.84	0.76	0.69	0.70	0.59	0.55	0.52	0.53
第3子以上	0.35	0.29	0.27	0.31	0.29	0.26	0.24	0.23

注：本表における出生順位別にみた出生率は15歳～49歳の母の出生順位ごとの各歳別出生率を合計したものであって、総数は全子の合計特殊出生率である。

第3表 出生順位別にみた母の平均年齢の年次推移

出生順位	昭和45年	50年	55年	60年	平成2年	6年	7年	8年
総数	27.5歳	27.4歳	28.1歳	28.6歳	28.9歳	29.0歳	29.1歳	29.2歳
第1子	25.6	25.7	26.4	26.7	27.0	27.4	27.5	27.6
第2子	28.3	28.0	28.7	29.1	29.5	29.7	29.8	29.9
第3子	30.6	30.3	30.6	31.4	31.8	32.0	32.0	32.0

(出生)

第4表 出生時の身長別に  
みた性別出生数

平成8年

身長	男	女
総数	619 793	586 762
46cm以下	53 470	70 048
47	51 145	65 310
48	84 305	97 309
49	111 399	114 469
50	138 749	120 913
51	93 900	67 772
52cm以上	84 111	48 529
不詳	2 714	2 412
	構成割合 (%)	
総数	100.0	100.0
46cm以下	8.7	12.0
47	8.3	11.2
48	13.7	16.7
49	18.1	19.6
50	22.5	20.7
51	15.2	11.6
52cm以上	13.6	8.3
平均身長	49.3cm	48.8cm

注：出生時の身長不詳を除く出生数に対する構成割合である。

第5表 出生時の体重別に  
みた性別出生数

平成8年

体重	男	女
総数	619 793	586 762
1.0kg 未満	1 296	1 238
1.0kg 以上		
1.5kg 未満	2 407	2 216
1.5~2.0	6 046	5 896
2.0~2.5	32 290	39 493
2.5~3.0	191 237	222 866
3.0~3.5	283 389	247 834
3.5~4.0	92 428	61 241
4.0~4.5	9 875	5 496
4.5kg 以上	729	388
不詳	96	94
	構成割合 (%)	
総数	100.0	100.0
1.0kg 未満	0.2	0.2
1.0kg 以上		
1.5kg 未満	0.4	0.4
1.5~2.0	1.0	1.0
2.0~2.5	5.2	6.7
2.5~3.0	30.9	38.0
3.0~3.5	45.7	42.2
3.5~4.0	14.9	10.4
4.0~4.5	1.6	0.9
4.5kg 以上	0.1	0.1
平均体重	3.11kg	3.02kg

注：出生時の体重不詳を除く出生数に対する構成割合である。

第6表 単産一複産（複産の種類・  
出生一死産の組み合わせ）別  
分娩件数<sup>1)</sup>

平成8年

	分娩件数
分娩件数 <sup>2)</sup>	1 234 344
単産	1 222 767
複産	11 424
双子	11 094
三つ児	321
四つ児	8
五つ児	1
(複産の再掲)	
出生一死産の組み合わせ別分娩件数	
双子	11 094
2出生	10 139
1出生1死産	297
2死産	644
1出生1不詳	7
1死産1不詳	7
三つ児	321
3出生	286
2出生1死産	14
1出生2死産	2
3死産	17
2死産1不詳	1
1死産2不詳	1
四つ児	8
4出生	7
4死産	1
五つ児	1
5出生	1

注：1) 分娩件数とは出産（出生及び死産）をした母の数である。

2) 分娩件数は死産の単産、複産の不詳を含む。



(死 亡)

第1表 死因順位(第10位まで)別にみた  
性別死亡数・死亡率(人口10万対)

死 因	平成8年			平成7年			対前年増減	
	死亡数	死亡率	死亡総数に占める割合(%)	死亡数	死亡率	死亡総数に占める割合(%)	死亡数	死亡率
総 数								
全 死 因	896 211	718.6	100.0	922 139	741.9	100.0	-25 928	-23.3
悪性新生物	(1) 271 183	217.5	30.3	(1) 263 022	211.6	28.5	8 161	5.9
脳血管疾患	(2) 140 366	112.6	15.7	(2) 146 552	117.9	15.9	-6 186	-5.3
心疾患	(3) 138 229	110.8	15.4	(3) 139 206	112.0	15.1	- 977	-1.2
肺炎	(4) 70 971	56.9	7.9	(4) 79 629	64.1	8.6	-8 658	-7.2
不慮の事故	(5) 39 184	31.4	4.4	(5) 45 323	36.5	4.9	-6 139	-5.1
自殺	(6) 22 138	17.8	2.5	(7) 21 420	17.2	2.3	718	0.6
老衰	(7) 20 878	16.7	2.3	(6) 21 493	17.3	2.3	- 615	-0.6
肝疾患	(8) 16 517	13.2	1.8	(8) 17 018	13.7	1.8	- 501	-0.5
腎不全	(9) 16 196	13.0	1.8	(9) 16 187	13.0	1.8	9	0.0
糖尿病	(10) 12 838	10.3	1.4	(10) 14 225	11.4	1.5	-1 387	-1.1
男								
全 死 因	488 605	799.5	100.0	501 276	822.9	100.0	-12 671	-23.4
悪性新生物	(1) 164 824	269.7	33.7	(1) 159 623	262.0	31.8	5 201	7.7
心疾患	(2) 68 977	112.9	14.1	(2) 69 718	114.4	13.9	- 741	-1.5
脳血管疾患	(3) 66 479	108.8	13.6	(3) 69 587	114.2	13.9	-3 108	-5.4
肺炎	(4) 38 472	63.0	7.9	(4) 42 419	69.6	8.5	-3 947	-6.6
不慮の事故	(5) 25 485	41.7	5.2	(5) 28 229	46.3	5.6	-2 744	-4.6
自殺	(6) 14 853	24.3	3.0	(6) 14 231	23.4	2.8	622	0.9
肝疾患	(7) 11 198	18.3	2.3	(7) 11 576	19.0	2.3	- 378	-0.7
慢性閉塞性肺疾患	(8) 8 481	13.9	1.7	(8) 9 452	15.5	1.9	- 971	-1.6
腎不全	(9) 7 488	12.3	1.5	(9) 7 800	12.8	1.6	- 312	-0.5
糖尿病	(10) 6 394	10.5	1.3	(10) 7 107	11.7	1.4	- 713	-1.2
女								
全 死 因	407 606	641.0	100.0	420 863	664.0	100.0	-13 257	-23.0
悪性新生物	(1) 106 359	167.2	26.1	(1) 103 399	163.1	24.6	2 960	4.1
脳血管疾患	(2) 73 887	116.2	18.1	(2) 76 965	121.4	18.3	-3 078	-5.2
心疾患	(3) 69 252	108.9	17.0	(3) 69 488	109.6	16.5	- 236	-0.7
肺炎	(4) 32 499	51.1	8.0	(4) 37 210	58.7	8.8	-4 711	-7.6
老衰	(5) 14 506	22.8	3.6	(6) 14 809	23.4	3.5	- 303	-0.6
不慮の事故	(6) 13 699	21.5	3.4	(5) 17 094	27.0	4.1	-3 395	-5.5
腎不全	(7) 8 708	13.7	2.1	(7) 8 387	13.2	2.0	321	0.5
自殺	(8) 7 285	11.5	1.8	(8) 7 189	11.3	1.7	96	0.2
糖尿病	(9) 6 444	10.1	1.6	(9) 7 118	11.2	1.7	- 674	-1.1
肝疾患	(10) 5 319	8.4	1.3	(10) 5 442	8.6	1.3	- 123	-0.2

注：( )内の数字は、死因順位を示す。

(死 亡)

第2表 主な死因別にみた年齢階級別死亡数・死亡率 (人口10万対)

年齢階級	全 死 因	02100 悪性新生物	09300 脳血管疾患	09200 心 疾 患	10200 肺 炎
	死				
総 数	896 211	271 183	140 366	138 229	70 971
0～4歳	6 310	155	28	203	194
5～9	934	173	14	36	41
10～14	931	177	25	70	41
15～19	2 973	334	54	162	39
20～24	4 550	434	82	257	48
25～29	4 419	627	152	373	60
30～34	4 941	1 038	263	501	77
35～39	6 728	1 967	461	707	116
40～44	11 761	4 163	1 089	1 240	190
45～49	25 110	9 971	2 653	2 811	389
50～54	31 005	13 175	3 299	3 477	510
55～59	42 658	19 406	4 481	4 949	922
60～64	66 735	31 844	7 173	7 901	1 847
65～69	88 210	40 965	10 115	11 240	3 461
70～74	102 481	40 994	14 121	14 957	5 883
75～79	120 063	37 954	20 102	19 662	9 619
80～84	149 252	35 727	29 309	26 661	16 036
85～89	133 538	23 018	28 073	25 356	17 399
90～	93 048	9 040	18 834	17 620	14 083
	死 亡				
総 数	718.6	217.5	112.6	110.8	56.9
0～4歳	106.5	2.6	0.5	3.4	3.3
5～9	14.8	2.7	0.2	0.6	0.6
10～14	12.8	2.4	0.3	1.0	0.6
15～19	36.3	4.1	0.7	2.0	0.5
20～24	47.0	4.5	0.8	2.7	0.5
25～29	48.4	6.9	1.7	4.1	0.7
30～34	63.0	13.2	3.4	6.4	1.0
35～39	87.9	25.7	6.0	9.2	1.5
40～44	138.3	48.9	12.8	14.6	2.2
45～49	225.9	89.7	23.9	25.3	3.5
50～54	367.6	156.2	39.1	41.2	6.0
55～59	528.3	240.4	55.5	61.3	11.4
60～64	879.7	419.8	94.6	104.2	24.3
65～69	1 350.4	627.1	154.9	172.1	53.0
70～74	2 060.7	824.3	284.0	300.8	118.3
75～79	3 562.7	1 126.2	596.5	583.4	285.4
80～84	6 289.6	1 505.6	1 235.1	1 123.5	675.8
85～89	10 874.4	1 874.4	2 286.1	2 064.8	1 416.9
90～	19 671.9	1 911.2	3 981.8	3 725.2	2 977.4

