


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**Population Problems in Post War Japan**  
—Now Facing Their Transitional Difficulties—

Volume I.

by

Tatsuo Honda



The Institute of Population Problems  
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## Introduction

The population of Japan which was less than 69 million (exclusive of that of Okinawa Prefecture) at the pre-war census taken in October, 1935 increased to 89 million at the October, 1955 census. This means an increase of 20 million in 20 years, but of this figure 17 million is represented by the increase in post-war years, since the population at the time of the war's end was a little more than 72 million.

Included in the post-war increase of 17 million were demobilized soldiers and repatriates from overseas and even though part of the increase was offset by foreigners (mostly Chinese and Koreans) who returned to their homeland there still remained an increase of 5 million. This increase was already a great burden to Japan defeated in the war, and after this post-war social increase has been subtracted, the remaining 12 million will represent an accumulative increase caused by natural increase. This meant an annual increase of 1.2 million exceeding by far the increase in pre-war years which was seldom over 1 million per year.

The abnormal reactionl increase in birth-rate during the several years after the war is a common post-war phenomenon, and it may be explained by the accumulation of births postponed till the war's end. In 1950 the birth-rate showed, for the first time since the end of the war, a decrease against the pre-war level, and ever since it has been decreasing with a rapid rate unheard of even in advanced nations of Europe. The birth rate in recent years has dropped to about two-thirds of the pre-war level. The population, however, continues to

grow at the pre-war pace of 1 million a year, owing to the remarkable decrease of death rate in recent years which is less than half of pre-war level.

Although there is some room for a further improvement of death rate, it is considered that no great decrease will be made over the present rate. As for the birth rate, on the other hand, it is hoped that further efforts will be directed toward birth control. The natural increase rate of population, therefore, is expected to decrease increasingly hereafter. The population of Japan which had been growing ever since the Meiji Restoration (1868) now shows a clear pose to slow down the increase. The stoppage of population increase is already predicted from the viewpoint of demographic statistics.

However, population is essentially a legacy or debt left behind, as a historical existence, by the socio-economic structure of the past. Therefore, we must continue our fight with this legacy of the past until the present population pattern marked by many deaths and many births is converted into a pattern of few deaths and few births. Especially in the ten-odd years to come, we must endure the great increase of one million per year in population, since the decrease in death rate will exert an especially great effect on the general aspect of the population. Moreover, special attention must be called to the fact that the future increase in population caused mainly by the decrease in death rate will be represented not by the increase of children but by that of adults. This fact will worsen the grave influence exerted on the labor market by population increase. It is estimated that the economically active age population (those between 15 and 59) will increase in the ten years to come at the annual rate of 1.1 million,

which amounts to twice as much as that of the prewar size and which far exceeds the annual increase of the total population in the ten years to come. Remarkable increase will also be seen in the old age population, or the population of those over 60. In addition, since the employment percentage of women and the aged recently shows a rising tendency, it means that the gainfully occupied population must increase, in the ten-odd years to come, at the annual rate of one million.

If we consider the fact that the actual number of the increase of gainfully occupied population averaged only 300 thousand a year in the Taisho era and before the war when the national economy was making rapid progress, we may easily imagine how grave a pressure the increase in population, especially in that of the economically active age, will impose on the labor market, and consequently on the economy of Japan.

The population of Japan has thus come to a great turning point, and is in a critical situation. In other words, the demographic revolution which enables us to expect a slow-down of population increase in future is now bringing forth a enormous pressure of population in a special form of the economically active age population increase. The difficulties has been exceedingly intensified by the last war. It should also be noted, however, that, although there was some difference in intensity, such change has already been in progress since the pre-war years. It is clear that it was a trend of population reflecting the modern advance in the national society and economy, and such a difficulty experienced in the advance of the nation had already given rise to the population problem in the pre-war years. If so, the great difficulty with which post-war Japan

is faced with respect to the population problem should suggest nothing but the great advance and reform required of the national society and economy of post-war Japan. Our national economic structure of the past, which has allowed us to live and propagate peacefully, now offers a grave question due to overpopulation which must be seriously tackled. And the suffering in this regard may be considered to show the real aspect of the so-called population problem.

Therefore, in order to analyze the population problem of present-day Japan we must clarify the change in the basic trend of population common in both pre-war and post-war years, as well as the change in the social and economic background. By doing so it will enable us not only to appreciate the difficult situation aggravated by the war but also to realize that the problem is not merely a passing phenomenon which follows a war. In other words, the population problem with which post-war Japan is confronted is such a problem that can never be solved unless we reexamine the basic socio-economic structure of modern Japan since the Meiji Restoration, and establish a long-range national policy to be followed in the years to come.

I have attempted, in the present work, to analyze the abnormal unbalance between the national economy and population of post-war Japan, from the viewpoint of the socio-economic structure under which such unbalance is expanded and reproduced. We hope this work will offer some opportunity to examine ourselves in connection with the future situation of Japan.



# I. An Analysis of the Basic Trend of Population in Pre-War and Post-War Japan

## 1. Gradual Decrease in Increase Pace of Population as a Long-Period Trend

With World War I (1914-18) as a turning point, the society of Japan has shown a remarkable progress in its modernization, and along with it the trend of population has also started to display an evident tendency of modernization. In other words, both birth rate and death rate have started to exhibit a steady decreasing tendency. Especially noteworthy is the fact that the pattern of birth rate decrease is remarkably similar to that followed by the Englishmen and the Germans at the close of the 19th century. However, at the beginning the modernization tendency in the vital statistics further promoted, as it did in the European countries, the growth of population, since the reduction of death rate was effected first. (See Fig. 1.) Nevertheless, as early as the pre-war years between 1930 and 1935 the decrease in birth rate exceeded that in death rate and there was clearly observed a downward tendency in the increase rate of population. The last war has made this change quite irregular, as seen by the figures in Table 1 obtained in each census taken every five years since 1920. But the Table shows also that the increase rate in the 15 years following 1935 is lower than that in the 15 years preceding 1935, and the increase rate in the last five years between 1950 and 1955 is lower than in the five years between 1930 and 1935.

Table 1. Trend of Total Population. (1920-1955) 15


Years	Total Population	Increase rate over preceding 5 years	Increase rate over preceding 15 years
1920	55.2 million	(5.2)%	(19.0)%
1925	59.0	6.9	—
1930	63.6	8.0	—
1935	68.4	7.5	24.1
1940	71.3	4.4	—
1945	72.0	1.0	—
1950	83.2	15.6	21.6
1955	89.3	7.3	—

Note 1: The populations in the above table are represented by those who lived in the territory as of October 1 each year, except for that of 1945 which is represented by the population as of November 1. The population for 1940 has been calculated with some estimation, because the census figure included the Japanese overseas forces personnel without distinction.

Note 2: The territory has been represented by that of 1950. However, in the population for 1955 is included that of the Amami-Oshima Islands which have recently been restored to Japan. Exclusive of the population of the Amami-Oshima Islands, the increase rate for the 5 years between 1950 and 1955 will be 7.1 per cent.

Note 3: The increase rates of the population of 1920 against those of the preceding 5 and 15 years have been worked out from estimated populations before the first census was taken.

Fig. 1. Trend of Population of Japan



Note: The populations for 1955-65 are estimated figures (See Table 3)

Needless to say, the effect of war on population cannot be ignored in the comparison of population trends in the 15 years preceding and following 1935. The reason is that deaths caused directly by the war, both in the battle and home fronts, were estimated at nearly two million. However, repatriates from overseas since the end of the war exceeded 6.5 million (An estimated figure up to September, 1950, after which the number of repatriates were negligible). Demobilized servicemen, a natural result of war, accounted for nearly one half of this figure, while 3.3 million, or the remainder, were represented by Japanese citizens formerly resident in foreign countries who were compulsorily repatriated by the allied powers. Even when 1.4 million, the number of foreigners repatriated to their home-lands, is subtracted from this figure there still remained a net social increase of 2 million. Therefore, the loss of population caused by the war was offset by the additional load of population, and it may be considered that the trend of the total population has not been affected by this loss. Although the great decrease in births between 1944 and 1946, or during the three years of confusion at the end of the war, cannot be overlooked, the abnormal reactional rise of birth rate during the three years between 1947 and 1949 has set off the decrease. Here again the increase and decrease have cancelled each other. The population of 1950 is almost the same in size as the population which would have developed from that of 1935 if the then declining tendency in increase pace had continued. And the decreasing tendency of birth rate has also started to show clearly since 1950.

## 2. Postwar Progress of Modernization Tendency of Vital Phenomena of Population

The birth rate in postwar Japan, as in any other country after the war, has shown a remarkable reactionary rise. However, the great increase may be considered to be due mainly to the catching up in childbirths which had been postponed during the war. The birth rate, as can be seen in Table 2, is lower than that of prewar level in 1950 and still continues thereafter to decrease at a rapid rate.

Table 2. Trend of Birth, Death and Natural Increase Rate  
in Prewar and Postwar Years. (per 1,000)

Years	Birth Rate	Death Rate	Natural Increase Rate
1915-19	35.5	24.1	11.4
1920-24	35.0	23.0	12.0
1925-29	34.0	19.8	14.2
1930-34	31.8	18.1	13.7
1935-39	29.2	17.4	11.8
1947	34.3	14.6	19.7
1948	33.7	12.0	21.7
1949	32.8	11.6	21.5
1950	28.2	10.9	17.4
1951	25.6	10.0	15.6
1952	23.3	8.9	14.4
1953	21.4	8.9	12.5
1954	20.0	8.2	11.8
1955	19.4	7.8	11.6
1956	18.4	7.8	10.6

Note 1: Birth rate and death rate figures for the years 1915-19 are estimates obtained by correcting the underestimated death rate figures of babies and children.

