Low Fertility and Family Policies in Southern European Countries

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Summary of the Study

This study conducted a comparative analysis on demographic trends and family policies in four EU member countries around the Mediterranean Sea, namely, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece. The fertility in these countries belongs to the lowest group among industrialized countries. To clarify the reasons for their low fertility is the central concern of the report of this study.

1. Fertility trends and Proximate Factors for Fertility Rates

(1) The fertility transition in countries in Southern Europe began 10 to 15 years later than Northern and Western Europe, and completed in the 1940s. Later, baby booms continued for some time in Southern Europe just like other European regions, and in the latter half of the 1970s, their fertility rates began falling at once to fall below the replacement level in the early half of the 1980s (This second fertility decline came behind Northern and Western Europe by around 10 years.) Fertility rates continued to fall until they recorded the lowest among developed countries ranging from 1.18 (Spain) to 1.46 (Portugal).

(2) The fertility declines after the late 1970s are caused, as in other developed countries, by higher ages at marriage and childbirth (late marriage and late childbirth). In Italy and Spain, average ages at first marriage and at childbirth have been delayed by 3 to 4 years in the past 20 years from around 1980. Accordingly, rates of unmarried people in their 20s remarkably increased in the same period. As non-marital couples and extra-marital childbirths are not spread in Southern European countries, the rise in the unmarried, late marriage and late childbirths directly affected to lower fertility in these countries. Furthermore, at least in Spain, the traditional high parity childbirths (more than three children) dramatically fell and parity of one or two came to the main, which contributed to the fall of fertility rates.

It is considered that the fall in period fertility rates in Southern Europe has been caused not only by changes in the time of childbirths (late childbirth) but also by the lowered completed cohort fertility rate. In the region, modern contraceptives are not spread as in other parts of Europe, and traditional methods are relatively dominantly used.

2. Socio-Economic Changes

(3) Behind the rapid increase in unmarried, late marrying, late childbearing people and small families is a rapid increase in women participating in the labor market in each country. From around 1980, women advancing to higher educational institutions increased and more women than men acquire higher academic qualifications. Women’s labor participation has continued to rise (in Spain, for example, labor participation rate of women aged 25-29 rose from one of four to
three of four between 1965 and 1999). Against this rapid labor participation by women, efforts to accommodate their needs in working environments, childcare services, institutional facilities to support women for commuting and housing have lagged behind. This can be regarded as one reason for the fall in fertility.

Other factors include the prolongation of schooling years in the region that delays the age of employment, higher youth unemployment rates, and housing problems in large cities. More young people stay in their parents’ house longer and depend on their parents economically. This phenomenon is also contributory to the increase in young people remaining single.

(4) In this region of Europe, people have deeply rooted traditional views on family including gender role divisions. Even after women’s participation in work force expanded, efforts to readjust the workload of household work and childcare between male and female members of a family have not been made, which made it difficult for women to work and keep household at the same time.

3. Family Policy

(5) Spain and Italy have the lowest fertility rates among developed countries, however, no clear policies are formulated by either government. Behind this reluctance are people’s feelings that policies on fertility are identified with the policies of the Franco regime in Spain, and with the Mussolini regime in Italy. Even so, the need for family policies began to be recognized in the two countries.

(6) In Spain, a maternity leave is given for 16 weeks with 100 percent income compensation, but there is no parental leave system. In Italy, a 5-month-long maternity leave is compulsory, during which time, 80 percent of wage is paid. In addition, working mothers have a right to take a 6-month parental leave with a payment of 30 percent of their wages. Childcare benefits are given to poor families both in Spain and Italy. Public childcare services for children under-3 are very limited either in Spain and Italy, and the enrollment rates are merely 5-6 percent of children of that age group.

(7) Insufficient housing is one of the obstacles for young people wishing to marry and have children. Both in Italy and Spain, people live in independent houses of their own. The rental house market is extremely undeveloped preventing young people from leaving their parents’ homes to build their own households.

(8) Taking point 1) to 7) into account, people in countries in Southern Europe have deep-rooted traditional family view (fixed gender role division), and their attitudes and social services do not accommodate women’s increased labor participation, hence, unfavorable conditions for childbearing. In addition to belated policies to help women to work and keep a family at the same time, youth unemployment and shortage of rental houses prevent young people from becoming independent, which is another factor contributing negatively to increase fertility.
1. Introduction

Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal are included among the group of lowest fertility in the world. Fertility rates in these Mediterranean countries fell to the 1.10 level, and they are in the state of super low fertility. There are some common points between Japan and these countries in that the falls of their fertility rates began later than other developed countries in European regions and the United States, that women’s labor participation is quite a recent development, and that people have a traditional family view. It is significant to examine cultural, institutional and policy factors resulting in low fertility rates in these countries in order to predict if Japan’s total fertility rate would be further lowered to the 1.0 level as in Southern Europe today. At the same time, economic and social characteristics and social policies that affect fertility rates will be identified. It is aimed to draw what to include in future advocacy to stop lowering fertility to the Japanese policy makers.