注：1 表頭内の数字は死因簡単分類コードを示す。

2 総数には、年齢不詳を含む。

平成 8 年

20100 不慮の事故	20200 自殺	18100 老 衰	11300 肝 疾 患	14200 腎 不 全	04100 糖 尿 病	年 齢 階 級
亡 数						総 数
39 184	22 138	20 878	16 517	16 196	12 838	総 数
746	-	-	11	12	3	0~4 歳
326	-	-	5	1	-	5~9
228	64	-	1	4	1	10~14
1 476	400	-	3	1	7	15~19
1 812	1 110	-	12	14	16	20~24
1 127	1 228	-	38	13	25	25~29
896	1 159	-	95	32	41	30~34
853	1 230	-	231	38	62	35~39
1 186	1 478	-	516	66	160	40~44
1 955	2 458	-	1 238	163	331	45~49
2 032	2 502	-	1 655	246	450	50~54
2 340	2 314	1	1 958	367	726	55~59
2 975	2 151	10	2 451	655	1 238	60~64
3 305	1 584	56	2 270	1 160	1 497	65~69
3 543	1 331	186	1 757	1 594	1 723	70~74
4 087	1 128	735	1 506	2 320	1 953	75~79
4 554	989	2 897	1 414	3 504	2 200	80~84
3 570	606	6 064	923	3 579	1 695	85~89
2 090	230	10 929	422	2 425	710	90~
率 (人口 10 万 対)						総 数
31.4	17.8	16.7	13.2	13.0	10.3	総 数
12.6	-	-	0.2	0.2	0.1	0~4 歳
5.2	-	-	0.1	0.0	-	5~9
3.1	0.9	-	0.0	0.1	0.0	10~14
18.0	4.9	-	0.0	0.0	0.1	15~19
18.7	11.5	-	0.1	0.1	0.2	20~24
12.3	13.4	-	0.4	0.1	0.3	25~29
11.4	14.8	-	1.2	0.4	0.5	30~34
11.2	16.1	-	3.0	0.5	0.8	35~39
13.9	17.4	-	6.1	0.8	1.9	40~44
17.6	22.1	-	11.1	1.5	3.0	45~49
24.1	29.7	-	19.6	2.9	5.3	50~54
29.0	28.7	0.0	24.3	4.5	9.0	55~59
39.2	28.4	0.1	32.3	8.6	16.3	60~64
50.6	24.2	0.9	34.8	17.8	22.9	65~69
71.2	26.8	3.7	35.3	32.1	34.6	70~74
121.3	33.5	21.8	44.7	68.8	58.0	75~79
191.9	41.7	122.1	59.6	147.7	92.7	80~84
290.7	49.3	493.8	75.2	291.4	138.0	85~89
441.9	48.6	2 310.6	89.2	512.7	150.1	90~

(死 亡)

第3表 悪性新生物の主な部位別にみた  
性別死亡率 (人口10万対) の年次推移<sup>1)</sup>

死 簡 単 分 類 コ ー ド	死 因	昭和45年	50年	55年	60年	平成2年	6年	7年	8年
		総 数							
02100	悪性新生物	116.3	122.6	139.1	156.1	177.2	196.4	211.6	217.5
02102	食道	4.7	4.5	4.9	5.2	5.9	6.6	6.9	7.3
02103	胃	47.3	44.8	43.4	40.7	38.7	38.5	40.3	40.2
02104	結腸	3.7	5.0	6.8	9.3	12.6	15.4	16.3	17.1
02105	直腸S状結腸移行部 及び直腸	4.5	5.3	5.9	6.5	7.4	7.9	8.8	9.0
02106	肝及び肝内胆管	0.6	1.0	12.0	15.8	19.7	22.1	25.5	25.8
02107	胆のう及び その他の胆道	3.0	4.0	5.7	7.9	9.7	10.9	11.1	11.3
02108	膵	4.3	5.1	6.7	8.7	10.9	12.1	12.9	13.3
02110	気管、気管支及び肺	10.2	13.3	18.3	23.8	29.7	35.0	36.8	38.5
02112	乳房	2.4	3.0	3.6	4.1	4.8	5.8	6.3	6.4
02113	子宮 <sup>2)</sup>	12.1	10.7	9.2	8.0	7.4	7.2	7.7	7.8
02114	卵巣 <sup>3)</sup>	2.1	2.7	3.5	4.4	5.2	6.1	6.1	6.3
02115	前立腺 <sup>4)</sup>	1.7	2.3	3.0	4.5	5.7	7.8	8.9	9.8
02119	白血病	3.5	3.7	3.9	4.3	4.6	4.8	4.9	5.0
02104, 02105	(再掲) 大腸 <sup>5)</sup>	8.2	10.3	12.7	15.8	20.1	23.3	25.2	26.2
		男							
02100	悪性新生物	132.6	140.6	163.5	187.4	216.4	241.5	262.0	269.7
02102	食道	7.3	7.1	7.8	8.5	10.0	11.1	11.9	12.6
02103	胃	58.6	55.6	53.9	51.1	49.6	50.2	52.6	53.0
02104	結腸	3.5	4.9	6.7	9.4	12.9	15.9	17.1	18.1
02105	直腸S状結腸移行部 及び直腸	5.0	5.7	6.8	7.8	9.1	10.1	11.3	11.5
02106	肝及び肝内胆管	0.8	1.4	17.0	23.3	29.5	33.0	37.4	37.5
02107	胆のう及び その他の胆道	2.6	3.5	4.9	6.7	8.4	9.7	10.2	10.3
02108	膵	5.0	5.8	7.8	10.1	12.1	13.6	14.7	14.8
02110	気管、気管支及び肺	14.8	19.6	27.0	35.3	44.6	52.1	54.8	57.3
02115	前立腺	1.7	2.3	3.0	4.5	5.7	7.8	8.9	9.8
02119	白血病	4.0	4.2	4.6	5.1	5.4	5.5	6.0	5.9
02104, 02105	(再掲) 大腸 <sup>5)</sup>	8.5	10.6	13.5	17.1	22.1	25.9	28.4	29.6
		女							
02100	悪性新生物	100.7	105.2	115.5	125.9	139.3	153.1	163.1	167.2
02102	食道	2.2	2.0	2.1	1.9	2.0	2.2	2.2	2.3
02103	胃	36.5	34.4	33.2	30.6	28.1	27.2	28.5	28.0
02104	結腸	3.9	5.1	6.9	9.3	12.4	14.9	15.6	16.2
02105	直腸S状結腸移行部 及び直腸	4.1	4.9	4.9	5.3	5.8	5.9	6.5	6.6
02106	肝及び肝内胆管	0.4	0.6	7.1	8.5	10.3	11.7	14.1	14.6
02107	胆のう及び その他の胆道	3.4	4.6	6.4	9.0	10.9	12.0	11.9	12.2
02108	膵	3.5	4.4	5.7	7.3	9.6	10.6	11.1	11.9
02110	気管、気管支及び肺	5.7	7.2	9.9	12.7	15.4	18.6	19.5	20.5
02112	乳房	4.7	5.8	7.0	8.0	9.4	11.3	12.2	12.4
02113	子宮 <sup>2)</sup>	12.1	10.7	9.2	8.0	7.4	7.2	7.7	7.8
02114	卵巣	2.1	2.7	3.5	4.4	5.2	6.1	6.1	6.3
02119	白血病	3.0	3.3	3.3	3.6	3.9	4.1	3.9	4.2
02104, 02105	(再掲) 大腸 <sup>5)</sup>	8.0	10.0	11.9	14.6	18.2	20.8	22.0	22.8

注：1) 平成7年からは、ICD-10の適用によるがんの部位別リストの新設により、部位別分類に変化がみられる。

2) 平成6年以前は胎盤を含む。

3) 女子人口10万対の死亡率である。

4) 男子人口10万対の死亡率である。

5) 結腸と直腸S状結腸移行部及び直腸である。

## (婚姻)

第1表 初婚-再婚別・夫妻の組み合わせ別にみた婚姻件数の年次推移

初 婚・再 婚	昭和45年	50年	55年	60年	平成2年	6年	7年	8年
総 数	1 029 405	941 628	774 702	735 850	722 138	782 738	791 888	795 080
夫 初婚	943 783	855 825	690 885	646 241	625 453	681 759	687 167	688 887
夫 再婚	85 622	85 803	83 817	89 609	96 685	100 979	104 721	106 193
妻 初婚	967 716	871 445	701 415	656 609	637 472	693 853	700 158	701 776
妻 再婚	61 689	70 183	73 287	79 241	84 666	88 885	91 730	93 304
組み合わせ別								
夫 妻とも初婚	914 870	822 382	657 373	613 387	589 886	642 827	646 536	647 477
夫初婚妻再婚	28 913	33 443	33 512	32 854	35 567	38 932	40 631	41 410
夫再婚妻初婚	52 846	49 063	44 042	43 222	47 586	51 026	53 622	54 299
夫 妻とも再婚	32 776	36 740	39 775	46 387	49 099	49 953	51 099	51 894