Note 2: Figures for 1956 are provisional.


The decrease in the birth rate, as shown in the above table,

is particularly notable in recent years and is graphically illustrated by Fig. 2. The downward trend of the birth rate is sharper than that observed in Germany after World War I. The 1955 birth rate was below the 20.0 ‰ mark. This is lower than the United States birth rate, (which stood at 24.0 ‰ in 1953), and the 1956 birth rate is almost equal to the French level of 18.8 ‰ in 1954. It is true that Japan's birth rate is still far above the Swedish, British, and West German birth rates, which are in the neighborhood of the 15 ‰ mark, but the birth rate in prefectures with such large cities as Tokyo, Osaka, Kyoto, etc., has already attained this level. Anyway, we can safely say that Japan is already among the countries with comparatively lower rates of birth.

However, as can be seen in Table 2, the death rate also shows a marked decline in postwar years. While the birth rate has been reduced to two-thirds of the prewar level, the death rate has declined to half of the prewar level. It goes without saying that this improvement in the death rate is due to the postwar development of public health administration, incorporating foreign technical achievements in public health made during and after World War II, as well as to the completion of social security systems in Japan. As will be seen from the above Fig. 1, not only did the postwar death rate sink far below the prewar downward curve, but also its downward curve preceded that of the birth rate. The natural increase rate, that is, the rate of births minus deaths, was lower in 1953 for the first time in postwar years than the prewar level of 13.4 ‰, (which is an average of five years from 1933 to 1937.)

There is still ample room for improving and lowering the

Fig. 2. Trends of Birth Rate and Death Rate in Japan since World War I.



Remarks: The thicker lines show trends in every five years, the part of the lines in dashes being extensions. (See Table 2.)  
The part of the thinner lines that is indicated in dots are based on estimates.

death rate. Deaths due to causes that can easily be controlled technically, such as acute contagious diseases, tuberculosis, diarrhoea and inflammation of the intestines, accounted for 14 per cent of all deaths in 1955, which is still very high as compared with the 3-4 per cent rates of advanced countries. However, future improvement in the death rate depends largely on the general betterment of the living conditions of the people rather than on sanitation and public health administration. In this sense, it would be far more difficult to achieve this improvement. On the other hand, we can safely assume that there will be continued efforts for reducing the birth rate in the atmosphere of overpopulation. Therefore there will be a sharp decline in the natural increase rate in the future. The above-mentioned Fig. 2 will be sufficient to indicate that the birth rate tends to go further down its curve which took a downward direction already in prewar years, in parallel with

the death rate that sank far below the prewar downward level.

### 3. Enormous Increase of Economically Active Age Population Expected in Ten-odd Years to Come

The population trend of "many deaths and many births" is rapidly shifting towards that of "few deaths and few births." We can safely say that there is a decisive tendency that the population increase is being slowed down and will ultimately be arrested. However, a rapid development of this tendency will cause a sharp change in the age composition of the population, and for the time being, this will take the form of an extraordinary increase in the economically active age population (population from 15 to 59 years of age). Table 3 shows estimated future populations of this country figured out by the Institute of Population Problems on the basis of recent population trends. This table will show that the population increase in the future will necessarily take the form of increase in the number of adults, particularly in the economically active age population (from 15 to 59 years of age), and not in the number of children (up to 14 years of age).

Table 3. Estimate of Future Population (Based on medians)

Year	Total Population (Unit: 1 million)	Increase Rate in Every 5 years (%)	Age Composition (%)			
			Total	0-14 yrs.	15-59 yrs.	60 yrs. or more
1950	83.2	—	100	35	57	8
1955	89.3	7.3	100	33	59	8
1960	93.2	4.4	100	29	62	9
1965	96.3	3.3	100	24	67	10
1970	99.8	3.6	100	21	68	11

1975	103.1	3.3	100	21	68	12
1980	105.6	2.4	100	21	67	12
1985	106.9	1.3	100	20	67	13
1990	107.1	0.2	100	18	66	15
1995	106.4	-0.7	100	17	66	18
2000	105.0	-1.3	100	16	64	20

Note 1: Estimates by the Institute of Population Problems in March 1955. The population of the census of October 1, 1950 is taken as the basis. The total population figure for 1955 includes the population of the Amami Oshima Islands brought under Japanese administration in the meantime.

Note 2: The estimates of Table 3 are based on the following suppositions:

- (1) Birth rate: on the supposition that the postwar downward trend of the age-specific fertility rate of women continues, the lowest minimum total fertility rate expected for the near future is taken as 1.600. The medians, i.e. the figures of the above table are based on the supposition that this lowest minimum is attained in 1962 and remains stationary after that.
- (2) Death rate: It is supposed that the lowest age-specific death rates figured out by the Institute (66.47 for males, and 70.89 for females, denoted in short by the life expectancy of a boy and a girl of 0 year of age) are realized in 1965 and remain stationary after that.
- (3) Emigration is ignored.

If the supposed fertility and mortality trends are expressed in crude rates per one thousand persons of the population, the birth, death and natural increase rates change as follows:

Years	Birth rate	Death rate	Natural Increase rate
1950-55	23.1‰	9.4‰	13.7‰
1955-60	16.9	8.2	8.7
1960-65	14.6	7.9	6.7
1965-70	15.2	8.2	7.0
1970-75	15.3	8.8	6.5
1975-80	14.2	9.4	4.8
1980-85	12.7	10.1	2.6
1985-90	11.3	11.0	0.3
1990-95	10.7	12.0	-1.3
1995-2000	10.7	13.3	-2.6

Note 3: Populations for the years after 1965 should be regarded as mere projections into the future of the population reproduction capacity of the year 1965 rather than as estimates in the strict sense of the term.



As mentioned in the footnote of the table, populations for the years after 1965 are estimated on the supposition that the age-specific rates of fertility and mortality for 1962-65 remain stationary through the years after that. In other words, the population reproduction capacity for that year is only mechanically projected into the future picture of population. However, whatever may be the case, there is no disputing that the population of Japan will inevitably hit the 100 million mark in the not distant future. Though the 100 million mark is not particularly meaningful except that it is a round figure, it is worthwhile noting the fact that a one per cent yearly increase will mean, for a population of 100 million, an increase by one million persons. Furthermore, since the 100 million population which is expected in the near future in this country, will inevitably have an unprecedentedly large proportion of reproductive age population in its composition, it is quite natural that married couples of ages capable of bearing children should be faced with an urgent need for limiting the number of children. There will possibly be a time when for a couple to have an average of two children in their lifetime will be regarded as something too much in view of the composition of population.

However, the most urgent question that the above-mentioned table showing Japan's estimated future populations poses, is the inevitability of increase of the economically active age population, which we are already facing, and its inevitable impact on the labor market. Children who were born in prewar days or in the postwar period when the birth rate rose sharply, grew up in the later period of an improved death rate, and are joining and will join the production age group

in large numbers. Birth control, which is greatly popularized in recent years, is of no avail in easing this situation. Furthermore, the improved death rate has measurably lessened the loss due to death of persons in the economically active ages. Moreover, the number of old men who retire yearly from the economically active age group is comparatively small at present. In other words, while persons who are to be replaced on account of old age or death, are decreasing instead of increasing, a great number of people are joining the economically active age group. Table 4 shows this situation in prewar and postwar years in round figures.

Fig. 3. Trend of Age Composition of Pop.




Table 4. Yearly Average Increase of Economically Active Age Population (from 15 to 59 years of age) from 1920 to 1980. (Unit: 1,000)

Year	Number of persons reaching 15 years of age	Number of persons required to be replaced on account of aging and death	Net Increase
1920-1935	1,250	750	500
1935-1950	1,550	950	600
1950-1965	1,950	850	1,100
1965-1980	1,500	1,050	450

Note 1: Populations for the years after 1950 are taken from the estimates figured out by the Institute of Population Problems.

Note 2: Figures in the second column represent the differences between the figures in the first column and those in the third column, and therefore, second column figures for the prewar years include some emigrants.

As will be seen from the above table, the yearly average increase by 1.1 million in the economically active age population in the years 1950-1965 is approximately double the past yearly increase. We are already in the midst of this great increase in the number of the economically active age population, which will be greater year by year with the year 1965 as the peak. The following figures, which represent yearly average net increases in the economically active age population in the successive periods of five years, figured out on the basis of the above estimated future population, will show that the yearly average net increase in the production age population continues to increase with 1965 as the peak year.

Years	Yearly Average Net Increase (Unit: 1,000)
1950-55	1,000
1955-60	1,070
1960-65	1,280
1965-70	820
1970-75	370
1975-80	180

The yearly average net increase in the economically active age population will be brought down below the prewar level after 1970, partly because the age composition of the population will by then be such as will fit in with the population pattern of "few deaths and few births" and partly because recent efforts for bringing down the birth rate will finally take effect so that there will be a gradual decrease in the number

of persons newly joining the economically active age population. However, the sharp increase in the economically active age population, which we are facing now and will continue to face for more than ten years in the future, constitutes a very important factor in the labor market. This presents itself as the most difficult of the problems that Japan has to tackle in the process of modernizing its vital trends started by the last war, being at the same time the crux of the present population problem of Japan.