In this project, chronological and comparative analyses were made based on the available data on fertility trends, socio-economic trends, and social policies (concerning lowering fertility rates and family policies) of Southern European countries. Homogeneity as well as heterogeneity, and commonality and diversity in these countries were examined, and the factors leading to low fertility rates were looked into from the background factors of fertility changes and the family policies taken by these countries. From the study, policy implications for the declining fertility in Japan will be drawn.

According to the regional division by the United Nations, 15 countries and territories are included in Southern Europe. In this paper, tendencies in four major countries, Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal which have populations larger than 10 million (in the order of size) will be discussed, with occasional reference to other countries and territories.

2. Fertility Trends

(1) Total Fertility Rates (TFRs) after 1960

The sharp fall of fertility to below the replacement level in Southern Europe occurred rapidly and in a short time period after the mid-1970s. This shows quite a different picture from the slow and long-time process of fertility transition in Northern and Western Europe.

The declining trends of fertility by total fertility rates (TFRs) are shown in Fig.1.1-1.2 after 1960. Italy was the first to record below the replacement-level fertility of 2.1 in 1977 (1.98), followed by Spain in 1981 (2.04), Greece in 1981 (2.09), and Portugal in 1982 (2.08).

In Spain, TFRs stayed between 2.5 and 3.0 until around the mid-1960s, but with 3.01 in 1964 as the peak, the rates began to draw a gradual declining curve. The rates still remained at 2.79 or so in the mid-1970s, but from the late 1970s, the fall accelerated to reach 2.20 in 1980. It continued to fall to 1.36 in 1990, and further to 1.16 in 1998, after which it rose a little to 1.20 in 1999, 1.24 in 2000. Even so, TFR in Spain is lower than the level in Japan.

After a drop right after World War II in Italy, TFRs remained stable at
around 2.3 in the 1950s, rose nearly to 2.7 during the baby boom period between 1964 and 65. With this as the peak, TFRs continued to fall to 2.3-2.4 at the beginning of the 1970s, to below the replacement level in 1977, 1.64 in 1980, and 1.42 in 1985. After being stable at the 1.3 level nearly a decade until 1992, it fell again to 1.19 in 1996, then it reversed to rise slightly to 1.23. Portugal had the highest fertility among the four countries. The TFR in this country was 3.23 in 1962 and they stayed at the 3-point level until 1971. In the following decade, TFRs fell nearly to the replacement level (2.13 in 1981) and continued to fall straightly to 1.40 in 1995, but from 1996, it reversed to gain until 1.50 in 2000.

In contrast to Portugal, Greece had lower TFRs in the four countries from earlier years, and 2.43 in 1967 was its highest record. TFRs remained at the 2-point level for 15 years between 1967 and 1982 (2.02). A little later than the other three countries, a rapid fall in fertility in Greece began in the 1980s, after which it continued to fall to 1.28 in 1999 and rose a little to 1.29 in 2000.

One of common TFR characteristics in these countries is the rapid fall in TFRs that began in the late 1970s (and early 1980s in Greece) to below the replacement level occurred by halving the peak fertility rates in the 1960s just in 10 years or so. Second common point is that Italy and Spain experienced sharp falls to extremely low TFRs at 1.10 that no other countries in Northern and Western Europe have experienced. Third point is that in Italy, Spain and Portugal have seen signs for slight rises in TFR in the past few years. It is hardly said that a TFR recovery is happening in Greece.

(2) Completed Cohort Fertility Rates

A total fertility rate is used as a period fertility index, drawn by calculating a fertility rate based on fertility statistics of each year. Against this, cohort fertility index is meant to observe actual fertility rates of each birth cohort. Completed fertility rates by birth cohorts are shown in Fig. 2.1-2.2.