第2表 夫妻の国籍別にみた婚姻件数の年次推移

国 籍 <sup>1)</sup>	昭和45年	50年	55年	60年	平成2年	6年	7年	8年
総 数	1 029 405	941 628	774 702	735 850	722 138	782 738	791 888	795 080
夫妻とも日本	1 023 859	935 583	767 441	723 669	696 512	756 926	764 161	766 708
夫妻の一方が外国	5 546	6 045	7 261	12 181	25 626	25 812	27 727	28 372
夫日本・妻外国	2 108	3 222	4 386	7 738	20 026	19 216	20 787	21 162
妻日本・夫外国	3 438	2 823	2 875	4 443	5 600	6 596	6 940	7 210
夫日本・妻外国	2 108	3 222	4 386	7 738	20 026	19 216	20 787	21 162
妻の国籍								
韓国・朝鮮	1 536	1 994	2 458	3 622	8 940	4 851	4 521	4 461
中国	280	574	912	1 766	3 614	4 587	5 174	6 264
米国	75	152	178	254	260	241	198	241
フィリピン						5 999	7 188	6 645
タイ						1 836	1 915	1 760
英国						90	82	88
ブラジル	217	502	838	2 096	7 212	590	579	551
ペルー						146	140	130
その他の国						876	990	1 022
妻日本・夫外国	3 438	2 823	2 875	4 443	5 600	6 596	6 940	7 210
夫の国籍								
韓国・朝鮮	1 386	1 554	1 651	2 525	2 721	2 686	2 842	2 800
中国	195	243	194	380	708	695	769	773
米国	1 571	631	625	876	1 091	1 445	1 303	1 357
フィリピン						46	52	56
タイ						17	19	25
英国						190	213	234
ブラジル	286	395	405	662	1 080	147	162	199
ペルー						74	66	58
その他の国						1 296	1 514	1 708

注：1) 平成4年からフィリピン、タイ、英国、ブラジル、ペルーについても調査している。

## (婚姻)

第3表 夫妻の年齢階級別にみた初婚件数・初婚率（人口千対）の年次推移

年齢階級	昭和45年	50年	55年	60年	平成2年	6年	7年	8年
夫								
総数	799 637	769 670	634 352	601 673	581 650	629 859	635 178	638 357
～19歳	5 811	5 077	5 304	6 577	7 683	8 855	8 693	8 641
20～24	221 545	210 292	137 768	126 761	118 866	135 323	136 347	136 301
25～29	451 864	430 929	325 327	288 236	274 447	287 314	287 105	294 623
30～34	101 083	104 611	142 437	138 164	129 444	137 465	140 354	135 834
35～39	14 377	14 325	18 875	34 783	37 101	42 394	42 848	42 764
40～44	3 196	3 083	3 330	5 317	10 893	13 247	13 516	13 299
45～49	853	849	856	1 229	2 225	3 860	4 777	5 205
50～	563	461	443	597	984	1 390	1 520	1 685
不詳	345	43	12	9	7	11	18	5
妻								
総数	818 316	783 246	643 514	610 389	592 262	640 976	647 004	649 961
～19歳	33 470	24 315	20 912	21 602	22 327	20 381	19 271	18 631
20～24	533 842	459 635	328 761	280 044	233 032	238 834	233 964	226 677
25～29	208 780	256 383	238 640	249 594	270 575	294 504	299 855	308 722
30～34	26 285	28 364	41 169	41 628	48 641	66 965	72 600	73 428
35～39	9 363	7 763	8 438	11 907	11 320	13 734	14 676	15 695
40～44	4 164	3 739	2 757	2 998	3 814	3 708	3 679	3 763
45～49	1 574	1 938	1 564	1 302	1 415	1 629	1 661	1 787
50～	621	1 071	1 261	1 313	1 136	1 220	1 294	1 255
不詳	217	38	12	1	2	1	4	3
夫（男子人口千対）								
～19歳	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.5	2.0	2.0	2.1
20～24	42.0	46.4	35.0	30.7	26.8	26.7	27.4	27.5
25～29	100.6	79.9	72.1	73.6	68.0	66.4	65.7	63.5
30～34	24.3	22.8	26.4	30.5	33.3	35.0	34.8	34.2
35～39	3.5	3.4	4.1	6.5	8.2	10.8	11.0	11.1
40～44	0.9	0.8	0.8	1.2	2.0	2.8	3.0	3.1
45～49	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.5	0.8	0.9	0.9
妻（女子人口千対）								
～19歳	7.5	6.3	5.2	5.0	4.6	4.8	4.7	4.7
20～24	100.4	102.7	85.4	70.0	54.4	49.5	48.9	47.8
25～29	45.9	48.0	53.5	65.0	68.7	70.0	70.6	68.6
30～34	6.3	6.2	7.7	9.3	12.7	17.4	18.5	19.0
35～39	2.3	1.9	1.8	2.2	2.5	3.5	3.8	4.1
40～44	1.1	0.9	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.9
45～49	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3

注：各届出年に同居し届け出たものについての集計である。

第4表 夫妻の平均婚姻年齢の年次推移

初婚・再婚	昭和45年	50年	55年	60年	平成2年	6年	7年	8年
全婚姻								
夫	27.6歳	27.8歳	28.7歳	29.3歳	29.7歳	29.8歳	29.8歳	29.9歳
妻	24.6	25.2	25.9	26.4	26.9	27.2	27.3	27.5
初婚								
夫	26.9	27.0	27.8	28.2	28.4	28.5	28.5	28.5
妻	24.2	24.7	25.2	25.5	25.9	26.2	26.3	26.4
再婚								
夫	38.0	37.8	38.2	39.4	40.1	40.3	40.3	40.4
妻	33.2	33.2	34.1	35.7	36.5	36.9	36.9	37.0

注：各届出年に同居し届け出たものについての集計である。

## (離婚)

## 第1表

## 同居期間別にみた離婚件数及び平均同居期間の年次推移

同居期間	昭和45年	50年	55年	60年	平成2年	6年	7年	8年
総数	95 937	119 135	141 689	166 640	157 608	195 106	199 016	206 955
5年未満	49 489	58 336	52 597	56 438	59 676	74 853	76 710	80 434
1年未満	14 523	14 773	12 990	12 655	13 065	14 695	14 893	15 512
1～2	11 149	13 014	11 427	12 815	14 387	17 342	18 081	19 123
2～3	9 193	11 731	10 211	11 710	12 326	16 143	16 591	17 605
3～4	7 772	10 141	9 204	10 437	10 452	14 488	14 576	15 117
4～5	6 852	8 677	8 765	8 821	9 446	12 185	12 569	13 077
5～10	23 299	28 597	39 034	35 338	33 168	40 125	41 185	42 725
10～15	11 898	16 206	24 425	32 312	21 988	25 529	25 308	25 962
15～20	5 858	8 172	14 088	21 529	19 924	19 960	19 153	18 970
20年以上	5 072	6 810	10 883	20 435	21 718	31 256	31 877	32 659
20～25	...	4 050	6 573	12 706	12 801	17 743	17 847	17 701
25～30	...	1 894	2 682	4 827	5 767	8 345	8 684	9 135
30～35	...	566	1 164	1 793	1 964	3 384	3 506	3 810
35～	...	300	464	1 109	1 186	1 784	1 840	2 013
不詳	321	1 014	662	588	1 134	3 383	4 783	6 205
平均同居期間(年)	6.8	7.1	8.6	10.1	9.9	10.0	10.0	9.8

## 第2表

## 夫妻の国籍別にみた離婚件数の年次推移

国 籍 <sup>1)</sup>	平成4年	5年	6年	7年	8年
総数	179 191	188 297	195 106	199 016	206 955
夫妻とも日本	171 475	180 700	187 369	191 024	198 860
夫妻の一方が外国	7 716	7 597	7 737	7 992	8 095
夫日本・妻外国	6 174	5 987	5 996	6 153	6 171
妻日本・夫外国	1 542	1 610	1 741	1 839	1 924
夫日本・妻外国	6 174	5 987	5 996	6 153	6 171
妻の国籍					
韓国・朝鮮	3 591	3 154	2 835	2 582	2 313
中国	1 163	1 234	1 323	1 486	1 462
米国	75	62	63	53	60
フィリピン	988	1 111	1 281	1 456	1 706
タイ	171	186	239	315	320
英国	15	17	17	25	19
ブラジル	39	43	35	47	52
ペルー	6	6	11	15	18
その他の国	126	174	192	174	221
妻日本・夫外国	1 542	1 610	1 741	1 839	1 924
夫の国籍					
韓国・朝鮮	956	889	885	939	912
中国	148	167	190	198	203
米国	203	265	273	299	298
フィリピン	33	40	52	43	66
タイ	4	8	12	8	14
英国	22	31	48	40	39
ブラジル	3	10	12	20	23
ペルー	3	7	7	7	15
その他の国	170	193	262	285	354

注：1) 夫妻の国籍は平成4年から調査している。

(別表)

<日本における外国人の人口動態>

平成8年

国籍	出生数(母の国籍別)			死亡数			乳児死亡数
	総数	男	女	総数	男	女	
総数	11 370	5 778	5 592	5 356	3 390	1 966	58
韓国・朝鮮	3 892	1 954	1 938	4 397	2 783	1 614	19
中国	2 334	1 206	1 128	410	249	161	8
フィリピン	720	389	331	63	27	36	8
タイ	378	183	195	72	36	36	5
米国	225	113	112	86	57	29	1
英国	67	39	28	13	12	1	-
ブラジル	2 050	1 038	1 012	124	83	41	10
ペルー	630	314	316	25	21	4	1
その他の外国	1 074	542	532	166	122	44	6

国籍	死産数 (母の国籍別)	婚姻件数		離婚件数	
		夫の国籍別	妻の国籍別	夫の国籍別	妻の国籍別
総数	834	3 314		1 233	
韓国・朝鮮	293	1 489	1 492	985	975
中国	80	230	273	176	187
フィリピン	196	8	51	-	8
タイ	72	1	13	-	3
米国	12	381	336	11	7
英国	3	51	49	3	3
ブラジル	85	762	775	13	10
ペルー	25	104	116	6	8
その他の外国	68	288	209	39	32

注：本表における外国人とは、つぎの者をいう。  
 出生・死産は両親とも外国籍のもの  
 死亡・乳児死亡は外国籍のもの  
 婚姻・離婚は夫妻とも外国籍のもの



諸率の算出に用いた人口

都道府県・男女別人口 (日本人人口)