#### 4. Two Central Questions—The Questions of Limitation of Birth and Employment

Various difficulties that confront Japan in this rapid modernizing reorganization process of its population, may be reduced to the following two focal points. The one is that Japan is required to control its births by intensifying efforts to a degree out of keeping with the present levels of modernization of the national living, and this, in other words, is the question as to how to adapt the Japanese people's mode of life to this requirement. The other concerns the impact of this unprecedented increase of the economically active age population on the labor market and the consequent problem of employment, which is sure to assume serious forms.

In postwar years Japan has managed to cope with the need to reduce its birth rate effectively to a considerable extent and will continue to do so in the future. However, it must not be overlooked that this urgent requirement to reduce the birth rate has been fulfilled forcefully under circumstances of a not yet fully modernized socio-economic state of the country.

We will analyze this situation closely elsewhere in this study. In other words, we are faced with the question of successfully adapting the attitude and ideals of life of the Japanese to the need for further strengthening the lowering tendency of the birth rate, or with a question concerning the so-called "movement for a planned family." This necessarily involves the question of changing the pattern of national living, and is not the mere question of popularizing contraceptive techniques.

On the other hand, the second question of employment is a most urgent question directly connected with people's daily living and will therefore assume serious proportions in accordance with the growing increase of the economically active age population. Postwar changes in the sex and age composition of population may be said to have been related directly or indirectly to the question of employment and to have, in effect, aggravated the employment situation. For instance, the increased proportion of the aged in population resulted not only in sharply increasing the economically active age population but also in causing a rapid growth of the old age population. According to figures in the above table of estimated future populations, the Japanese population above the age of 60 will gain by two million in 15 years from 1950 to 1965, and by 3.5 million in the subsequent period of 15 years. The old age population of 6.4 million in 1950 will be increased to nearly 13 million, or will be more than doubled, in 30 years. As against this, the population of those less than 15 years of age will be decreased by nearly 6.6 million in 15 years from 1950 to 1965 and by slightly more than one million in the subsequent period of 15 years as a result of the lowered birth rate. This means that the burden of the population of old and

young dependents will be lessened so long as full employment is guaranteed. However, in view of the fact that supporters of dependents, who belong to the economically active age group are finding difficulties in getting jobs and that the aged are being driven more and more to the labor market than they were before, this increase in the old age population naturally poses serious social and economic problems.

It cannot be said that the unbalance between the male and female populations due to the war has no bearing on the problem of employment. The female population as of 1950 between the age of 20 and 49 was greater by 1.5 million than the male population of corresponding ages. This means that the female population was virtually greater by over two million than the male population if we take into consideration the fact that in 1935 the former was smaller by 750,000 persons than the latter. As a result, the rate of married females in their twenties has naturally become extremely smaller in postwar years. It must not be overlooked at the same time that the number of females in their thirties and forties who were separated from their husbands by death or otherwise, is extremely great.

The poor chance of marriage for the younger generation of women has the effect of necessarily meeting the urgent requirement for reducing the birth rate. But, this, at the same time, increases new competitors in the labor market. Further, the increase in the number of women of above middle age who were separated from their husbands by death or by some other reasons and their very slim chance of remarriage pose a question directly connected with their and their children's daily living, which, along with the difficulty the econo-

mically active age population is encountering in finding jobs, we will have to tackle for a long time to come. In this way, postwar changes in the population pattern have found concentrated expression in the aggravation of the employment question.

## II. Overpopulation Problem Viewed in the Light of National Economy

As reviewed in the foregoing chapter the problem of overpopulation in post war Japan has come to pose itself focussed on two major issues, namely, the necessity of enforcing birth control effectively and of solving the fast aggravating employment situation—the two desiderata originating from a disproportion between the nation's economic capacity and the size of its population. Yet, since the populational reproduction would necessarily follow the course of economic reproduction of a nation it may be concluded that the disproportion between economy and population derives intrincically out of the disproportion which is inherent in the economic structure of the country. Therefore, if Japan's current population problem is to be treated as an issue of excess population efforts must be directed to the probing of the structure of its national economy.

### 1. Progress of National Economy and Living Standard Before and After War

It is a well-known fact that in a brief period following the Meiji Restoration of 1868, Japan had succeeded in achieving a

spectacular advancement of capitalist economy system with but little introduction of foreign capital. The concentration and accumulation of capital required therefore was attended by the evil trend of depressing the normal improvement of living standard of the general public well-matched with the growth of production standard. As a matter of fact, the Meiji era Government, especially in the early years after the Restoration, found it unavoidable to depend largely on the land tax for the financing of its industrial development policies with the inevitable result that the fruits of peasantry was subjected to official exaction and the capitablistic progress of its agricultural system was hopelessly marred until the entire national economic structure was allowed to be reduced to a limping machinery.

Nevertheless, such limpingness, in pre-war years to say the least of it, served to be a springboard for Japan's unparalleled expansion of national strength and furnished a ground for an accelerating increase of its population. The traditional austere mode of life of the masses long formed the reservoir of hard-working labor force on one hand, and the generative power of a sound prolificacy characteristic of familism, on the other. The two phenomena, thus functioned to collaboratively contribute to each other on the common ground of the nationwide austerity system. Accordingly, though the banefulness of overpopulation was not unperceived then, the population growth in pre-war Japan had been allowed to take its own course of rising trend as its industrial structure afforded ample room to take care of the swelling population and which fact may be evidenced, at least, in the instance of the nation's living standard as represented in per capita income that rose



in direct ratio to the increasing trend of population.

Although there are no available data of good authority by which we can ascertain the drift of national income as far back as early Meiji period, presumptive estimates by Messrs. Yūzō Yamada and Kazushi Ōkawa indicate that in about half a century from 1878-82 to 1933-37 real national income increased as much as over ten times. The rate of the increase, of which mode of yearly average ran about 4 per cent, was greatly accelerated during the years consequent on World War I and was particularly manifest in the commercial and industrial branches. Against this economic picture, Japan's population increased twofold in the 65 years from 1871 to 1935 at a mean rate of 1.1 per cent or, to put it more precisely at a rate of 0.7 per cent in the first half of the same period and 1.8 in the later period. This tells of the fact that the ascending trend of productivity prevalent during the period was capable of absorbing, without much difficulty and without sacrificing the living standard of the general public, the nation's growing population which began to boost in a modern age fashion.

World War II brought about to Japan a complete destruction of the foundation of modern industrial activities. In the wake of the war, the people's standard of living, as viewed from per capita real national income fell as far down as half the pre-war level of 1934-36 period. The trend of the living standard in post-war years is illustrated against that of pre-war years in Table 5, below.

As will be noticeable from the Table 5, the drastic downfall of the living standard ensued from the destructive shrinkage of national productive activity. Besides the substan-

Table 5. General Trend of Nation's Living Standard  
In Post-war Years

(Index: 100 in years, 1934-36)

Year	Popula- tion	Agricul- tural produc- tion	Mining & Manuf. produc- tion	National income		Consumption		
				Total	per capita	Nation- wide	Urban	Rural
1946	110	77	31	58	52	—	—	—
1947	114	75	37	61	54	—	55	—
1948	117	86	55	72	61	—	61	—
1949	119	93	71	83	69	76	65	88
1950	121	99	84	98	81	79	70	94
1951	123	99	114	108	88	83	69	103
1952	125	111	126	125	100	96	80	117
1953	127	98	155	130	103	105	94	122
1954	129	108	167	134	105	110	100	125
1955	130	127	181	149	115	115	107	128

Note: Population index is based on 1935 (October 1) census figures adjusted according to Japan's territorial conditions in 1955 (i. e. setting aside Okinawa, etc.) Agricultural product index is based on 1933-35 figures excluding forestry products but including sericultural and livestock products. All indexes represent that of calendar years with the exception of national incomes which are of fiscal years. Urban household consumption is based on survey on Tokyo's wage-earners, Household Living Expenses Survey, and that of rural households on Survey on Farmers' Household Economy. Nationwide consumption figures represent the weighted average of the two items. Although the consumption figures were taken from official statistics by Economic Deliberation Agency, some other statistics of different methods of calculation allow more higher figures to rural consumption.

tial national income which fell below 60 per cent mark of the pre-war level, the national wealth lost to war, even excepting military assets which literally perished, is believed to equal the portion of national wealth which had been accumulated since 1935. Such being the circumstances, it is no wonder that the living standard as a whole dropped at a rate far

outstripping that of per capita national income as manifested in the same table. Simultaneous increase in population was of course one of the major factors contributory to the degenerative living standard. The strain borne by the domestic labor market was especially heavy as the population increase immediately after the war was largely due to the repatriates from abroad, the majority of whom was males of working age. Yet, the crux of the overpopulation problem in those days lay not in the scarcity of employment but in the shortage of food-stuffs, in other words while an average salary earner would have found his regular salary short of meeting his minimum cost of living, golden opportunity for vast profit was open everywhere in the country in the form of black-marketing—a sort of primitive capitalistic enterprise, independent and self-sustaining in its business methods. As, however, the categorical imperative of the day for an immediate and full-scale reconstruction of national economy called, with the state power which was yet to be retrieved, as a level, for the accumulation and concentration of capital, in the face of an aggravated inflationary trend, in a way to restore the big financial cliques to their former position of predominancy, the overpopulation issue was bound to undergo a new transformation.