Completed fertility rates after 1930 birth cohorts (after 1937 in Greece, and after 1941 in Spain) show that in Italy the rates turned to decline after the peak of 2.32 by 1933 birth cohort, and in Portugal after the peak of 2.95 by the 1931 birth cohort. The earliest data available for Spain in 1941 shows that the rate of the birth cohort born in that year was 2.55, after this year a declining tendency followed. The cohort whose completed fertility rate fell below the 2.1 replacement level was the 1944 birth cohort of Italy, the 1952 birth cohort of Spain, and the 1950 birth cohort of Portugal. In recent birth cohorts, the 1962 birth cohort of Italy recorded 1.60, the 1964 birth cohort of Spain 1.63, and that of 1966 of Portugal 1.81. As to Greece whose oldest data are those of 1937 birth cohort, the largest fertility rate was 2.08 by the 1939 birth cohort and for the following two decades the rates remained around 2.0. After the completed fertility rate by the 1956 birth cohort fell below 2.0, it kept lowering and fell to 1.70 by the 1966 birth cohort. The rates are low in respective countries, and it is predicted that this tendency will continue considering gaps between period fertility rates.

Comparing with Northern and Western European countries, there are
larger differences between the highest and lowest period fertility rates in Italy, Spain and Portugal in the past 40 years. It suggests that these countries have undergone greater changes in fertility (between 1.51 and 1.85 of period total fertility rates). Fertility rates by birth cohort may show more stable fertility trends than period fertility rate. Since the rates by birth cohort appear about 30 years later than the other, and taking into this period and the rate at 2.0 by the 1965 birth cohort of Northern and Western Europe into account, completed cohort fertility rates in Southern European countries are low, and continuous declines are most probable (the cohort fertility trend in Greece has been relatively stable, but a continuous fall has been witnessed after the 1955 birth cohort).

3. Proximate Factors for Fertility Rates

(1) Age at Marriage and Childbirth

Changes in women’s marrying and childbearing age are relevant to changes in fertility rates. Evidence for the relevancy can be found in several marriage and childbirth indices.

1) Total first marriage rates and ratios of ever-married women

The total first marriage rate is calculated based on the statistics of first marriage of people aged between 15 and 49 in one year. It indicates the total occurrence rate of first marriage by age in a year, and is used as indices that reflect yearly changes in first marriage. In contrast, the ratio of the ever-married (the remainder of the ratio of the never-married) indicates the ratio of married people around age 50 of a generation, and it can be considered as an index of the total cohort first-marriage rate.

Looking at the total female first marriage rates after 1960, Italy and Spain kept above one until 1974 and 1975 respectively, and Portugal until 1979. However, once the rates became lower than one in these countries, they fell rapidly as if geared to the decline in TFRs (Fig.3.1-3.2). In Spain, the total female first marriage rate fell to 0.69 in 1981, and remained on the 0.6 level for nearly 20 years. In Italy, it maintained the 0.6 level, from 0.68 in 1984 to 0.62 in 1999. After falling below one in Portugal, the rate has declined to 0.73 in 2000. In Greece, the rates fluctuated every other year, and remained between 0.5 and 0.7 in the 1990s. In general, the rates in Southern Europe are slightly higher than those of Northern and Western Europe that stay around 0.5.

As to the ratios of every-married women, the birth cohorts between 1930 and 1945 in Greece, Italy and Portugal show higher than 90% (Fig.4.1-4.2). In both Greece and Portugal, the same situation continued among women of postwar birth cohorts for some time. It is estimated that more than 90% of women even among the 1967 birth cohort were married. In Italy, the ratios of ever-married women gradually declined after the war, and in the 1967 birth cohort, it is estimated to 79%. In Spain, the data are available from 1955, and the rate of ever-married women in the 1955 birth cohort is estimated to be 87%, and that in the 1967 birth cohort to be 82%. Even though the rates are lowering, they are higher than those in Northern and Western Europe (69% in the 1967 birth cohort.
in France, 62% in the 1965 birth cohort in Sweden, and so on.)

As mentioned before, people still follow their tradition for marriage and reproductive behaviors in Italy. Most marriages are official (98% in the 1991 population census), and 80% of which are wed at Catholic churches and 92% of their children are legitimate. After the 1970s, cases of marriage decreased, and currently, its total period first marriage rate (TPFMR) fell to 60%. However, in accordance with the tradition, 90% of women are married by age 50 when their reproductive periods end. In Spain, cases of marriage declined through the 1990s, and 220,000 couples were married and the general marriage rate was 5.7 in 1990, and the marriage rate was 5.3 in 1998, and in 1999, 206,000 couples were registered and the marriage rate was 5.2 (in Japan, 6.1 in 1999). Among the total cases of marriage, the ratios of first-marriage are decreasing both among men and women. Even so, they are still high with 93.3% of men and 94.7% of women (in Japan, 86.1% of men, and 87.6% of women). The total first marriage rate has kept a declining tendency through the 1990s. The rates of 0.68 of men and 0.69 of women in 1990 decreased to 0.61 and 0.63 respectively, both lower than Japan with 0.65 and 0.68.