都道府県	総数	男	女
全 国	124 709 000	61 115 000	63 594 000
北海道	5 689 000	2 733 000	2 956 000
青森	1 480 000	704 000	777 000
岩手	1 417 000	681 000	736 000
宮城	2 330 000	1 144 000	1 186 000
秋田	1 208 000	575 000	633 000
山形	1 253 000	606 000	647 000
福島	2 130 000	1 041 000	1 089 000
茨城	2 942 000	1 469 000	1 473 000
栃木	1 974 000	982 000	992 000
群馬	1 986 000	980 000	1 006 000
埼玉県	6 753 000	3 415 000	3 339 000
千葉県	5 775 000	2 912 000	2 863 000
東京都	11 587 000	5 792 000	5 795 000
神奈川県	8 194 000	4 176 000	4 018 000
新潟	2 484 000	1 208 000	1 276 000
富山	1 119 000	539 000	580 000
石川	1 177 000	569 000	608 000
福井	820 000	398 000	422 000
山梨	877 000	432 000	445 000
長野	2 178 000	1 063 000	1 115 000
岐阜	2 085 000	1 012 000	1 074 000
静岡県	3 706 000	1 825 000	1 882 000
愛知	6 806 000	3 406 000	3 400 000
三重	1 831 000	888 000	942 000
滋賀	1 283 000	632 000	650 000
京都府	2 585 000	1 255 000	1 331 000
大阪府	8 630 000	4 239 000	4 391 000
兵庫県	5 333 000	2 577 000	2 756 000
奈良	1 431 000	688 000	742 000
和歌山	1 075 000	511 000	565 000
鳥取	613 000	293 000	319 000
島根	767 000	367 000	400 000
岡山	1 941 000	933 000	1 008 000
広島	2 863 000	1 389 000	1 474 000
山口	1 539 000	729 000	811 000
徳島	831 000	395 000	436 000
香川	1 025 000	493 000	532 000
愛媛	1 502 000	710 000	792 000
高知	813 000	382 000	431 000
福岡	4 926 000	2 352 000	2 573 000
佐賀	884 000	419 000	465 000
長崎	1 538 000	723 000	815 000
熊本	1 859 000	880 000	980 000
大宮	1 227 000	580 000	647 000
分岐	1 176 000	556 000	619 000
鹿島	1 791 000	839 000	952 000
沖縄	1 277 000	626 000	651 000

資料：「平成8年10月1日現在推計人口」(総務庁統計局)

年齢5歳階級・男女別人口 (日本人人口)

年齢階級	総数	男	女
総 数	124 709 000	61 115 000	63 594 000
0～4歳	5 925 000	3 036 000	2 889 000
5～9	6 330 000	3 242 000	3 088 000
10～14	7 285 000	3 730 000	3 555 000
15～19	8 181 000	4 195 000	3 986 000
20～24	9 691 000	4 952 000	4 739 000
25～29	9 135 000	4 637 000	4 498 000
30～34	7 845 000	3 973 000	3 872 000
35～39	7 650 000	3 862 000	3 788 000
40～44	8 506 000	4 277 000	4 229 000
45～49	11 115 000	5 575 000	5 541 000
50～54	8 434 000	4 182 000	4 252 000
55～59	8 074 000	3 968 000	4 107 000
60～64	7 586 000	3 668 000	3 918 000
65～69	6 532 000	3 075 000	3 458 000
70～74	4 973 000	2 109 000	2 864 000
75～79	3 370 000	1 276 000	2 095 000
80～84	2 373 000	848 000	1 526 000
85～89	1 228 000	386 000	841 000
90歳以上	473 000	123 000	350 000

資料：「平成8年10月1日現在推計人口」(総務庁統計局)

13大都市・男女別人口 (総人口)

13大都市 (再掲)	総数	男	女
東京都区部	7 962 000	3 954 000	4 008 000
札幌市	1 774 000	851 000	924 000
仙台市	981 000	485 000	496 000
千葉市	860 000	435 000	425 000
横浜市	3 320 000	1 689 000	1 631 000
川崎市	1 209 000	632 000	577 000
名古屋市	2 151 000	1 073 000	1 078 000
京都市	1 464 000	706 000	757 000
大阪市	2 600 000	1 277 000	1 322 000
神戸市	1 420 000	682 000	738 000
広島市	1 115 000	545 000	570 000
北九州市	1 018 000	483 000	535 000
福岡市	1 296 000	630 000	666 000

資料：各指定都市及び東京都が推計した平成8年10月1日現在の人口である。

年齢調整死亡率算出に使用した昭和60年モデル人口

年齢階級	基準人口	年齢階級	基準人口
0～4歳	8 180 000	50～54歳	7 616 000
5～9	8 338 000	55～59	6 581 000
10～14	8 497 000	60～64	5 546 000
15～19	8 655 000	65～69	4 511 000
20～24	8 814 000	70～74	3 476 000
25～29	8 972 000	75～79	2 441 000
30～34	9 130 000	80～84	1 406 000
35～39	9 289 000	85歳以上	784 000
40～44	9 400 000	合 計	120 287 000
45～49	8 651 000		

注：昭和60年国勢調査人口をベビーブーム等の極端な増減を補正し、四捨五入によって1000人単位として作成した。

## インターネット掲載のお知らせ

次の統計表は、インターネット上の厚生省ホームページ「統計情報」の「人口動態統計年報（最新データ、年次推移）」に掲載しています。

なお、○印の表については、「報道発表資料」にも掲載しています。

アドレス <http://www.mhw.go.jp/>

### 総 覧

- 第 1 表 人口動態総覧
- 第 2 表-1 人口動態総覧の年次推移
- 第 2 表-2 人口動態総覧（率）の年次推移
- 第 3 表-1 人口動態総覧，都道府県（13大都市再掲）別
- 第 3 表-2 人口動態総覧（率），都道府県（13大都市再掲）別

### 出 生

- 第 1 表-1 母の年齢階級別にみた出生数の年次推移
- 第 1 表-2 母の年齢階級別にみた出生率の年次推移
- 第 2 表-1 出生順位別にみた出生数の年次推移
- 第 2 表-2 出生順位別にみた出生率の年次推移
- 第 3 表 出生順位別にみた母の平均年齢の年次推移
- 第 4 表 出生時の身長別にみた性別出生数
- 第 5 表 出生時の体重別にみた性別出生数
- 第 6 表 単産-複産（複産の種類・出生-死産の組み合わせ）別分娩件数
- 第 7 表 都道府県別にみた単産-複産（複産の種類）別分娩件数
- 第 8 表 父母の国籍別にみた出生数の年次推移

### 死 亡

- 第 1 表 死因順位（第10位まで）別にみた性別死亡数・死亡率（人口10万対）
- 第 2 表 主な死因別にみた年齢階級別死亡数・死亡率（人口10万対）
- 第 3 表 悪性新生物の主な部位別にみた性別死亡率（人口10万対）の年次推移
- 第 4 表 性・年齢階級別にみた死亡数・死亡率（人口10万対）の年次推移
- 第 5 表 死亡の場所別にみた死亡数の年次推移
- 第 6 表 死亡の場所別にみた都道府県別死亡数・構成割合
- 第 7 表 死因順位（第5位まで）別にみた死亡数・死亡率（人口10万対）の年次推移
- 第 8 表 死因順位（第5位まで）別にみた年齢階級・性別死亡数・死亡率（人口10万対）  
・構成割合
- 第 9 表 年齢階級別にみた選択死因分類・性別死亡数
- 第 10 表 年齢階級別にみた選択死因分類・性別死亡率（人口10万対）
- 第 11 表 死因年次推移分類別にみた性別死亡数の年次推移
- 第 12 表 死因年次推移分類別にみた性別死亡率（人口10万対）の年次推移
- 第 13 表 死因年次推移分類別にみた性別年齢調整死亡率（人口10万対）の年次推移
- 第 14 表 死因簡単分類別にみた性別死亡数・死亡率（人口10万対）
- 第 15 表 主な死因別にみた都道府県別死亡数・死亡率（人口10万対）
- 第 16 表 悪性新生物の主な部位別にみた性別死亡数の年次推移
- 第 17 表 悪性新生物の主な部位別にみた性別年齢調整死亡率（人口10万対）の年次推移

### 死 産

- 第 1 表 妊娠期間別にみた自然-人工別死産数・構成割合

### 婚 姻

- 第 1 表 初婚-再婚別・夫妻の組み合わせ別にみた婚姻件数の年次推移
- 第 2 表 夫妻の国籍別にみた婚姻件数の年次推移
- 第 3 表 夫妻の年齢階級別にみた初婚件数・初婚率（人口千対）の年次推移
- 第 4 表 夫妻の平均婚姻年齢の年次推移
- 第 5 表 都道府県別にみた夫妻の平均初婚年齢の年次推移
- 第 6 表 初婚夫妻の年齢差別にみた婚姻件数の年次推移

### 離 婚

- 第 1 表 同居期間別にみた離婚件数及び平均同居期間の年次推移
- 第 2 表 夫妻の国籍別にみた離婚件数の年次推移
- 第 3 表 別居したときの夫妻の年齢階級別にみた離婚件数