As evident in the statistics of "Mining and Manufacturing Industries Production" in the foregoing table, it was the Korean War of 1950 that not only enlivened Japan's industry to rally its former strength but also to boost its output twice as much as its pre-war level late in 1955. However, the people's general living standard as viewed from the point of consumption failed to accomplish a recovery comparable with that of industry. One exemption was that the consumption

rate of farm households rose beyond the pre-war marks, but for this attention is invited to the fact that their pre-war consumption used to be traditionally and notoriously low. It is also noteworthy that the statistics show that though the wage earners families in Tokyo recovered their former consumption level in 1954 that of other cities in the same year still lingered at 94 against the pre-war index. The lameness in the ascending rates of production and consumption which had long been peculiar to Japanese economy was called into play again, admittedly in a still more intensified degree, for the purpose of achieving the economic reconstruction in the tumultuous years following the end of the war. What differed, as it became plain in the course of the reconstruction, from its former functional effectiveness was that, instead of being a steering force as it had proved to be in the days before the war, the lameness turned out to be a resistant factor to cripple the progress of national economy, and came to bring about a discouraging influence to the overpopulation problem.

It was true that the speed of reconstruction of the national economy after the war was signal and phenomenal as far as the production activity was concerned. In fact, Japan has succeeded in establishing a record of general production far excelling that of pre-war years and an economic structure more highly advanced than that theretofore. As shown in Table 6 hereunder, while her population feeding burden increased to twofold in rate her substantial national income boosted to almost three times as much as its pre-war record.

The extent of expansion of Japanese post-war economy would seem spectacular enough as the average rate of progress was well over 12 per cent a year. Nevertheless, its

Table 6. Increase Rates of National Income and Population Feeding Burden, Before and After War

Year	(1) Annual increase rate, real national income	(2) Annual increase rate, Population feeding burden	(3) Ratio between (1) & (2) (increased population vs. gross accumulation)
1910-20	3.8 %	1.2 %	30.9 %
1920-35	4.2 %	1.4 %	34.5 %
1946-53	12.5 %	2.4 %	19.2 %

Note: Figures of national incomes for pre-war years are based on "Data for Compilation of National Income" prepared by Yuzo Yamada, and for which the average for 5 years (i.e. in addition to the respective years cited, 2 successive years preceding and ensuing them) was taken for calculation. Figures for post-war years are taken from statistics by Economic Deliberation Board. Annual population increase rates for 1946-53 (fiscal years) cover the period, August 1945 to October 1953. Gravity of the increased population's portion in the gross accumulation (3) is computed on the assumption that no change occurred in living standard and capital coefficient during the period.

merits would be belittled drastically when deducing the portion of its fruits that had to be spent in order to catch up with the pre-war level of the national economic set-up. Supposing that the real national income in 1946 was on the par with that of 1935 the annual rate of increase of real national income would have been 4.0 per cent, as indicated in the following table, and consequently 60 per cent of this accumulation would have been spent for feeding the population increased during the same period. It is needless to explain that the accumulation of capital made available for the execution of post-war economic reconstruction was carried out only under a policy of severely discouraging the recovery of people's living standard.

On the other hand, the prime years of post-war recon-

Table 6. (Supplementary).  
 Comparison of Increase in Real National Income and  
 Population Supporting Accountability, 1946-1953.  
 (Assuming national incomes in 1946 were on a par with that of 1935)

Year	(1) Annual rate of in- crease, real national income	(2) Annual rate of in- crease, pop. support. accountability	(3) $\frac{(2) \times 100}{(1)}$
1946-53	4.0	2.4	60.0

struction have come to an end, and the pace of economic expansion fell off below 4 per cent in 1954 when the Government's policy of anti-inflation came into full play. Fortunately, because of the world-wide boom reflected in brisk export trade and the record-breaking bumper crop the years 1955 and 1956 saw another interim economic prosperity, but it is apprehended that Japan will find it difficult to go much further beyond the 4 per cent mark of the pre-war economic strength. The rate of the population increase also will be relieved in future. The yearly average rate of increase is expected to drop down to 0.8 % in ten years to come 1955-65. against 1.2-1.4 % in pre-war years. But if we calculate the real pressure of population giving weight by age, 15 years or less as 0.5, 15-59 years as 1.0 and 60 years or more as 0.8, the yearly average rate of the increase of population pressure in 1955-65 is 1.3 %, while those of pre-war years remains almost equal to those unweighted. Therefore, for some time to come, the increase of the population-feeding accountability will never go down below the pre-war level.

Furthermore, attention must be paid to the fact that the pressure of increasing population is becoming more keenly felt when viewed in its marginal utility. For instance, assuming that they are totally dependent on imported food and

clothing, a million of new population a year would be bound to require some \$40,000,000 worth of foodstuffs and textile materials to be imported from abroad yearly. Aggregation of those two items of minimum essentials for a matter of ten years will reach an astounding sum of \$400,000,000. What is worse, in an even larger scale than in pre-war days, the pressure of population increase is now finding their outlets in farm communities, destined to form the strongest barrier in the way of rational improvement of agricultural industry. It is clear enough that in post-war Japan the increase of population came to manifest itself as a powerful dissenting factor against normal progress of economy.

There is still another factor which had had much to do with the aggrandizement of Japanese population problem of late years. The end of the war saw a surge of democratism install the idea of social resistance among the general public that they now seem to be determined to win, for themselves, a rightful remuneration befitting to the merits of the individual works rendered. However, such indications of self-consciousness of democratic principles on the part of the masses must be taken as a token bespeaking of the fact that the nation has now entered into an epochmaking age of transition where its economy has reached a highly advanced stage of capitalistic progression and the society a mellow stage of maturity. Limited in resources of industry as well as of foodstuffs, Japan so far has made it a point to export processed goods in return for raw materials imported, but this mode of foreign trade which has been enforceable only by underscutting people's livelihood shall not be hoped for to last much longer. Doubtlessly the only alternative left Japan for her making

inroads into the future world market is that she develop the quality of her exports to a more higher standards than heretofore—a policy which is now being pursued but not without difficulties. It, however, is feared that encouragement of the capital concentration and management rationalization program in the field of basic industry would result in the relative oppression of smaller enterprises and self-sustaining private businesses which are accomodating no small portion of the population, and tends to make the overpopulation situation still the more sinister and unruly. Yet, the surplus population which so far have been cared for in the nationwide austerity system, that is to say the backwardly managed agricultural structure and small business units, not only has already passed the marginal point of utility, but also is fast becoming the fetters or restraining influence of Japan's economy. This accounts for why the affliction of overpopulation persisted itself not in the early post-war years when national economy was amidst the pellmell of jumble, but in the course of reconstructive progress well afterwards when the ill influence of the problem began to strike inward. And, the greater will be felt the weight of the burden as the demand for reshuffling economic machines becomes more acute. This vicious circle in the causality of the problem speaks of the present situation of Japanese population issue—no wonder that institution of counter measures is attended with a great deal of difficulty in determining their priority or urgency in the face of the conflicting interests among social strata.



## 2. Overpopulation Viewed from the Point of Industrial Structure (As studied from number of industrially employed persons)

The following table illustrates the change in the industrial set-ups before and after the war as observed from the movement of occupied persons in three major industries groups.

Table 7. Number of occupied population in 3 major industrial groups

Year	Total	I	II	III
		Agriculture, Forestry & Fisheries	Mining, Manufacturing & Construction	Others
Actual Number (in 1,000,000 persons)				
1920	27.0	14.4	5.6	6.9
1930	29.3	14.5	6.0	8.9
1940	32.2	14.2	8.4	9.6
1947	33.3	17.8	6.8*	8.7*
1950	35.6	17.2	7.6	10.8
1955	39.2	16.2	9.3	13.8
Percentage				
1920	100.0	53.6	20.8	25.7
1930	100.0	49.3	20.4	30.2
1940	100.0	44.1	26.0	29.9
1947	100.0	53.4	20.4*	26.2*
1950	100.0	48.3	21.9	29.8
1955	100.0	41.2	23.8	35.2

Note 1: Statistics based on census returns. Figures for 1955 is taken from 1 % Tabulation.

Note 2: In preparing the Table, the Bureau of Statistics, Prime Minister's Office, manipulated the past census figures according to the industrial classification of 1950. However, because of a certain degree of difficulties involved, figures for Manufacturing Industry (II) in pre-war years are believed somewhat over-rated than that in post-war years, and by the same token, that for Other Industries (III) in pre-war years a little under-rated than that in post-war years. \*mark indicates that a further correction of the original was made by the present writer out of the same reason as above.

Note 3: Okinawa is excepted in all statistics.

Note 4: Statistics for 1940 and theretofore indicate [employment of usual status; that for 1947 and after employment in one week at the time of the survey.

The Table is self-explanatory that the rising trend in pre-war days of the general standard of living evolved invariably around the trend of progress of the mining, manufacturing and construction industries (II) while the gravity of agriculture, forestry and fishery industries (I) deminished. It must be noted, however, that the lastnamed industries (I) had even in pre-war times long maintained a stagnant stability in the number of employment, sustaining in their own systems a sizable portion of overpopulation all the time.

Measuring the pace of progress of industrial structure in terms of ratio in the total employment of laborers in the agriculture, forestry and fishery industries, the structural scale in 1947, or two years after the war end, had once fell back to that of 1920, but came to rally to a point well above the pre-war mark of 1940 in recent years. The recovery was resultant chiefly of the successful progress in reconstruction program of basic industries, which was steered with much difficulty as elucidated before, but which, in spite of it, left the agriculture communities to continue to retain a large number of laborers as weighed against the pre-war records.