As the majority of childbirths occur by married couples in Southern Europe, the late marriage trend is closely related to delaying the mean age at first birth.

2) Mean Age at First Marriage and Mean Age at First Marriage by Cohort

Mean age at first marriage shows the average of distribution of first marriage occurrences by age (Fig.5.1-5.2). Mean age of women at first marriage in 1960 was 25.1 in Greece, and 24.8 in both Italy and Portugal. After 1960, women tended to marry at younger age hitting the bottom at 23.2 in Greece in 1979, 23.6 in Italy in 1977, 23.1 between 1982-83 in Portugal, and 23.4 in 1979-80 in Spain which has data only of 1975 and later. After hitting the bottom in these years, the mean age at first marriage in these countries has kept becoming higher to 26.6 in Greece in 1999, 27.0 in Italy in 1997, 25.2 in 2000 in Portugal and 27.7 in Spain in 1999.

Mean age at first marriage by birth cohort (Fig.6.1-6.2) reveals that mean age at first marriage begins to be late with the birth cohorts of earlier and latter 1950s as the youngest. The mean age at first marriage of 1967 birth cohort is 24.5 in Greece, 25.6 in Italy, 25.7 in Spain, and 23.9 in Portugal, each of which is younger than the mean age at first marriage in the latest year of every country.

3) Mean Age at Childbirth (Mean Age at Birth of First Child) and Mean Age at First Birth by Cohort

Mean age at childbirth in each country kept lowering from 1960 toward 1979 and the early 1980s, and then continued to rise (Fig.7.1-7.2). Mean age at birth of first child turned to rise in each country in the late 1970s, two to three years earlier than the rise of mean age at childbirth (Fig.8.1-8.2). The values in each country in 1999 were 28.9 years old (mean age at birth of first child, 27.3 years old) in Greece, 30.4 years old (28.7 years old as of 1997) in Italy, 28.6 years old (26.4 years old) in Portugal, and 30.7 years old (29.0 years old) in Spain.
While the process of late childbearing is slow in Greece and Portugal, it is very fast in Italy and Spain.

The same trend can be endorsed by age of childbirth by cohort. The 1948 birth cohort in Italy, and the 1954-1958 birth cohorts in the rest are the youngest groups to have children (Fig.9.1-9.2). The mean ages at childbirth by cohort according to the latest data are 27.1 (1966 birth cohort) in Greece, 27.6 (1966 cohort) in Portugal, 28.4 (1962 cohort) in Italy and 28.8 (1964 cohort) in Spain.

It is noted that the turning points from marrying at younger age to older age in Southern European countries are found during or after the process of lowering period fertility rates that occurred after the mid-1970s. It mirrors changes in mean age at first marriage, from marrying at younger age that continued from the late 1970s toward the early 1980s to marrying at older age after the mid-1980s.

The indices of marrying and childbearing age are largely following the trends in countries in Northern and Western Europe, however, some indices of Italy and Spain exceed those of the other two sub-regions, and fertility rates are reduced further than these sub-regions.

4) Crude Divorce Rate and Total Divorce Rate

Crude divorce rates are shown in Fig.10.1-10.2. A divorce implies the discontinuation of births, and in Southern Europe, there has been strict social norm on divorce, and it is only recent that divorce was recognized officially. However, crude divorce rates are on the rise in all of these countries; 0.74 in Greece, 0.58 in Italy, 1.51 in Portugal, and 0.94 in Spain in 1998. These are lower than the rates in Northern and Western Europe, and that of Japan with 1.94. In Spain, for example, divorce became legal in June 1981, and within half a year after the enforcement 9,500 couples registered their divorces, with general divorce rate of 0.3%, and in the following year 20,000 couples divorced with the rate of 0.6%. Between 1981 and 1989, 20,000 couples on average divorced annually and general divorce rates stayed 0.5%. In 1998, 36,072 couples divorced, and the rate rose to 0.92%, but still the figure is about a half of Japan. Therefore, it can be said that relatively stable marital relations are maintained in Spain. As mentioned before, the higher age at first marriage in Spain can be partially attributed to little divorce rate.

The total divorce rates in 1995 are 17% in Greece, 8% in Italy, 16% in Portugal, and 15% in Spain, and they are taking upward paths rapidly in recent years.

(2) Change in Marriage Rates

Compared to Northern and Western Europe, extra-marital births are fewer in Italy and Spain and other Southern European countries. Thus, marriage rates affect fertility rates.