### ○別 表

日本における外国人の人口動態

### ○付 表

諸率の算出に用いた人口





表 1 人口動態総覧(率)・都道府県別順位

平成8年

都道府県参考表

都道府県	出生		死亡		乳児死亡		新生児死亡		死産		周産期死亡		婚姻		離婚		婚姻		合計特殊出生率	
	率	順位	率	順位	率	順位	率	順位	率	順位	率	順位	率	順位	率	順位	率	順位	率	順位
全	9.7		7.2		3.8		2.0		31.7		6.7		6.4		1.66		10		1.43	
北海道	8.8	44	7.2	35	3.7	27	1.9	29	40.1	5	6.6	27	6.3	10	2.06	2	10	46	1.30	46
01 青森	9.4	29	8.5	14	4.3	12	2.6	9	33.3	18	7.3	11	5.5	32	1.69	12	32	19	1.54	19
02 岩手	9.1	40	8.4	17	3.1	43	0.9	47	37.8	12	5.1	47	5.1	44	1.21	43	44	13	1.58	13
03 宮城	9.5	28	6.8	39	3.2	42	1.7	36	39.0	10	6.4	32	6.0	18	1.41	34	18	37	1.42	37
04 秋田	8.1	47	9.2	4	3.4	35	2.2	20	35.7	14	6.8	20	4.8	46	1.22	41	46	21	1.52	21
05 山形	9.3	33	9.0	8	3.7	28	2.2	18	36.1	13	8.5	1	4.9	45	1.12	45	45	5	1.69	5
06 福島	10.1	9	8.3	19	4.8	6	2.4	12	35.2	15	7.8	6	5.7	29	1.39	35	29	3	1.71	3
07 茨城	9.8	18	7.1	36	4.1	16	2.2	19	30.8	24	8.0	3	6.0	22	1.48	29	22	25	1.49	25
08 栃木	9.7	25	7.4	31	4.5	8	2.6	8	35.0	16	8.4	2	8.0	15	1.51	27	15	24	1.50	24
09 群馬	10.0	13	7.5	29	3.5	33	1.5	43	28.8	33	6.3	34	6.0	17	1.56	20	17	22	1.52	22
10 群馬	10.2	6	5.4	47	3.8	22	1.9	31	27.3	41	7.2	13	6.7	6	1.72	9	6	40	1.37	40
11 埼玉	9.6	26	5.9	44	3.3	38	1.6	42	29.2	31	7.0	17	6.7	5	1.71	10	5	42	1.33	42
12 千葉	8.5	46	6.7	41	3.8	23	1.9	27	31.5	22	6.7	23	7.3	3	1.92	5	3	47	1.07	47
13 茨城	10.0	11	5.6	45	3.7	25	2.3	16	27.4	40	7.2	12	7.6	1	1.86	6	1	44	1.31	44
14 神奈川	9.2	35	8.2	20	4.2	14	2.1	22	26.4	43	6.5	29	5.2	41	1.07	47	41	14	1.58	14
15 新潟	9.2	36	8.2	21	4.7	7	2.6	7	28.2	37	6.4	31	5.6	31	1.15	44	31	27	1.49	27
16 富山	9.8	20	7.6	27	3.7	24	1.7	34	29.8	29	7.7	7	5.9	23	1.25	39	23	32	1.46	32
17 石川	10.2	7	8.1	22	4.9	3	3.2	1	25.8	45	7.2	14	5.7	28	1.21	42	28	7	1.65	7
18 福井	10.2	5	8.0	24	4.5	9	2.7	6	26.8	42	7.3	9	6.1	16	1.43	33	16	15	1.57	15
19 山梨	9.8	19	8.4	15	4.7	46	1.2	45	24.7	47	5.9	40	5.9	25	1.25	38	25	12	1.58	12
20 山梨	9.9	16	7.4	32	3.7	29	1.6	41	27.5	39	6.2	36	5.8	27	1.24	40	27	31	1.47	31
21 岐阜	9.7	21	7.0	37	3.3	37	1.7	37	28.9	32	6.3	35	6.2	13	1.56	21	13	35	1.46	35
22 静岡	10.8	3	6.2	43	3.7	26	2.6	26	27.8	38	6.4	30	7.1	4	1.59	18	4	36	1.43	36
23 愛知	9.7	23	8.0	23	4.1	15	2.7	5	30.2	28	6.9	19	6.0	19	1.45	31	19	33	1.46	33
24 三重	10.8	2	6.7	40	4.2	13	2.3	14	26.0	44	6.6	24	6.4	9	1.33	37	9	17	1.57	17
25 滋賀	9.3	32	7.4	30	4.0	17	2.3	15	30.2	27	7.1	15	6.2	12	1.59	17	12	45	1.30	45
26 京都	10.3	4	6.6	42	3.6	32	1.9	30	31.8	21	5.9	41	7.5	2	2.02	3	2	43	1.32	43
27 大阪	10.0	12	7.3	33	4.0	18	2.1	21	28.6	34	6.1	38	6.6	8	1.60	16	8	39	1.39	39
28 兵庫	9.5	27	6.8	38	4.4	10	2.6	10	24.9	46	6.8	22	6.0	20	1.46	30	20	41	1.34	41
29 奈良	9.4	30	9.1	6	2.7	47	1.8	33	28.2	36	7.0	18	6.4	24	1.69	11	24	28	1.49	28
30 和歌山	9.1	38	8.8	10	3.6	30	2.0	25	40.1	6	7.3	10	5.3	40	1.50	28	40	10	1.62	10
31 鳥取	8.9	41	9.8	1	5.0	2	2.3	13	30.8	25	6.1	37	4.6	47	1.09	46	47	2	1.73	2
32 島根	9.9	15	8.3	18	3.2	39	1.6	40	31.1	23	5.4	43	6.0	21	1.53	25	21	20	1.53	20
33 岡山	9.8	17	7.6	28	3.2	41	1.6	38	28.2	35	5.2	45	6.1	14	1.57	19	14	34	1.46	34
34 広島	8.7	45	9.1	7	3.9	21	1.7	35	30.5	26	5.8	42	5.3	37	1.55	23	37	26	1.49	26
35 山口	8.9	42	9.1	5	3.4	36	1.6	39	32.6	19	7.9	4	5.3	36	1.45	32	36	29	1.48	29
36 徳島	9.1	39	8.6	11	3.2	40	1.9	28	33.9	17	7.6	8	5.8	26	1.54	24	26	30	1.47	30
37 香川	9.1	37	8.9	9	4.4	11	1.3	44	32.4	20	6.5	28	5.5	33	1.65	14	33	23	1.50	23
38 愛媛	8.8	43	9.7	2	3.5	34	1.3	44	40.0	7	5.1	46	5.3	35	1.86	7	35	18	1.56	18
39 高松	9.7	22	7.3	34	3.9	19	2.5	11	39.8	8	6.8	21	6.3	11	1.94	4	11	38	1.41	38
40 福岡	10.1	8	8.5	13	4.9	4	3.1	2	38.7	11	6.6	26	5.2	43	1.38	36	43	6	1.67	6
41 佐賀	9.9	14	8.4	16	3.6	31	2.1	23	41.8	4	6.4	33	5.3	38	1.55	22	38	8	1.64	8
42 長門	9.7	24	7.9	26	4.8	5	2.8	4	43.4	3	7.0	16	5.4	34	1.64	15	34	11	1.61	11
43 熊本	9.2	34	8.6	12	2.7	45	1.9	32	39.5	9	6.6	25	5.3	39	1.67	13	39	16	1.57	16
44 大分	10.0	10	7.9	25	3.9	20	2.0	24	47.9	1	6.0	39	5.7	30	1.83	8	30	4	1.71	4
45 宮崎	9.4	31	9.2	3	2.8	44	1.1	46	44.5	2	5.3	44	5.2	42	1.52	26	42	9	1.63	9
46 鹿児島	13.4	1	5.5	46	5.1	1	3.0	3	29.4	30	7.8	5	6.6	7	2.33	1	7	1	1.86	1

[表2] 主な死因の死亡数・死亡率・死亡順位、都道府県別

平成8年(3-1)