The following table which was made from Labor Force Surveys and which accounts for the drift of employment after the war will show very clearly that numerical fluctuations of laborers in the agriculture-forestry industry ran directly counter to the vicissitudes of general industry circles.

It will be noted plainly in the Table that the influx of surplus population into the farming communities had reached

Table 8. Number of Laborers in Agriculture-Forestry  
Industry and Other Industries, After War  
(In 1,000 persons)

Year	Other Indu- stries	Agri. & Forest. Industry	Self-employed farmers dur- ing Farming Months	Unpaid family workers in Agri.&Forest. Industry	Paid Employees in in Agri. & Forest. Industry
Total Number					
1944	18,230	16,370	6,050	10,280	510
1949	17,980	18,080	6,460	11,390	540
1952	20,020	16,370	6,040	10,260	470
1955	24,650	17,150	5,810	11,090	530
Increase or Decrease					
1948-49	-250	+1,710	+410	+1,110	+30
1949-52	+2,040	-1,710	-420	-1,130	-70
1952-55	+4,630	+760	-230	+830	+60

Note: Figures based on yearly average of Labor Force Survey statistics except for "Self-employed Laborers during Farming Months" for which the end of October (and early November for 1948 only) was chosen for calculation.

its height in 1949 when the Dodge Line of financial policy was driven forward most stringently; its backward flow which was occasioned by the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 passed the peak two years later and ceased to exercise its effect of mitigating the populational pressure on the farming populace.

What would be the actual number of laborers the agriculture-forestry circles are now carrying in excess of pre-war years can not be easily ascertained precisely because of lack of pertinent data, due to the difference in methods of survey before and after the war. However, various data which have been conducted in a similar way before and after the war in respect of employment in usual status tends to suggest that, as compared with the pre-war days, there are presently more than one million of farm hands, or nearly 300,000 households.

in farming for the main, who are dependent on the agricultural regions throughout the country. The situation is illustrated in the following table.

Table 9. Numerical Comparison of Farmhouseholds & Farming Population, Before and After War  
(in 1,000)

Year	(1) Farmhousehold	(2) (1) minus those making farming their side-job	(3) Those making agricul- ture-forestry their prin- cipal occupation
1935	—	—	14,000
1941	5,499	4,344	—
1954	6,105	4,620	—
1955	—	—	15,110

Note: Figure for 1935 is presumptive number drawn in consideration of changes after 1930 census. 1941 is represented by returns of Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry's survey taken in August, same year which includes Okinawa. 1954 figures are based on returns of Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry's survey taken in February, and that for 1955 on Special Labor Force Survey of Statistics Bureau in March, same year. In (2) those in forestry industry and paid workers principally dependent on agriculture-forestry industry are excluded, but who are included in (3).

The number of farm households who are well worthy of the accepted sense of the term 'farmers' is on a marked decreasing tendency in recent years as is observable in the number of 'Self-employed Farmers during Farming Months' in Table 8 above. In fact there are an increasing number of non-productive farm families in every rural district who are rapidly falling off the line of regular farmers. To make matters worse, the area of arable land is fast shrinking after the war. Even granting that this shortcoming is offsettable, logically speaking, by the enforcement of diversified farming methods, the newly introduced agricultural technics would be

bound to be less capable of absorbing as much farm hand as before. That the practices of making agriculture the secondary occupation is now spreading into the middle class of farmers well speaks of the fact that the burden of surplus population thrust on the agricultural communities since the end of war continues to be a problem yet to be resolved.

It, however, must be recalled in this connection that such primary industry as agriculture, forestry or fishery by no means is the only agent in playing the role of generous host to the chronic overpopulation. The sudden boost in 1930 in the number of employment in the "Other Occupations" in Table 7 will speak of the convergence of such population into petty commercial enterprises or personal-service businesses in time of depression. As may be seen therein, while the year's rate of increase in general employment was only a little less than 9 per cent over that in 1920, the number of wholesale dealers and retailers rose at a rate of 55 per cent and of which most remarkable was that of eating-house operators which boosted by nearly 90 per cent. Breaking down the 240,000 which was the sum total of this increase we note that almost 180,000 or roughly 75 per cent of it consisted of miscellaneous retailers and people in promiscuous personal-service businesses which respectively numbered nearly 1,500,000 and 150,000. Attention must be directed to the singular feature in the case of Japan that, whereas the increase of employment in the industrial group III would normally be interpreted as signifying the advancement of a country's industrial strength, the increase of employment in this group in 1930 merely suggests of the human pools that popped up in urban areas to harbor unemployed population. It is believed that

though employment is on an up trend in recent years, no small part of it is finding its place in petty retail and service enterprises of this group. Undeniableness of this fact is well evidenced in the Table given below that the returns of Labor Force Survey tell that in the recent three years the bulk of new employment found its way in this (III) branch of the three industrial branches.

Table 10. Annual Increase of Employment in 3 Industrial Groups (Average of 3 years, 1952 to 1955)

Industrial group	Actual number increased	Rate of increase	Rate of distribution
I. Agriculture, Forestry & Fishery	260,000	per cent 1.6	21
II. Mining, Manufacturing & Construction	260,000	2.9	20
III. Other industries	750,000	6.0	59
Total	1,270,000	3.3	100

Note: Average rate of Labor Force Survey figures. Of the 750,000, increase in Other Industries (III), 730,000 or more than 97 per cent were found to have gone to small scale commerce or personal-service businesses.

There can now be but little doubt that the pressure of overpopulation has functioned to drive a vast number of people into III group of occupation in a way little deserving the term 'employment' in pecuniary returns. Such situation is analyzed in the following table in which the ups and downs in the per head national incomes of employes of the three industrial groups are weighed and which will serve to elucidate that the relative position of Group III has degraded sharply in the post-war years.

It should not be passed unnoticed that, analyzing the status of employment in Group II (mining, manufacturing and construction), one will find out that exactly the same nature

Table 11. Comparative Table, Percapita National Income of workers of 3 Industrial Groups, Before and After War

Year	All industries	Indust. Group I	Indust. Group II	Indust. Group III
1935	100	43	128	167
1954	100	49	132	144

Note 1: Figures do not signify that officially given out, but were compiled by the present writer.

Note 2: When including, after Colin Clark's way of classification, petty handicraft manufacturing plants into Group III productivity of the same group will fall behind that of Group II in Japan's case as under:

Per Hour Productivity of workers after Clark's Method  
(Unit: I. U.)

Country	Year	I	II	III
Japan	1934	0.049	0.200	0.145
Britain	1937	0.200	0.353	0.669
U. S. A.	1939-41	0.282	1.070	1.241

(Colin Clark took males only for Industrial Group No. 1)

of defect thrives in this field of industry which normally constitutes the economic backbone of a country. Table 12 is the numerical statement of how that branch of industry is clustered by a host of petty cottage industries of family unit where the employees are set to work on or even below the border of prime cost, and where the opportunity of employment is wide open to the latent unemployed. The ratio of workers in such petty family enterprises, which is 60 per cent in the entire industrial circles and 95 per cent in agriculture, forestry and fishery industry, is well over 20 per cent even in the case of the mining-manufacturing-construction industry.

Looking further into the structural elements of Group II industry, one would be surprised to see that even in the manufacturing industries, the very staple of all industries, as much as 95 per cent of its total number of establishments

Table 12. Ratio of Employment by Occupational Status  
in 3 Industrial Groups (1950)

Occupational status	Total industries	I Agriculture, Forestry & Fishery	II Mining, & Manufactur- ing & Con- struction	III Other industries
Enterpriser (self-employed)	26.1	32.9	14.6	23.5
(Do. with paid employes)	(2.2)	(0.9)	(3.4)	(3.3)
Unpaid family workers	34.4	61.2	7.2	10.8
<b>Total</b>	<b>60.5</b>	<b>94.1</b>	<b>21.8</b>	<b>34.3</b>
Employees	39.3	5.9	78.2	65.7
Unknown	0.2	—	—	—
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Note: 10 per cent extract of 1950 census figures quoted. Figures of the latest Labor Force Survey are practically the same as that of above.

are made up of petty cottage plants or family unit enterprises with the employment unit of 30 men or less, about 80 per cent of it of 10 men or less, and about 60 per cent of 5 men or less. Examining the situation from the point of the number of employees, more than 60 per cent of workers in this field of industry belong to smaller enterprises of less than 100

Table 13. Number of Manufacturing Establishments by  
Business Scale and Labor Complements (in 1954)

Business scale (Labor complements)	Number of establishment	Number of employees
1- 9 men	79.5	23.2
10- 29 men	15.1	20.7
30- 99 men	4.2	17.6
100-199 men	0.6	7.5
200 or more men	0.6	31.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Note: Extracted from Establishment Census of 1954 by Statistics Bureau, Prime Minister's Office.



labor strength and well over 40 per cent to those of less than 30 workers. The above picture is illustrated in Table 13.

The high ratio of employment as reflected in the medium and small-scale enterprises manifests the very fact that there exists an oversupply of labor in inverse proportion to the size of their capital. It follows that it is a foregone conclusion that surplus laborers are destined to sacrifice their wage scale to the opportunity of employment—particularly so where the enterprises run on family-holding system are serving as a vessel for overpopulation. The helplessness of Japanese overpopulation problem lies in this constitutional singularity of its industrial system in which family industry comes out predominantly to bear upon all kinds of industries and which at times would opportunely digest surplus labor, but which at the same time would function to repeat the reproduction

Table 14. Wagescale Differentiated by Scale of Enterprises  
(1954, Male factory-laborers only)

Scale of enterprise	Wage index
1,000 men or more	100.0
500-999 men	88.0
100-499 men	74.4
30- 99 men	63.4
10- 29 men	53.7

Note 1: Quoted from Fact-finding Survey on Wagescale by Occupational Classification for April 1954 by the Labor Ministry. Actual wage disparity is believed to be far greater than these as the statistics were taken on the basis of regular pay scale alone.