The trend of marriage rates in Spain is shown in Figure 11. It is clear that the rates of married women rapidly fell, and in contrast, the rates of unmarried women are on the rise. In 2000, the rates of unmarried women in
20-24, 25-29 and 30-34 age groups are higher than corresponding age groups in Japan. In particular, among women in the 25-29 age group, 32.9% are married and 65.4% are unmarried, meaning two of three are single. The rate of single women in this age bracket in Spain (men are 81.35%) is higher by 10% than Japan where unmarried women occupy a majority. In the past three decades, the rates of married women in the 25-29 age group decreased by 20% in 10 years from 75.9% in 1981, 53.5% in 1991, and 32.9% in 2000. The rate fell by 20% in the past two decades, and the process for non-marriage and late-marriage is rapidly ongoing.

A similar tendency is observed also in Italy. As marriage plays a central role as a parameter for fertility in Mediterranean countries, lowering marriage rates are closely linked with lingering-low fertility rates in these countries. The rise in unmarried women corresponds with the rapid fall in fertility rates from the late 1970s toward 1980s. Hence, changes in marriage behavior can be considered as an element directly contributing to fertility changes.

(3) Non-Marital Couples and Extra-Marital Births

1) Non-marital couples

Fig.12-13 shows the rates of non-marital couples in selected countries in 1994 and 1996. Non-marital couples in the 16-29 age group in 1996 was 15% (9% in 1964) in Greece, 9% (6%) in Italy, 11% (10%) in Portugal and 10% (14%) in Spain, and including other age groups, non-marital couples share only 2-3 percent of all couples in these countries. Comparing with the average rate of non-marital couples of the 16-29 age groups in 15 EU member countries with 31%, the rates of non-marital couples in Southern European countries are among the lowest in Europe, and the cohabitation of non-married couples is not a common lifestyle.

In Southern Europe, marriage is a normal style of man-and-woman partnership, and although non-marital cohabitation is increasing, the ratios are still much lower than Northern and Western Europe. The majority of non-marital couples are finally officially married when they expect a child, or when they intend to have a child. The low rates of non-marital couples can be explained, to some extent, by lack of legal protection.

2) Extra-marital births

It is said that marriage no longer signifies the commencement of childbirths in Northern and Western Europe. In many countries in these parts of Europe, quite a number of extra-marital births are seen affecting fertility rates. Fig.14.1-14.2 shows the trends of extra-marital births.

Extra-marital birth rates in 1999 were 3.9 in Greece, 9.2 in Italy, 20.9 in Portugal, and 16.3 in Spain. Among these countries, Spain and Portugal on the Iberian Peninsula and Italy and Greece show a slight difference. The indices of marriage and fertility in these countries are following the path of Western European countries, and the rates of non-marital couples and extra-marital births are going up recently. Even so, their rates of extra-marital births are far below
from France with 41.7, Sweden with 55.3 and Britain with 38.8 (1.6 in Japan). However, new “North of the Pyrenees” trends in marriage and childbearing behavior pattern can be seen in the Iberian countries.

(4) Contraception and Induced Abortion

1) Contraceptives

It was in December 1978 (Decree No. 303378) that contraception was officially admitted in Spain. Studies on contraceptive behavior and contraceptive means began relatively recently (Table 1).

The International Health Foundation (IHF) conducted surveys on childbirths and family planning in 1984 and 1985 among women aged between 15 and 44 in France, Britain, Italy, Spain and West Germany. The result on contraceptives can be summarized as follows.

People using the combined modern methods of pills, hormone injection, IUDs, sterilization were 17% in Italy, 22% in Spain, which were lower than 41% in West Germany, 43% in France, 56% in Britain (in 1985). The most popular method in Italy was the traditional means mainly using condoms with 18%, and also in Spain, 14% were using traditional means. The use of traditional means is higher in the two countries than in other countries except for Britain. Other traditional methods such as rhythm method, and coitus interrupts are widely practiced in Italy with 20%, comparing to 18% in West Germany, 10% in Spain and France, and 3% in Britain. The ratio of those who do not take any contraceptive means is highest in Italy with 23%, followed by Spain with 16%. It is noted, however, that 29% of Spain (5-8% in other countries) replied that they abstained from sexual activities.

During the period of rapid fertility decline beginning in the late 1970s, traditional contraceptive means were popularly used instead of modern contraceptive methods due partially to religious backgrounds in Italy and Spain. Therefore, fertility declines in Southern Europe have been achieved in spite of insufficient “contraceptive revolution” in respective countries. The situations in Southern Europe have more similarities with Japan than with countries in Northern and Western Europe.