	全死因		02100 悪性新生物		03000 脳血管疾患		08200 心疾患		10200 肺炎		20100 不慮の事故		
	死亡数	死亡率	死亡数	死亡率	死亡数	死亡率	死亡数	死亡率	死亡数	死亡率	死亡数	死亡率	
全	896 211	718.6	271 183	217.5	140 368	112.6	138 229	110.8	70 971	56.9	39 184	31.4	
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50	40 742 12 542 11 870 15 743 11 104 11 332 17 612 20 884 20 884 14 553 14 820 36 608 33 939 33 939 45 884 20 437 9 187 8 967 7 014 7 014 18 323 15 326 26 089 42 231 14 659 8 646 19 068 57 187 39 112 9 769 9 747 5 382 7 501 16 183 21 736 13 947 7 602 8 852 13 295 7 855 35 788 7 517 12 938 14 723 10 577 9 320 16 531 7 038	718.2 847.4 837.7 675.7 919.2 904.4 826.9 709.9 737.2 746.2 542.1 587.7 667.6 560.0 822.7 821.0 781.9 807.0 769.8 841.3 735.1 704.0 620.5 800.6 673.9 737.6 662.7 733.4 682.7 906.7 878.0 978.0 804.3 759.2 906.2 914.8 863.6 885.2 966.2 726.7 850.3 841.2 792.0 882.0 792.5 923.0 551.1	271 183 13 238 3 562 4 850 3 392 3 311 5 058 6 075 4 119 4 056 11 471 10 635 24 734 14 820 6 105 2 720 2 643 1 859 2 022 4 898 4 369 4 447 12 882 3 898 2 600 5 808 18 932 12 220 2 986 2 902 1 592 2 186 4 489 6 667 3 998 2 075 2 489 3 691 2 175 11 615 2 325 4 074 4 299 3 661 4 496 2 026	217.5 232.7 240.7 228.8 208.2 280.8 264.2 237.5 206.5 208.7 169.9 145.5 130.0 135.5 123.2 84.4 91.7 101.5 85.8 153.4 127.8 119.7 120.0 93.3 107.4 108.9 84.1 160.5 128.9 106.6 150.2 143.3 128.1 245.7 267.5 235.8 263.0 264.9 231.3 249.6 226.3 129.0 117.5 117.4 136.0 128.7 158.7 62.7	140 368 5 836 2 111 2 253 2 864 2 286 2 129 3 039 3 826 2 674 2 447 5 701 5 293 11 760 7 033 3 811 1 430 1 406 1 077 1 079 3 901 2 496 4 447 6 349 2 515 1 373 2 915 2 760 5 267 1 425 1 492 879 1 231 2 501 3 051 2 311 1 191 1 313 2 029 1 251 5 009 1 140 1 807 2 182 1 669 1 513 2 832 801	112.6 102.6 142.6 131.5 100.2 122.6 169.9 145.5 130.0 107.4 135.5 84.4 91.7 101.5 85.8 153.4 127.8 119.7 120.0 93.3 107.4 108.9 84.1 160.5 128.9 106.6 150.2 143.3 128.1 245.7 267.5 235.8 263.0 264.9 231.3 249.6 226.3 129.0 117.5 117.4 136.0 128.7 158.7 62.7	138 229 6 667 1 869 1 869 2 441 1 481 1 789 2 846 3 160 2 309 2 397 5 778 5 407 12 811 6 678 2 876 1 347 1 364 1 068 1 053 2 781 2 477 4 047 6 968 2 515 1 329 2 930 8 671 6 068 1 560 1 595 793 2 503 3 386 2 065 1 282 1 422 2 192 1 313 4 850 1 036 1 915 2 167 1 652 1 443 2 393 922	110.8 117.2 134.4 131.5 100.2 122.6 142.8 133.6 48.0 117.0 120.7 85.6 93.6 106.2 81.5 115.8 120.4 115.9 130.2 120.1 127.7 118.8 109.2 102.4 130.2 103.6 113.3 100.5 113.8 109.0 148.4 129.4 146.0 129.0 118.3 118.3 134.2 154.3 138.7 135.9 161.5 98.5 117.2 124.5 116.6 134.6 122.7 133.6 72.2	70 971 3 253 1 098 1 013 1 042 771 784 1 391 1 412 1 098 1 284 2 731 2 422 6 203 3 630 1 462 840 831 4 777 554 1 241 1 180 1 252 3 111 989 673 1 595 4 808 2 940 807 744 375 607 1 452 1 725 1 291 793 2 503 3 386 2 065 1 282 1 422 2 192 1 313 4 850 1 036 1 915 2 167 1 652 1 443 2 393 922	56.9 57.2 74.2 71.5 44.7 63.8 62.6 65.3 48.0 37.0 55.6 63.6 40.4 41.9 53.5 44.3 58.9 75.1 70.6 58.2 63.2 57.0 56.6 51.5 45.7 54.6 52.5 61.7 55.7 55.1 56.4 69.2 61.2 79.1 74.8 60.3 83.9 71.1 79.8 70.0 87.5 61.9 77.6 72.7 73.5 71.2 62.8 83.7 49.8	39 184 1 768 568 553 657 488 519 783 1 089 685 1 536 2 497 2 233 1 916 1 121 482 449 328 332 741 743 1 252 1 948 711 421 757 2 195 1 836 470 398 269 344 780 1 012 586 354 461 634 404 1 596 384 509 605 452 405 690 279	31.4 31.0 38.4 33.4 28.2 40.4 41.4 36.8 37.0 35.4 34.5 22.7 25.9 19.3 23.4 45.1 43.1 38.1 40.0 37.9 34.0 35.6 33.8 28.6 38.8 32.8 29.3 25.4 34.4 32.8 37.0 43.9 44.9 40.2 35.3 38.1 42.6 45.0 42.2 49.7 32.4 43.4 33.1 32.5 36.8 34.4 38.5 21.8	38 17 14 41 11 10 24 22 26 28 45 42 47 44 2 7 18 13 20 20 31 25 32 32 40 15 35 39 5 4 43 30 34 30 34 21 5 4 12 27 19 8 3 9 1 37 6 33 36 23 23 16 46

注：1) 死因名の上部の数字は、死因分類番号である。  
2) 順位は高位順である。

[表2] 主な死因の死亡数・死亡率(人口10万対)・順位、都道府県別

全	18100 老			20200 自			11300 肝疾患			14200 腎不全			04100 糖尿病			10400 慢性閉塞性肺疾患		
	死亡数	死亡率	順位	死亡数	死亡率	順位	死亡数	死亡率	順位	死亡数	死亡率	順位	死亡数	死亡率	順位	死亡数	死亡率	順位
国	20 878	16.7		22 138	17.8		16 517	13.2		16 196	13.0		12 838	10.3		11 765	9.5	
道	485	8.2	47	1 008	17.7	24	624	11.0	37	1 008	17.7	9	675	11.9	13	493	8.7	38
0 1 北	350	23.6	16	7 370	23.0	7	234	15.8	9	248	16.8	13	239	16.1	2	105	7.1	43
0 2 青	32	17.2	2	184	26.1	2	209	12.9	25	252	17.8	7	165	11.6	35	117	8.3	39
0 3 岩	351	15.1	36	405	17.4	29	271	9.0	45	271	11.6	33	228	9.8	38	171	7.3	42
0 4 岩	215	17.8	30	367	30.4	1	154	12.7	28	182	15.1	18	139	11.5	18	120	9.9	33
0 5 秋																		
0 6 山	371	29.6	8	246	19.6	14	128	10.2	41	176	14.0	23	148	11.8	14	125	10.0	32
0 7 山	604	28.4	10	409	19.2	15	236	11.1	36	262	12.3	30	278	13.1	6	246	11.5	18
0 8 茨	608	20.6	21	505	17.2	31	358	12.2	30	326	11.1	37	356	12.1	10	235	8.0	40
0 9 茨	332	19.9	25	375	19.0	18	256	13.0	24	211	10.7	41	204	10.3	28	217	11.0	21
1 0 群	474	23.9	14	413	20.8	11	269	13.5	21	228	11.5	34	200	10.1	31	210	10.6	27
1 1 埼	787	11.7	42	1 106	16.4	37	763	11.3	34	631	9.3	46	546	8.1	46	400	5.9	47
1 2 埼	770	19.3	41	813	14.1	46	603	10.4	39	571	9.9	45	548	9.5	40	389	6.7	45
1 3 東	1 051	9.1	45	2 026	17.5	27	1 704	14.7	16	1 309	11.3	35	1 203	10.4	27	895	7.7	41
1 4 神	753	9.2	44	1 193	14.6	45	1 146	14.0	19	1 747	9.1	47	615	7.5	47	533	6.5	46
1 5 新	589	23.7	15	591	23.8	5	204	8.2	46	265	10.7	42	308	12.4	9	272	11.0	23
1 6 宮	225	20.1	23	207	16.7	38	118	10.5	32	143	12.8	26	148	13.2	4	122	10.9	24
1 7 石	245	20.8	19	197	16.5	36	136	11.6	38	128	10.9	39	131	11.1	21	119	10.1	31
1 8 福	214	26.1	11	147	17.9	23	102	12.4	26	102	12.4	29	112	13.7	3	91	11.1	19
1 9 山	280	33.1	5	174	18.8	13	138	16.7	10	92	10.5	44	97	11.1	22	106	12.1	13
2 0 長	772	35.4	1	374	17.2	30	207	9.5	44	272	12.5	28	215	9.9	34	241	11.1	20
2 1 岐	537	25.8	12	339	16.3	38	204	8.8	43	227	10.9	38	224	10.7	25	199	9.5	35
2 2 静	847	22.9	17	551	14.9	44	386	10.4	40	477	12.9	25	375	10.1	30	340	9.2	36
2 3 愛	827	35.6	2	1 044	15.3	42	695	10.2	43	723	10.6	43	532	8.8	43	462	6.8	44
2 4 三	642	35.1	2	287	15.7	33	207	11.3	33	324	17.7	8	239	13.1	5	201	11.0	22
2 5 滋	201	15.7	33	218	17.0	34	99	7.7	47	139	10.8	40	108	8.4	44	155	12.1	14
2 6 京	380	14.7	38	442	17.1	32	330	12.8	27	481	18.6	4	262	10.1	29	278	10.8	26
2 7 大	729	8.4	46	1 390	16.1	39	1 449	16.8	13	1 171	13.6	24	824	9.5	39	824	8.8	37
2 8 兵	109	20.8	20	800	15.0	43	817	15.3	13	759	14.2	21	532	10.0	32	525	9.8	34
2 9 奈	263	17.7	31	180	12.6	47	184	12.9	26	169	11.8	32	139	9.7	36	145	10.1	30
3 0 和	332	32.7	6	231	21.5	9	160	14.9	14	160	14.9	19	137	12.7	7	144	13.4	9
3 1 島	213	34.7	3	125	20.4	12	90	14.7	17	78	12.7	27	73	11.9	12	74	12.1	15
3 2 島	258	33.6	4	200	26.1	3	110	14.3	18	128	16.7	15	84	11.0	24	110	14.3	16
3 3 岡	593	30.6	7	307	15.8	40	271	14.0	20	330	17.0	11	204	10.5	26	253	13.0	11
3 4 広	609	21.3	18	481	16.8	35	517	18.1	2	408	14.3	20	314	11.0	23	296	10.3	29
3 5 山	289	18.8	27	294	19.1	16	240	15.6	11	258	16.8	12	181	11.8	16	229	14.9	4
3 6 徳	166	20.0	24	142	17.1	33	169	20.3	1	162	19.5	2	136	16.4	1	125	15.0	2
3 7 香	255	24.9	13	193	18.8	19	124	12.1	31	186	18.1	6	129	12.6	8	129	12.6	12
3 8 愛	440	29.3	9	313	20.8	10	265	17.6	8	261	17.4	10	169	11.3	19	181	13.1	16
3 9 高	161	19.8	26	188	23.1	6	129	15.9	8	179	22.0	11	98	12.1	11	107	13.2	10
4 0 福	549	11.1	43	940	19.1	17	757	15.4	12	583	11.8	31	477	9.7	38	536	10.9	25
4 1 佐	181	20.5	22	156	17.6	26	147	16.6	7	136	15.4	17	79	8.9	42	92	10.4	28
4 2 長	232	15.1	35	276	17.9	22	228	14.8	15	257	16.7	14	125	8.1	45	214	13.9	7
4 3 熊	230	15.6	34	347	18.7	20	248	13.3	22	290	18.5	16	185	10.0	33	277	14.9	3
4 4 大	220	17.9	29	215	17.7	25	215	17.5	4	231	18.8	3	137	11.2	20	176	14.3	5
4 5 宮	173	14.7	37	294	25.0	4	154	13.1	23	167	14.2	22	114	9.7	37	137	11.6	17
4 6 鹿	328	18.3	28	391	21.8	8	298	16.6	6	328	18.3	5	211	11.8	15	241	13.5	8
4 7 沖	173	13.5	40	223	17.5	28	143	11.2	35	143	11.2	36	119	9.3	41	194	15.2	1