Note 2: In the case of enterprises with 10 or less laborers the wage index, deducing from data compiled on the ground of unemployment insurance application, was obviously below 50 per cent mark.

of surplus population. The continued high ratio of employment current in general industry world must be counted largely to the credit of those small plants or cottage industries. However, scrutinizing from the angle of wage index there is noticeable that this ostensible vigorousness in employment is attended with a marked disparity in pay scale arising out of the difference in the scale of individual enterprises to afford no room for optimism as it points outright to the seriousness of the overpopulation problem. This phase of wage scale is elucidated in Table 14.

### **3. Employment Problem Assumes Serious Proportions in the Form of Latent Unemployment Problem**

In Japan's economy a petty enterprise managed by family workers in which each member is, as a self-employed employer, obliged, more often than not, to leave his or her labour unpaid, is not a thing peculiar to the sector of her primary industries, such as agriculture, forestry and fishery, but is present to a varying extent throughout her whole industries. Such enterprises are making the additional labour needed for the country's all industrial activities to stand ready, as it were, on their own account.

On the other hand, the enormous group of small and medium enterprises are characterized with marked wage differentials from large enterprises. They serve, for their part, as a 'chain' linking the self-sustaining labour with modern industrial capital by means of their wage-disparities varying in mathematically accurate proportion to their small

and medium scales of management. In the economic society of such a pattern, capital and labour are not so much in clear-cut opposition to each other under the rationalism of capital as standing face to face with each other in association with the distortions of industries and form of enterprises. And the overabundance of labour in relation to capital does not present itself in the shape of opposition of unemployment to employment, but rather is bound to appear as the under-employment with an extremely low productivity. The number of persons in actual unemployment now covered by the Labour Force Survey remains stationary from month to month at the level of approximately 700,000. This represents less than 2 percent of the total labour force of about 40 million and less than 3 percent of the total number of employers and employees obtained by subtracting the number of family workers from the whole labour force. The number of the unemployed registered under unemployment insurance stands at roughly the same level. The number of the jobless is apparently within the sphere of frictional unemployment. Meanwhile, the number of those who may be regarded in various senses as under-employed is growing from year to year. For example, let us follow the trend of the distribution of the whole employed persons by working hours under the Labour Force Survey, which is shown in Table 15. You will note that the rate of increase in the number of the gainfully employed is the largest in the case of those employed for a short work week less than 20 hours followed by those for a long one exceeding 60 hours, while little or no increase is observed in the case of those employed for the moderate length of work week of 35 to 48 and 49 to 59 work weeks. In the case of the former,

that is, the group of 35 to 48 work week, they are rather decreasing in the absolute number, thus making their relative importance in the total employed dwindling year by year.

Table 15. Changes in the Number of the gainfully  
Employed by Work Week  
(All industries; both male and female put together.)

Year	Total	1-19 hr	20-34 hr	35-48 hr	49-59 hr	60 hr and above
A) Real number (unit: 1,000)						
1949	35,090	3,030	4,840	11,480	8,400	7,350
1952	36,820	3,620	4,810	11,450	8,790	8,150
1955	40,560	4,720	5,340	11,430	9,010	9,960
B) Index (1949=100.0)						
1949	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1952	104.9	119.5	99.4	99.7	104.6	110.9
1955	115.6	155.8	110.3	99.6	107.3	135.5
C) Ratio (%)						
1949	100.0	8.6	13.8	32.7	23.9	21.0
1952	100.0	9.8	13.1	31.1	23.9	22.1
1955	100.0	11.7	13.2	28.2	22.3	24.6

Note: Source; Labour Force Survey. The yearly average is taken for each year. As regards those absent from work the definition of whose meaning was meanwhile subject to change, they were 980,000 in 1949, 470,000 in 1952 and 560,000 in 1955.

The trends revealed in the changes in the distribution of the employed given above are roughly the same with reference to all classifications by sex, by occupational position and by agriculture-forestry or otherwise, though varying in degree. Generally, the aggravating tendency is stronger in the sectors which absorbed a large number of the employed.

The actual working condition of the underemployed viewed from the angle of working hours is out of the coverage of the periodic labour force survey. Nevertheless, some idea of it may be obtained by reference to the Extra Inquiry in Labour

Force Survey of March, 1955. According to the Survey, a majority or, to be more exact, 55 per cent of the employed for a short work week below 35 hours are principally occupied in usual status with domestic affairs or school attendance and only secondarily with work. A greater part of them are, it is noted, accounted for by unpaid female family workers. The rest or 45 per cent is represented by those mainly engaged in usual occupation, while nearly all or a little more than 98 per cent of the employed for such an extremely long work

Table 16. Distribution of Short and Long Hour Employed  
Mainly in Usual Occupation by Agriculture-Forestry or  
Otherwise and by class of work (March, 1955)

Industry and position in occupation	Employed for 1-34 work week	Employed for more than 70 work week
A) Real number (unit: 1,000)		
Total	3,460 (100.0)	3,490 (100.0)
Agriculture-forestry total	2,160 (62.4)	670 (19.2)
of which employer	740	280
unpaid family worker	1,400	380
paid employees	20	20
Non-Agriculture-forestry total	1,300 (37.6)	2,820 (80.8)
of which employer	580	1,140
unpaid family worker	370	710
paid employees	350	970
B) Ratio in percentage of the employed mainly engaged in usual occupation (%)		
Total	9.3	9.4
Agriculture-forestry total	14.3	4.4
of which employers	13.9	5.3
unpaid family workers	15.0	4.1
paid employees	4.7	0.6
Non-agriculture-forestry total	5.9	12.8
of which employers	12.5	24.5
unpaid family workers	13.5	25.9
paid employees	2.4	6.6

Note: Source; Extra Inquiry in Labour Force Survey of March, 1955.

week as exceeds 70 hours were, as a matter of course, engaged in usual occupation. Table 16 gives the distributive picture, by industries and by occupational positions, of the employed for short and long work weeks who are engaging in usual occupation. It is found that the short-hour employed are concentrated in a larger degree in the agricultural and forestry department and the long-hour employed in the non-agricultural and-forestry department and that they are in either case closely associated with family-managed enterprises.

Let us, then, inquire into the reason why they should be compelled to work for a short or long work week. The largest number of them are included in the category of "by the nature of work," but undoubtedly this would be connected with the reason of "slackness of business" with the employed for short work week and with that of "small income" with the employed for long work week. In other words, they are, most of them, either in the petty family enterprises suffering from low productivity which could not properly be said an enterprise at all or belonging to the enterprises the productivity of which is similarly low and which can support themselves only by buying the labour dumped by the households under like livelihood conditions. Either of them may well be said to be typical of the low income employees who have tinged strongly with the character of underemployment, being assigned to work under the familist cooperation and coercion.

The number of the employed under the Labour Force Survey has been increasing by nearly 1,300,000 on an annual average since the past several years (see Table 10 above). The total of the employed is now well over 40,000,000. How many of the persons of the low income class such as are

mentioned above are included in the so over-grown employed? We shall try to estimate the figure on the basis of the results of the above mentioned Extra Inquiry in the Labour Force Survey of March, 1955. It is found that the living standard of the households protected under the Daily Life Protection Law, currently in force, when adjusted for the difference in the number of household members, is slightly higher than half of the averaged living standard of total households. So we shall prepare a distributive picture of incomes by classifying them generally by the above standards. In other words, in the case of the paid employees, those with incomes less than a half of the average monthly income of their respective groups classified by sex and age (minimum: ¥3,000) and in the case of the self-employed, those with incomes less than a half of the average annual income of their respective groups classified by the scale of management according to the number of employees, (maximum; ¥10,000 in the case of the self-employed in agriculture and forestry, and ¥12,000 in the case of the self-employed in other industries) are assumed to be the employed of low income classes. The results obtained are shown in Table 17, according to which the total is estimated at 6,500,000.

The Welfare Administration Basic Survey conducted by the Welfare Ministry in April, 1954, estimates the aggregate of the number of households in the lower consumption groups, roughly of the same level with those under daily life protection, at 2,530,000 and the number of the members of these households at 11,700,000, with which may well be considered to coincide generally the estimated number of lower income groups above. Then, it follows that a greater part of under-

Table 17. Estimate of the Employed of Low Income Classes  
(Unit: 1,000)

A) Paid employees			
	Male	female	Total
All industries	1,500	500	2,000
B) Self-employed households			
	Self-employed	Unpaid family workers	Total
Agriculture & Forestry	1,200	1,600	2,800
Non-Agriculture & Forestry	1,100	600	1,700
Total	2,300	2,200	4,500

Note 1: See the text for the source and the method of calculation. Figures in this Table cover those chiefly engaged in usual occupation, but under the present method of calculation the unpaid family workers in self-employed households are bound to include some of those secondarily engaged in usual occupation.