2) Induced Abortion

Because of religious restrictions, induced abortion was liberalized much later in Southern Europe than in other parts of Europe and it was only after 1985 in Spain (Ley Organica 9.1985). Hence, data on induced abortion are very limited. In 1998, the ratio of induced abortion cases was 24.0 to 100 live births in Italy and 14.7 in Spain. Right after the legalization of abortion in Italy in the 1980s, abortion cases among women in their latter 30s increased but they decreased in the 1990s (Fig.15.1-15.2).
4. Socio-economic changes and fertility trends

(1) High educational attainment

In Southern European countries, the number of women with high educational attainment is increasing. In Spain, for example, more and more women became better educated during the 1980s and 1990s, with the result that the number of women seeking to proceed to higher education exceeded that of men. Currently, there are more young women with a better academic grounding than is the case for young men (Figure 16).

(2) Women’s advancement in society - Changes in women’s labor force participation rate by age and socio-economic background

As with other Western European countries, it is considered that the low fertility rate in Spain and Italy is caused by socio-economic factors such as education, occupation and income.

There is no doubt that the high level of participation of women in the labor force has had a large influence on changes in the Southern European fertility. Rapid economic development after World War 2 brought about changes in industrial structures. This produced a sharp decline in the women’s employment rate for the reason that unskilled and relatively lower-educated female workers in the primary sector are difficult to be hired in other industries. But increased educational attainment by women, combined with demand for more female labor during the 1960s and 1970s, triggered a rapid increase in the participation of women in economic activities during the 1970s and 1980s, in line with trends in other Western European nations (Figure 17.1-17.2).

The women’s labor force participation rate by age in Spain between 1960 and 2000 shows an aggregate increase of only 15% during this period. High educational attainment resulted in the female participation rate in the 15-19 age bracket reducing by half, while the 20-24 segment increased by only a little over 10%. However, the economic activity rate of women over 25 grew rapidly. In particular, the female labor force participation rate in the 25-29 age range rose by 26% to 76%. This means that only one out of four women of this generation entered the workforce in 1960, but three out of four did so in 2000. The number of female workers tripled in the 30-34 and 35-39 age groups. Spain’s graph that indicates the level of participation of women in the labor force by age groups does not resemble that of Japan at all, which shows up on the graph as a letter “M.” That is to say, Spanish women do not mirror the typical Japanese woman’s life course: marriage, quit working for childbirth, followed by social rehabilitation after the child-raising period.

Also, growth of the economically active population resulted in an increase in women workers as a percentage of total employees. Furthermore, there are some notable characteristics pertaining to the differences in female labor force participation rate by age. The percentage of working women with spouses, in proportion to all female employees, increased over a 30-year period, finally reaching the point where the number of married female workers exceeded that of single female workers (Table 2). The percentage of married female workers
entering work grew from 7.6% in 1970 to 36.9% in 2001. This shows that more and more wives went out to work, and that the number of two-income couples increased.

Changes in industrial structure led to large-scale entry of women into the workforce. But the pace of their entry was so rapid that various institutional problems remain unresolved. These include a delay in developing social services to support working parents, such as improvement of working environment and child-care services; and non-resolution of commuter traffic and housing problems. In addition, traditional views of the family, such as gender-specific division of labor, are deep-rooted. This causes problems in respect of conventional wisdom, such as the sharing of responsibilities for housekeeping and childcare between husband and wife. As a result, Spanish female workers have had to shoulder more burdens than their counterparts in other Western European countries, in order to achieve compatibility between family and work. It is considered that a lack of social preparation to accommodate the various changes accompanying women’s social advancement is a major factor in the low fertility rate. Moreover, if the burden on Southern European female workers is causing individual and family problems, it will not be easy to raise the fertility.

(3) Other Changes

Thus far, we have discussed the achievement of compatibility between family and work for married female workers. At this point, we would like to refer briefly to the background of a growing percentage of unmarried young people.

As previously noted, the increasing proportion of unmarried people under 30 is closely related to the prolonged time in which adult children are supported by their parents. In Spain, young people are educated for at least as many years as their contemporaries in other Western European nations, which results in delayed entry into the workforce. Additionally, a high unemployment rate among young adults, despite recent steady economic growth, encourages them to be economically dependent upon their parents for a longer period (Figure 18, Table 3). Moreover, under the Spanish principle that a couple should make a new home after marriage, young people have to cope with formidable housing conditions, such as skyrocketing rental and purchase prices in urban and metropolitan areas. Accordingly, more and more young people tend to remain economically dependent on their parents for a longer period. However, such circumstances have a negative impact on the numbers of young people leaving their parents’ homes and on their marriage or childbirth timing.