注: 1) 死因名の上部の数字は、死因分類番号である。  
2) 順位は高位順である。

【表2】 主な死因の死亡数・死亡率（人口10万対）・順位、都道府県別

平成8年（3-3）

	09100 高血圧性疾患		02200 その他の新生物		10500 喘		01200 結核		(再)20101 交通事故	
	死亡数	死亡率	死亡数	死亡率	死亡数	死亡率	死亡数	死亡率	死亡数	死亡率
全	7 245	5.8	7 660	6.1	5 995	4.8	2 858	2.3	14 343	11.5
国	230	4.0	243	4.3	243	4.3	75	1.3	806	14.2
道	85	5.7	117	7.9	71	4.8	46	3.1	219	14.8
0 1	74	5.2	104	7.3	78	5.5	24	1.7	188	13.3
0 2	101	4.3	118	5.1	102	4.4	35	1.5	248	10.6
0 3	59	4.9	61	5.0	51	4.2	24	2.0	146	12.1
0 4	80	6.4	74	5.9	64	5.1	32	2.6	167	13.3
0 5	120	5.6	117	5.5	129	6.1	35	1.6	300	14.1
0 6	185	6.3	200	6.8	168	5.7	50	1.7	484	16.5
0 7	92	4.7	107	5.4	117	5.9	45	2.3	341	17.3
0 8	130	6.5	184	8.8	81	4.1	37	1.9	265	13.3
0 9	196	2.9	334	4.9	267	4.0	107	1.6	623	9.2
1 0	367	6.4	301	5.2	218	3.8	96	1.7	674	11.7
1 1	547	4.7	673	5.8	516	4.5	315	2.7	633	5.5
1 2	295	3.6	411	5.0	302	3.7	158	1.9	543	6.6
1 3	230	9.3	144	5.8	91	3.7	30	1.2	366	14.7
1 4	74	6.6	85	7.6	52	4.6	16	1.4	138	12.3
1 5	87	7.4	80	6.8	44	3.7	22	1.0	153	13.0
1 6	58	7.1	49	6.0	50	6.1	12	1.5	125	15.2
1 7	47	5.4	66	7.5	43	4.9	13	1.5	116	13.2
1 8	191	8.8	143	6.6	78	3.6	45	2.1	239	11.0
1 9	119	5.7	130	6.2	100	4.8	67	3.2	282	13.5
2 0	236	6.4	232	6.3	129	3.5	71	1.9	484	13.1
2 1	306	4.5	312	4.6	265	3.9	164	2.4	736	10.8
2 2	148	8.1	160	8.7	91	5.0	46	2.5	255	13.9
2 3	92	7.2	71	5.5	41	3.2	17	1.3	189	14.7
2 4	138	5.3	160	6.2	104	4.0	57	2.2	304	11.8
2 5	664	7.7	425	6.2	431	5.0	309	3.6	745	8.6
2 6	311	5.8	380	7.1	293	5.5	156	2.9	689	12.9
2 7	76	5.3	70	4.9	72	5.0	27	1.9	166	11.6
2 8	76	7.1	76	7.1	54	5.0	33	3.1	129	12.0
2 9	43	7.0	39	6.4	29	4.7	12	2.0	100	16.3
3 0	53	6.9	60	7.8	52	6.8	12	1.6	114	14.9
3 1	89	4.6	130	6.7	133	6.9	7	0.8	305	15.7
3 2	139	4.9	252	8.8	134	4.7	59	3.0	366	12.8
3 3	105	6.8	143	9.3	85	4.5	37	2.4	232	15.1
3 4	49	5.9	64	7.7	60	7.2	21	2.5	126	15.2
3 5	55	5.4	94	9.2	67	6.5	29	2.8	200	19.5
3 6	94	6.3	113	7.5	123	8.2	41	2.7	246	16.4
3 7	39	4.8	62	7.6	51	6.3	25	3.1	119	14.6
3 8	358	7.3	327	6.6	234	4.8	108	2.2	571	11.6
3 9	118	13.3	37	4.2	44	5.0	25	2.8	142	16.1
4 0	144	9.4	123	8.0	85	5.5	38	2.5	167	10.9
4 1	153	8.2	141	7.6	116	6.2	29	1.6	227	12.2
4 2	133	10.8	89	7.3	60	4.9	34	2.8	162	13.2
4 3	89	7.6	100	8.5	91	7.7	30	2.6	157	13.4
4 4	126	7.0	164	9.2	188	10.5	40	2.2	215	12.0
4 5	40	3.1	82	6.4	92	7.2	17	1.3	95	7.4

注：1) 死因名の上部の数字は、死因分類番号である。  
2) 順位は高位順である。



【表3】 悪性新生物の主な部位別死亡数・率（人口10万対）・順位、都道府県別

平成8年（3-1）

	02100 悪性新生物		02102 食 道		02103 胃		02104 結 腸		02105 直腸・結腸移行部及び直腸	
	死亡数	死亡率	死亡数	死亡率	死亡数	死亡率	死亡数	死亡率	死亡数	死亡率
全	271 183	217.5	9 138	7.3	50 165	40.2	21 382	17.1	11 248	9.0
国	13 238	232.7	506	8.9	2 191	38.5	1 048	18.4	552	9.7
道	3 562	240.7	131	8.9	689	46.6	310	20.9	164	11.1
0 1 北	3 242	228.8	117	8.3	536	31.9	310	21.9	166	11.7
0 2 青	4 850	208.2	250	10.7	836	35.9	425	18.2	209	9.0
0 3 京	3 392	280.8	175	14.5	741	61.3	246	20.4	155	12.8
0 4 神	3 311	264.2	116	9.3	738	58.9	271	21.6	159	12.7
0 5 山	5 058	237.5	186	8.7	1 060	42.8	385	18.1	229	10.8
0 6 福	6 075	208.7	231	7.9	1 281	49.9	483	16.4	265	9.0
0 7 茨	4 119	208.7	136	6.9	912	46.2	298	15.1	153	7.9
0 8 栃	4 056	204.2	129	6.5	811	40.8	312	15.7	191	9.6
0 9 群	11 471	169.9	456	6.8	2 270	33.6	910	13.5	544	8.1
1 1 埼	10 635	184.2	353	6.1	2 173	37.6	830	14.4	458	7.9
1 2 千	24 734	213.5	1 025	8.8	4 448	38.4	1 818	18.6	1 069	9.2
1 3 東	14 820	180.9	601	7.3	2 804	34.2	1 234	15.1	625	7.6
1 4 神	6 105	245.8	280	11.3	1 309	52.7	491	19.8	301	12.1
1 5 新	2 720	243.1	91	8.1	620	55.4	208	17.5	109	9.7
1 6 宮	2 643	224.6	57	4.8	552	46.9	206	18.6	103	8.8
1 7 石	1 859	226.7	37	4.5	355	43.4	137	16.7	66	8.0
1 8 山	2 022	230.6	58	6.6	379	43.2	144	16.4	78	8.9
1 9 山	4 898	224.9	145	6.7	960	44.1	461	21.2	220	10.1
2 0 長	4 369	209.5	104	5.0	868	41.6	364	17.5	176	8.4
2 1 岐	7 603	205.2	241	6.5	1 444	39.0	611	16.5	310	8.4
2 2 静	12 882	189.3	310	4.6	2 437	35.8	1 007	14.8	531	7.8
2 3 愛	3 898	212.9	110	6.0	733	40.0	295	16.1	159	8.7
2 4 滋	2 600	202.7	53	4.1	497	38.7	210	16.4	96	7.5
2 5 和	5 809	224.7	157	6.1	1 071	41.4	493	19.1	251	9.7
2 6 京	18 932	219.4	618	7.2	3 387	39.2	1 431	16.6	697	8.1
2 7 大	12 220	229.1	302	7.4	2 187	41.0	921	17.3	476	8.9
2 8 兵	2 986	208.7	102	7.1	595	41.6	207	14.5	116	8.1
2 9 奈	2 902	270.0	96	8.9	539	50.1	202	18.8	126	11.7
3 0 和	1 592	259.7	44	7.2	319	52.0	115	18.8	82	13.4
3 1 鳥	2 186	285.0	76	9.9	422	35.0	173	22.6	101	13.2
3 2 島	4 489	231.3	123	6.3	767	39.5	312	16.1	180	8.5
3 3 岡	6 687	232.9	193	6.7	1 153	40.3	240	17.4	240	10.1
3 4 広	3 998	259.8	109	7.1	739	48.0	289	18.8	155	10.1
3 5 山	2 075	249.7	38	4.6	375	45.1	172	20.7	75	9.0
3 6 香	2 489	242.8	46	4.5	508	49.6	157	15.3	92	9.0
3 7 愛	3 691	245.7	79	5.3	676	45.0	247	16.4	132	8.8
3 8 高	2 175	267.5	61	7.5	370	45.5	170	20.9	106	13.0
3 9 富	11 615	235.8	372	7.6	1 952	39.6	919	18.7	394	8.0
4 0 岡	2 325	263.0	64	7.2	402	45.5	182	20.6	106	12.0
4 1 佐	4 074	264.9	117	7.6	618	40.2	309	20.1	162	10.5
4 2 長	4 299	231.3	117	6.3	603	32.4	334	18.0	154	8.3
4 3 熊	3 063	249.6	104	8.5	505	41.2	227	18.5	132	10.8
4 4 大	2 681	226.3	82	7.0	460	39.1	166	14.1	96	8.2
4 5 宮	4 496	251.0	173	9.7	607	33.9	324	18.1	187	10.4
4 6 鹿	2 026	158.7	66	5.2	229	17.9	173	13.5	84	6.6
4 7 沖										