Note 2: The number of the self employed in (B) include those who are fictionally computed as householder, as in the case of such a wife, who is farming a petty farm, while her husband, the true householder, is employed as wageearner.

paid employees, reaching as many as 2 million are in the same lower income households and working together for a living with their household partners or engaging in some work as a side job for making up for the deficits in their household budgets. Besides, the number of persons receiving unemployment insurance doles under the unemployment insurance stands at about 500,000 in 1955 on the annual average, so that, of those who personally are bound to engage mainly in some work, the total number of those who are not offered socially ample opportunity for employment, that is, the total number of the superfluous labour force, combined with 6,500,000 of the employed of lower income classes, should reach 7 million.

As all the above figures are based on the lowest estimates,



the total strength of the surplus labour force will be actually well over 7,000,000. Therefore, if the real situation of the labour force as of 1955 is analysed in the light of the above estimated figures, the results will be as shown in Table 18. It may be understood how many intricate problems are involved in the labour force which is apparently so large in size.

Table 18. Composition of Labour Force in 1955

Item	Actual figure	Percentage
1) Total labour force officially announced	41,800	100.0
2) Total labour force in usual status	40,000	95.7
a) Those chiefly engaged in usual occupation	37,500	—
b) The unemployed without usual occupation	500	—
c) of those chiefly engaged in family work	2,000	—
3) Labour force effectively operated	33,000	78.9
4) Superfluous labour force	7,000	16.7
a) Underpaid employed	6,500	—
b) Unemployed without usual occupation	500	—
5) Floating labour force bordering on non-labour force	1,800	4.3

Note: (1) Source: Annual average for 1955, Labour Force Survey. Hence the size of labour force in actual status is here indicated.

(2 a) Midy-yearly figure for 1955 has been worked out on the basis of the results of the Labour Force Extra Surveys of March, 1954 and March, 1955.

(2 b) The number of persons given unemployment insurance doles on the annual average for 1955.

(2 c) About half the estimated number of those chiefly engaged in family work as of the middle of 1955 is taken as the essential labour force for family-operated enterprises.

(3) (2)–(4)

(4 a) Based on the above estimated figure. cf. Table 17.

(4 b) Same with (2 b)

(5) (1)–(2)

The superfluity of the labour force with which Japanese economy now is confronted may reach the level of 17 percent of the total force or 7 million, even on the basis of the lowest estimate. But the question does not consist merely in the proportion of the number of the underemployed at present. As may be understood by reference to Table 4 above, we are faced with the increase in the economically active age population which may average 1,100,000 per year in the 10-odd years to come. This is a figure more than double the prewar level. Furthermore, no less conspicuous is the rise in the old age

Table 19. Prewar and Postwar Trends of the Labour Force Participation Rate by Sex and Age (1920-'55)

Age group	1920	— Male —		
		1930	1950	1955
0-13	3.4	1.6	1.2	—
14-19	78.7	72.7	52.9	44.9
20-24	93.7	91.8	90.0	88.1
25-29	97.1	96.7	95.1	96.2
30-39	98.1	98.1	96.9	97.1
40-49	98.0	97.5	97.1	97.2
50-59	96.0	93.8	92.3	93.5
60 and above	75.3	71.5	65.4	66.2
Total	60.6	58.8	55.1	55.7
		— Female —		
0-13	4.6	2.7	1.0	—
14-19	66.9	58.6	46.8	41.5
20-24	59.6	53.7	64.1	68.2
25-29	53.4	46.5	48.2	51.8
30-39	54.8	50.2	50.1	51.3
40-49	56.4	53.6	53.1	55.0
50-59	50.3	48.2	48.3	48.8
60 and above	28.2	24.2	27.2	26.3
Total	36.9	33.0	33.3	34.3

Note: Source: Census figures for 1955 is computed by 1% tabulation.

group of 60 and above. Of course, not all members of these groups enter on the labour market. However, the rate or the percentage of labour force in population has recently shown, as may be perceived by reference to Table 19, a strong upward trend in the case of women and the aged.

Although the rise in the share of the female employed can be in a sense undoubtedly an index of the social progress in keeping with the times on the one hand, but on the other it shows how the inadequacy of incomes earned by male heads of households is driving their wives and sometimes even their aged mothers to the labour market.

Now, let us assume that (A) a case exists where the future labour force is reorganized along the trend carried over from the prewar years on a minimal and reasonable scale and also that (B) another case exists where the upward trend is kept up if not aggravated, and measure on these assumptions the probable trend of increase of the labour force in the ten-year period from 1955 to 1965. Then, the working population in 1965 will work out at 48 million in the case of (A), at 52 million in the case of (B) and at 50 million on the average. The yearly average will be 800,000 to 1,200,000. This means the inevitable increase on an average of approximately 1 million for each year. When it is recalled that the net increase of the gainfully employed which Japan's economy was able to absorb in the peak years of the national economy before the war stood roughly at 300,000 on an annual average, it may easily be imagined how heavy would be the burden of the net increase of nearly 1 million job seekers, an increase which would necessarily be expected in the period of more than ten years to come. Moreover, there is a high probability of this

making the already superfluous labour force reaching the enormous number more superfluous.

So, we shall assess the overabundance or shortage of labour force in 1965 which is expected to be the peak year for the increase of the economically active age population and is thus taken as the goal year. Then, the results obtained will be as shown in Table 20.

Table 20. Surplus or Deficit in Labour Force in 1965 Estimated by the Different Rates of Future Economic Growth

(Unit: 1,000 persons)

		Rates of Economic Growth (at an annual rate)		
		4 %	5 %	6 %
<b>(A) 1955</b>				
1)	Total labour force	40,000		
2)	Effectively operatable labour force	33,000		
3)	Surplus labour force	7,000		
<b>(B) 1965</b>				
1)	Total labour force	50,000	50,000	50,000
2)	Effectively operatable labour force	38,300	41,900	46,200
3)	Surplus labour force	11,700	9,100	3,800
<b>(C) Increases for the 1955 to '65 period</b>				
1)	Total labour force	10,000	10,000	10,000
2)	Effectively operatable labour force	5,300	8,900	13,200
3)	Surplus labour force	4,700	2,100	(- )3,200

Note: Effectively operatable labour force is obtained by multiplying the one for the base year by the estimated rate of economic growth. However, the rate of increase of labour productivity is estimated at 2.5 percent annually in the light of the total production and the number of the employed for the 1930-'45 period.

The above Table shows that the surplus labour force will approach the 12 million mark when the future rate of growth of the national economy stands at 4 percent annually, thus

registering a nearly 5-million increase over the present level. If the annual growth rate is to stand at 5 percent, the surplus labour force will be increased to a certain extent and there will be no prospect of any improvement. Only if the annual growth rate reaches 6 percent, the surplus labour force will be reduced by half. Further, when the surplus labour force is reduced by half, there is strong possibility of the remaining half being removed, in a favourable sense, from the labour force. However, as touched on at the outset of this paragraph, the rate of growth of the national economy in future may be maintained at most at 4 to 5 percent of the prewar level, so that there is a great danger of a further cumulative increase of the superfluous labour force. Otherwise, if the growth at an annual rate of 6 percent should be attained through the unusual effects which may be exercised by an economic policy or like action, this would necessarily bring in its train an extreme unbalance in the distributive structure of incomes. Hence, this would probably bring about a marked increase in the number of the employed in the form of the latent unemployment. In either case, there is a very fair probability of the employment problem assuming more serious proportions in the period of a rapid increase of the economically active age population.

The serious problem of unemployment that occurred at the time of the world-wide crisis of 1930 was the first important event to arouse the people's concern over the population problem from the standpoint of employment. But the increase of the economically productive age population was then still of the level of 400,000 to 500,000 on an annual average. The unbalance between national economy and population was

rather due to the causes on the part of national economy. Whereas, the unbalance of today arises to a greater extent from the side of population. And, as a matter of course, this unbalance from the side of population is less likely to draw immediate attention. The worsening of the employment situation goes on striking inwards, assuming the form of latent unemployment. We must be fully aware of the fact that the social unrest intensified thereby unnoticed, when it goes beyond a certain limit, harbours a danger which may explode with the least stimulus. The rice riot of 1918 is a case in point. It was the first big event that aroused the concern of government and people over the population problem in the form of the food problem. The rate of increase of our rice production from the early years of the Meiji era until then was somewhat higher than that of the population increase. However, with the enhancement of the nation's living standard the per capita consumption of rice had progressively been rising. In addition, the rice production in those days had been expanded almost up to a maximum that could have been attained under the existing system of agricultural production and was almost in a top-heavy condition. Thus the failure in the maintenance of equilibrium between food and population had already become a definitive reality. The rice riot was an explosion of this failure amidst the gap between the rich and the poor and amidst the difficulty of living of the masses under the epoch-making development of the national economy following the First World War. The population problem may justly be said to have become for the first time the object of the nation's interest in the shape of the food shortage. The shortage was later to be settled in some way or other through the imple-

mentation of the overseas rice increased production plan. Anyhow, behind serious social questions of critical importance arising with the evolution of the national economy there is accumulating the population pressure before we are aware of it, thus forming a hotbed for the explosion of big social events. The riot above referred to tells this eloquently. And as stated at the outset of this essay, the birthrate in Japan about this time began to show a slow but steady downward trend peculiar to modern times.