A similar situation of delayed family formation is apparent in Italy. Young people are starting work, leaving their parents’ homes, marrying and giving birth much later. For example, the proportion of young people aged 25-34 living at their parents’ homes was 26% in 1990, and rose to 38% in 1998. The reasons are not clear but could be related to the overall unemployment rate (12%); high unemployment rate among young people aged 25-34 (33%); prolonged time in education; enjoyment of the comfort and freedom provided at their parents’ homes (especially by their mothers); and their tendency to shy away from the hardship and economic restraint involved in living away from their parents. In all cases,
late family formation has brought about changes in reproduction rates. Women still aspire to bearing an average 2.2 children in their lifetimes, but the actual number of children per woman is much lower. The percentage of childless women used to be 10%, but is now around 20% and increasing (Second Italian Fertility Survey, 1995).

(4) Relationship between socio-economic changes and fertility

Results of fertility surveys conducted by the National Statistics Institute of Spain in 1977 and 1985 show that an increase in the participation of women in the labor force becomes an important determining factor as to the timing of childbirth and family planning, given that other socio-economic parameters are controlled. From the results of a similar survey in Italy (1983), it is clear that a high employment rate for women has a great impact on fertility. Generally, a rising women’s employment rate produces a declining fertility.

This is a brief summary of changes in fertility and the factors responsible for them in Southern Europe. The rapid decline in fertility during a short period occurred after the mid-1970s. A fertility far below population replacement level was so interwoven with the business recession that the government could implement few institutional measures and supports. Factors contributing to the low fertility rate include high educational attainment among young people, their tendency to delay leaving their parents’ homes, and deferment of family formation, due to the economic depression.

As for education, increasing numbers of women wish to advance to higher education, so that, now, the number of young women with a better academic grounding exceeds that of young men. Women’s advancement in society and young people’s delayed and difficult entrance into the labor market are major social characteristics in this country. In particular, the economic recession resulted in young people making a slow transition to adulthood, and their delayed formation of a family, which includes labor participation, marriage and reproduction. Young people regard the family as a buffer, and they hope to create a home having the same economic and welfare levels as that of their parents. Their preference for gender equality in forming a family is based not merely on ideology but also on “risk aversion” - a way to avoid material damage in case of “no income” caused by the husband being or becoming unemployed. Young people’s difficulty in obtaining jobs is due to the tight labor market arising out of a sluggish economy. Under such economic conditions, financial independence from their parents offers no advantage, and often drives up costs for young adults. Thus, their tendency to marry later is a contributing factor to the low fertility rate. Furthermore, due to the variety of sudden social changes, the Southern European government has been unable to take adequate measures to support young people financially, and to help married female employees achieve compatibility between family and work. These are the factors behind the declining fertility.

As mentioned above, the factors responsible for late marriage and low fertility directly or indirectly impact on marriage and childbirth statistics. These factors include women’s advancement in society, the prolonged period of young people’s dependency on their parents, and housing issues. However, the
overriding problem is that the society has not been able to adequately respond to such sudden socio-economic changes.

5. Trends in family policy in Southern European countries

(1) Background of family policy
   In this section, we will discuss trends in family policy in Italy and Spain.

1) Family and labor policy in Italy
   There hasn’t been any official population policy in Italy. Here are some of the reasons:
   a) Mussolini introduced a series of pronatalist measures with Fascism’s ideologies during the Fascist regime (1922-1943). After the Mussolini regime, the pronatalist policies have not been considered acceptable.
   b) Over recent years, Italy has been perceived as having an over-population problem.
   c) The Italian people do not have such strong nationalistic sentiments as the French; rather they place a higher value on a sense of belonging that manifests itself in various ways. As for politics, a move towards decentralization has been promoted, as opposed to central government. The Communist Party is always seen as the ideological leader among people, while the influence of the Catholic Church, supported by the Pope, is strong. Accordingly, there exists a broad spectrum of public opinion about family policy: what measures the government should take; how the government should be involved in such individual matters as “family formation”; distinctions between the traditional family and the family in law; and women’s roles in modern society. In addition, such vexed issues have largely been shunted aside while the government has focused on economic reconstruction since World War II.

   However, Italian society is gradually changing. Leaving aside the Fascist Era, the very low fertility is gaining recognition as a new problem among Italians, even at the political level. In addition, many social and economic changes are taking place. For instance, today, young women attain higher education and enter the workforce just as men do. Following the enactment of the “new family law” in 1975, male chauvinism no longer has a place in the family. Contraception has been advertised freely since 1971, and women have enjoyed the right to seek an abortion since 1997. Women have also been free to divorce since 1971. Thus, discrimination against women is no longer found formally in any field, especially the workplace.