注：「02112 乳房」及び「02113 子宮」の死亡数は、女の数値である。死亡率は女子人口10万対の率である。

【表3】 悪性新生物の主な部位別死亡数・死亡率（人口10万対）・順位、都道府県別

平成8年、3-2

	02106 肝及び肝内胆管		02107 胆のう及び その他の胆道		02108 膵		02110 気管、 気管支及び肺	
	死亡数	死亡率	死亡数	死亡率	死亡数	死亡率	死亡数	死亡率
全	32 175	25.8	14 067	11.3	16 613	13.3	48 041	38.5
0 1 北海道	1 152	20.2	805	14.2	946	16.6	2 555	44.9
0 2 青森	305	20.6	188	12.7	233	15.7	801	40.6
0 3 岩手	211	14.9	200	14.1	240	16.9	584	41.2
0 4 宮城	365	15.7	285	12.2	336	14.4	907	38.9
0 5 秋田	216	17.9	220	18.2	244	20.2	546	45.2
0 6 山形	277	22.1	219	17.5	202	16.1	549	43.8
0 7 福島	454	21.3	339	15.9	345	16.2	841	39.5
0 8 茨城	592	20.2	393	13.4	395	13.4	996	33.9
0 9 栃木	437	22.1	249	12.6	223	11.3	689	34.9
1 0 群馬	429	21.6	278	14.0	261	13.1	700	35.2
1 1 埼玉	1 250	18.5	543	8.0	673	10.0	1 921	28.4
1 2 千代田	1 197	20.7	498	8.6	605	10.5	1 743	30.2
1 3 東京	2 754	23.8	1 021	8.8	1 445	12.5	4 240	36.6
1 4 神奈川	1 669	20.4	638	7.8	857	10.5	2 484	30.3
1 5 新潟	1 412	16.6	383	15.4	424	17.1	1 054	42.4
1 6 富山	218	19.5	150	13.4	191	17.1	483	43.2
1 7 石川	229	20.3	155	13.2	183	15.5	495	42.1
1 8 福井	191	23.3	127	15.5	135	16.5	355	43.3
1 9 山梨	278	31.7	110	12.5	168	19.2	335	38.2
2 0 長野	446	20.5	321	14.7	331	15.2	739	33.9
2 1 岐阜	532	25.5	220	10.6	253	12.1	780	37.4
2 2 愛知	980	26.4	375	10.1	454	12.9	1 268	34.2
2 3 静岡	1 453	21.3	672	9.9	797	11.7	2 345	34.5
2 4 三重	411	22.4	181	9.9	272	14.9	782	42.7
2 5 滋賀	221	17.2	173	13.5	191	14.9	550	42.9
2 6 京都	645	25.0	294	11.4	359	13.9	1 135	43.9
2 7 大阪	3 224	37.4	752	8.7	1 015	11.8	3 364	39.0
2 8 兵庫	1 811	34.0	509	9.5	682	12.8	2 255	42.3
2 9 奈良	390	27.3	132	9.2	170	11.9	569	39.8
3 0 和歌山	449	41.8	134	12.5	185	17.2	564	52.5
3 1 鳥取	165	26.9	84	13.7	108	17.6	285	46.5
3 2 島根	295	38.5	109	14.2	152	19.8	359	46.8
3 3 岡山	604	31.1	249	12.8	257	13.2	879	45.3
3 4 広島	1 140	39.8	323	11.3	383	13.4	1 104	38.6
3 5 山口	564	36.6	176	11.4	234	15.2	759	49.3
3 6 徳島	297	35.7	121	14.6	136	16.4	359	43.2
3 7 香川	326	31.8	139	13.6	140	13.7	470	45.9
3 8 愛媛	494	32.9	194	12.9	232	15.4	683	45.5
3 9 高松	290	35.7	115	14.1	142	17.5	360	44.3
4 0 福岡	1 904	38.7	602	12.2	643	13.1	2 054	41.7
4 1 佐賀	353	39.9	132	14.9	143	16.2	398	45.0
4 2 長門	502	32.6	249	16.2	247	16.1	745	48.4
4 3 熊本	604	32.5	275	14.8	279	15.0	752	40.5
4 4 大分	389	31.7	178	14.5	172	14.0	455	45.0
4 5 宮崎	307	26.1	156	13.3	182	15.5	455	38.7
4 6 鹿児島	543	30.3	287	16.0	289	15.0	848	47.3
4 7 沖縄	152	11.9	110	8.6	72	5.6	507	39.7

注：「02112 乳房」及び「02113 子宮」の死亡数は、女の数値である。死亡率は女子人口10万対の率である。

[表3] 悪性新生物の主な部位別死亡数・率(人口10万対)・順位、都道府県別  
平成8年(3-3)

	02112 房乳			02113 子宮			02119 白血病			(再)02104,02105 大腸		
	死亡数	死亡率	順位	死亡数	死亡率	順位	死亡数	死亡率	順位	死亡数	死亡率	順位
全	7 900	12.4		4 963	7.8		6 275	5.0		32 630	26.2	
01 国	396	13.4	5	233	7.9	27	281	4.9	24	1 600	28.1	20
02 道	100	12.9	7	66	8.5	18	79	5.3	17	474	32.0	8
03 府	90	10.2	18	48	6.5	38	70	4.9	23	476	33.6	4
04 市	121	10.2	40	69	5.8	46	123	5.3	18	634	27.2	22
05 町	68	10.7	36	61	9.6	6	70	5.8	14	401	33.2	5
06 市	70	10.8	34	54	8.3	21	80	6.4	10	430	34.3	2
07 市	102	9.4	44	79	7.3	31	97	4.6	33	614	28.8	16
08 市	163	11.1	32	103	7.4	29	122	4.1	40	748	25.4	29
09 市	123	12.4	17	69	7.0	35	78	4.0	42	454	23.0	40
10 市	107	10.6	39	60	6.0	43	75	3.8	45	503	25.3	31
11 市	395	11.8	23	232	6.9	36	253	3.7	46	1 454	21.5	46
12 市	368	12.9	9	202	7.1	33	244	4.2	39	1 288	22.3	44
13 市	943	16.3	1	467	8.1	24	548	4.7	26	3 220	27.8	21
14 市	548	13.6	4	261	6.5	39	313	3.8	44	1 859	22.7	41
15 市	163	12.8	12	77	6.0	42	115	4.6	31	792	31.9	9
16 市	80	13.8	3	34	5.9	44	60	5.4	16	317	28.3	19
17 市	69	11.3	27	57	9.4	13	53	4.5	34	309	26.3	24
18 市	50	11.8	22	26	6.2	41	47	5.7	15	203	24.8	36
19 市	65	14.6	2	26	5.8	45	28	3.3	47	222	25.3	32
20 市	127	11.4	26	88	7.9	28	102	4.7	27	681	31.3	10
21 市	116	10.8	35	88	8.2	23	97	4.7	29	540	25.9	27
22 市	236	12.5	14	122	6.5	40	169	4.6	32	921	24.9	34
23 市	426	12.0	15	249	7.3	30	274	4.0	41	1 538	22.6	42
24 市	113	12.0	21	73	7.7	28	80	4.4	36	454	24.8	35
25 市	72	11.1	31	35	5.4	47	50	3.9	43	306	23.9	38
26 市	176	13.2	6	93	7.0	34	111	4.3	37	744	28.8	17
27 市	564	12.8	10	360	8.2	22	401	4.6	30	2 128	24.7	37
28 市	349	12.7	13	261	9.5	9	273	5.1	19	1 397	26.2	26
29 市	85	11.5	23	49	6.6	37	67	4.7	28	323	22.6	43
30 市	55	9.7	41	51	9.0	14	51	4.7	25	328	30.5	12
31 市	39	12.2	19	31	9.7	3	38	6.2	11	197	32.1	7
32 市	38	9.5	42	38	9.5	8	39	5.1	21	274	35.7	1
33 市	89	8.8	46	85	8.4	19	96	4.9	22	482	25.3	30
34 市	170	11.5	24	138	9.4	10	146	5.1	20	738	25.8	28
35 市	91	11.2	30	73	9.0	15	66	4.3	38	444	28.8	15
36 市	49	11.2	29	42	9.6	7	37	4.5	35	247	29.7	13
37 市	47	8.8	45	50	9.4	12	63	6.1	13	249	24.3	38
38 市	87	11.0	33	70	8.8	16	100	6.7	7	379	25.2	33
39 市	54	12.5	16	50	13.7	1	54	6.6	8	276	33.9	3
40 市	329	12.8	11	207	8.0	25	304	6.2	12	1 313	26.7	23
41 市	44	9.5	43	39	8.4	20	57	6.4	9	288	32.6	6
42 市	87	10.7	37	79	9.7	4	169	11.0	2	471	30.6	11
43 市	126	12.9	8	85	8.7	17	139	7.5	6	488	26.3	25
44 市	69	10.7	38	61	9.4	11	102	8.3	5	359	29.3	14
45 市	75	12.1	20	63	10.2	2	108	9.2	4	262	22.3	45
46 市	108	11.3	28	92	9.7	5	219	12.2	1	511	28.5	18
47 市	55	8.4	47	47	7.2	32	124	9.7	3	257	20.1	47

注:「02112 乳房」及び「02113 子宮」の死亡数は、女の数値である。死亡率は女子人口10万対の率である。