The population pressure now confronting us is heavy to such an extent as surpasses by far that experienced in those days. It has already been remarked from time to time that this population pressure is corresponding, both explicitly and implicitly, to the further epoch-making development or the decisive transition to the high-grade capitalist system, the task imposed on the national economy of today. There had been existing in the prewar days as well a great many cases of employment at low income even below the so-called poverty level. Today it constitutes the focal point of the employment problem as the problem of latent unemployment. This means exactly that such a form of employment has come to the fore as the question which could not be left unsettled in connection with the advance movement to be demanded of our national economy in future. This does not come up for discussion simply because poverty left uncared for and accumulated in the advance movement adds to social unrest. The intensified competition in the international market demands the reduction of commodity prices as well as that of wages. This would among all else require the cutting down to a reasonable level of the current price of rice which is comparatively high

by the international standard. The expansion of farming enterprises on a reasonable scale, especially the handling of the unproductive petty farming households with subsidiary business, would, it may justly be said, become the proper subject we should tackle in earnest. Here lies the very reason why poverty, so far taken for granted with farmers' life, should have come to be highlighted as the problem of latent unemployment.

Here lies also the reason why the overoccupied population in the pre-modern industrial departments generally has come actually to intensify the anguish of overpopulation. The unbalance between national economy and population has, in this sense, been enlarged and expanded afresh since the war's ending. Although apparently the expansion of the unbalance has been caused on the side of population without our knowing it, this means actually how radical the reform now demanded of our national economy is. After all, it implies that the relationship of equilibrium Japan has so far maintained between her national economy and population has now come to the stage where it stands in need of its drastic readjustment. In this sense, we may be justified in saying that the social reproductive structure for Japan's population has come to envisage a serious failure.

#### **4. Breakdown of Equilibrium in Reproductive Structure between National Economy and Population**

The so-called farmers' second and third sons and daughters whom the 5,500,000 households had in prewar days left to go away from farms and desert rural communities, when computed



on the basis of the fertility of the then farmers and the prewar deathrate, reach almost 400,000 in number. The fertility of the farmers in the Taisho era (1912-'26), if calculated on the basis of the number of children borne per lifetime of a married couple, stood at a little more than 5, of which those survive up to full age number slightly over 4. If 2 out of the number, 1 male and 1 female, are to succeed to a farming household, the number of persons required to move will be a little more than 2. If the number of years of a generation or the age difference between father and son or daughter is assumed to be 30, of the 5,500,000 farmhouses 180,000 on an annual average was every year to hold more than 2 sons or daughters required to move. Or it may fairly be said that such farmhouses were faced with a necessity for sending out of their households roughly 400,000 sons and daughters in the aggregate. After the war's ending, the number of farming households has jumped to 6,000,000. Furthermore, the drop in the deathrate has served to enhance considerably the survival rate of the children borne. In prewar years the proportion represented by those aged 20 was less than 80 percent, while it is now well over 90 percent. Subsequently, the fertility of farmers showed a downward trend and recently has sharply dropped. But the definitive outcome of the present tendency is yet to be seen. Therefore, the population required to move whom farming households are expected to reproduce in the 10-odd years to come, if calculated under the formula similar to the above, has reached nearly 500,000 on an annual average. Meanwhile, it is noteworthy that the social environment surrounding the deserting population has undergone a more drastic transformation owing to a remarkable increase of population

reproduced by non-farming households. If the changes in prewar and postwar years are calculated by farming and non-farming populations on the basis of Table 4 above, the results will be as shown in Table 21. It may be seen that their social composition too has undergone the process of a more striking transformation.

Table 21. Yearly Average Increase of Economically Active Age Group (15-59) by Farming and Non-Farming Households

	No. of newly grown-ups	No. of persons required to be replaced by reason of death & old age	Net increase
A) 1920-35			
Total	1,250	750	500
of which farm households	800	400	400
Otherwise	450	350	100
B) 1950-65			
Total	1,950	850	1,100
of which farm households	900	400	500
Otherwise	1,050	450	600

Note: The total is based on Table 4 above. For the method of calculation of the figures for farming households refer to the text. Figures for non-farming households are obtained by striking the balance.

As is indicated in the above Table, the share taken by farming households in the process of reproduction of the whole labour force before the war was larger than that by non-farming ones. Especially the relative importance of the superfluous labour force whom the farming households enabled to desert farms and depart from rural communities after reproducing the necessary labour force for themselves outweighed by far its counterpart in the case of the non-farming population. Japan's economy in the prewar days (annual average for 1920-

'35) had offered every year on an average fresh opportunities for employment for 300,000 persons. The surplus labour force of farming households was not only provided with opportunities for leaving farmwork and taking new positions without delay, but, it would rather be said, was equal to the significant role that could not have been dispensed with in the process of reproduction of the labour force needed by the national economy as a whole. Meanwhile, the percentage of the labour force in the economically active age group (15-59) before the war stood at about 70 percent, and so the net increase by 500,000 persons in this group ought to mean an increase of some 350,000 working population. On the other hand, the evolution of our national economy in the prewar years served to decrease the number of the employed from among the minor or the old age group and the number so decreased may be worked out on an annual average at about 50,000. Then it follows that the entire labour force had been reproduced on an expanded but moderate scale, with this surplus manpower of farming households as the main force. Whereas, the steep rise in the economically active age population with which we are now faced has reached, as shown in the above Table, 1,100,000 on an annual average, of which the working population may be estimated at some 800,000, when its share in the total population is assumed to stand at generally the same level as prewar. Moreover, the juvenile and the old age labour groups are either ceasing to follow their downward trend or taking a reverse direction. What is particularly important is that a majority of the newly recruited labour force is being reproduced on the side of the urban population. Nowadays, the increase in an opportunity for a new position

is not very different from the prewar level, so that the superfluous portion must be forced into somewhere from year to year. This situation will only serve to make the employment problem still more critical in the shape of the problem of latent unemployment. The relationship of equilibrium in the supply and demand of population which used to be maintained somehow between the urban and the rural population has already come to a complete ruin. This may imply that the social reproductive structure in Japan's population in the past has entirely broken down. In this sense, if it is contemplated to remedy the situation merely by resorting to the intensified and unlimited practice of birth control, which would be an inevitable step for the moment, it may fairly be said that such attitude has only forgotten the serious importance of the situation.

This failure in the structural equilibrium which has so far enabled the social reproduction of population on a moderate scale signifies that the basic structure of the national economy has already lost its structural equilibrium. Modern Japan has fostered her modern armaments and industries which can stand a fair comparison with their counterparts of other countries in the arena of international competition. But for attaining this goal she has left a majority of her population, that is, the substance of her national life in the field of primary industries which depend on the manual family labour for subsistence and also the groups of petty enterprises in urban districts capitalizing on their unremitting physical labour, while taking full advantage of the surplus value exploited from their labour in sweat and blood and the surplus labour force being reproduced by them. Thus, the long strides taken

in her modernization has gone so far as to sanctify the pre-modern poverty to a creed of national morality. Lack of co-ordination in her economic development such as has been remarked above had only worked, at least in the case of pre-war Japan, to tighten the mechanical interdependence between both sectors of her economy, thus exerting some favourable effects from the viewpoint of her national economy. Since Japan is left no recourse for her survival but to derive earnings from her processing trade, it holds true to her now as ever before that the fostering of her modern industries standing rivalry on the international market is her primary and essential task. Now that military security is lost to her, the necessity may be said to have become stronger. However, if the necessary economic rationalism is pushed on for realization exclusively in the key industrial departments, the structural dislocation of the entire national economy will be further intensified, and the gripe of overpopulation become more serious. The practice of national austerity has already struck against the margin of its utility from the viewpoint of national economy. Here underlies the most fundamental reason for which people has come to view the current population problem with serious concern. From the angle of population problem, however, it should be strongly desired that the general expansion of population supporting capacity, that is, the reorganization of the national economic structure on a modern basis be attained through the enhancement of the national economy as a whole and its multiplied effects, the backward industries, which are the last resort of the superfluous population and as such most likely to reproduce constantly the superfluous population, being enabled to make up the leeway. But this

is no easy task to undertake. For, the introduction of such manner of reform would necessarily involve the risk of actualize the overpopulation of today that has assumed serious proportions in the form of the problem of latent unemployment. To give an example, the modernization of farm production is the most important link in the chain of the proposed reform, but would call, as the requisite condition, for the reorganization of farming households and the paying of adequate attention to the superfluous farming population who must be removed thereby. Undoubtedly the increase in the opportunities for employment through roundabout channels following the rise of agricultural productivity and the replenishment of the domestic market will fully absorb as the new modern citizenry the population so excluded. However, there is no denying that a mass exodus of farmers from their own communities at the present stage would intensify class struggles to an abnormal extent. Here again the overpopulation performs the function like that of terrestrial gravity by arresting the induction of techniques with which farmers have been already familiar and the rationalization of management which they are zealously desiring to attain. It may be considered that the seriousness of the population problem of present-day Japan consists in the fact that the economic progress is being so deterred at the resistance of population in the national economy as a whole as well as in the individual industrial departments, that is, that economy and population are standing in rivalry and opposition with each other.

This very opposition in rivalry between them testifies to the fact that the population of Japan today is integrally associated with the structural features of the Japanese national

economy in the past. Because of this [very circumstance, population and economy are disclosing the relation of rivalry and opposition as if they were two entirely separate things most remotely connected with each other, at this momentous historical turning point of modern Japan. In other words, the current situation is not a thing created merely by the natural, biological propagative power of the population nor should it be dismissed as a thing merely to be borne as the affliction caused by the defeated war and lasting only temporarily. Even though accelerated by the defeated war, the necessity for a serious reflection on the part of the nation on the proper pattern of the national living, the necessity with which we should have grappled is now looming before us in the form of population problem. As for the increase in the intensive practice of birth control and induced abortion, which have been progressing under the pressure of circumstances, it would also be necessary to examine into their actual situation from the viewpoint of such a historical situation of our national life.