2) Historical background of family policy in Spain
   Spanish total fertility rate in 2000 was 1.24 - the lowest level in the world. Although many researchers on the population problem have been discussing the rights and wrongs, and the government strategy for intervention in these issues, the government has not yet developed a clear policy. Family policies have been identified with the ultra-conservatism of the Franco administration and denounced
by citizens. However, such one-sided accusations are rapidly becoming “old hat,” because people have become aware of the remarkably low fertility since 1975. The social changes in family policies are as follows:

Under the Franco regime (1939-1975), family policy was combined with Catholicism and Fascist corporatism. As a result, the fertility-rate rose, traditional family values based on the strict idea of gender-specific division of labor won acclaim, and men’s roles as family breadwinners were strengthened.

During the transition to democracy (1975-1986), under the strong influence of the Franco regime, family policy was identified with past dictatorial policies and not accepted by the general public. Since the government gave priority to changing the legislation that controls family matters, important laws have been enacted: lifting of the ban on contraception (1978), equality of legitimate and illegitimate children under the law (1981), Divorce Law (1981), and partial sanction of abortion (1985). Thus, the government has tried to exert an indirect effect on the family with limited intervention into certain fields (housing, education, labor market), rather than with an integrated approach targeted at specific goals. Also, some local governments (autonomous regions) have been empowered to execute their own policies on social and family issues.

The Spanish people have become aware of the need to introduce a family policy since 1986. The symbolic relationship between the family and traditional family values has faded. And debate on family functionality as “social security” is once more exercising people’s attention. This is due to people becoming aware that the family serves as a buffer against social instability (recognition aroused by indications of the high unemployment rate during the period preceding the economic crisis of 1975-1986). Also affecting the implementation of family support measures is the widening regional gap between autonomous and non-autonomous local governments.

(2) Maternity and child-care leave (Table 4, Figure 19)

1) Maternity and child-care leave in Italy

In Italy, expectant working women are given mandatory maternity leave for 5 months (2 months before and 3 months after childbirth). If they are employees, 80% of their basic monthly income will be paid every month during the leave period. Within one year after childbirth, they have the right to take child-care leave for 6 months, during which time 30% of their regular monthly income will be paid every month.

2) Maternity and child-care leave in Spain

Maternity leave with pay, included in a family allowance, has been attracting attention for several years. Various amendments have been made to the duration and quality of the system since 1989. With the 1989 amendment, maternity leave was extended from 14 weeks to 16 weeks, and return to work after one year’s leave was guaranteed (insurance has to be paid during that year). The guarantee period for return to work was extended, and a similar right was provided for fathers (up to 4 weeks).
In 1994, the financial allowance during maternity and child-care leave was increased from 75% to 100% of a mother’s monthly income, and the term of insurance payment required for receiving the allowance was reduced from one year to 180 days. The allowance is paid directly from social security funds. Maternity leave has come to be regarded as leave for childbirth, rather than contingency or sick leave (industrial disability period).

In 1995, tax deductibility was made available to companies that allow new employees a minimum one year of child-care leave. As a result, workers have become to take child-care leave at their own initiatives. In November 1999, the 39/1999 Law, to “co-ordinate the family responsibility and career of workers” was approved. Under this law, fathers were granted a strengthened right to take paternity leave. The details are as follows:

a) A mother can ask the father to take paternity leave of 10 weeks (out of the total 16 weeks) on her behalf (only 4 weeks in the old law), but the mother must take the first 6 weeks.

b) The mother and father may take child-care leave simultaneously, but the total duration cannot exceed 16 weeks.

c) Under the new law, in the case of a mother’s death, the father can take child-care leave up to 16 weeks (only 6 weeks in the old law), or the remaining amount of leave due to the mother.

d) Child-care leave for an older son or daughter, and for an adopted child was approved. The leave duration is no longer affected by the age of the child. Parents can take 16 weeks of child-care leave for any child aged 7 or younger.

e) By way of a new allowance, a mother can take leave during her pregnancy if emergency circumstances arise, and 75% of her basic salary will be paid.

However, the fundamentals of the new law also enhance the non-economic protection of workers. The family and relatives have to provide home care for older blood relatives who are struck down by advanced age, accident or medical disorders. Under the old law, this was limited to child-care. Family-care leave is unpaid but guarantees job security (one year of leave in the case of caring for relatives, 3 years for childbirth). Shortening the leave and reducing workloads is permitted to both female and male workers.

(3) Financial support through child allowance (Table 5, Figure 20)

1) Financial support through child allowance in Italy

Besides paid maternity leave, a family allowance is provided to paid workers, civil servants and pensioners. This is based on a stringent means test and the number of children. The family allowance structure is up to 34 million lira for a family of three; up to 42 million lira for a family of four; and up to 49 million lira for a family of five. Under the Finance Law of 1999, special aid was provided for economically handicapped families with three or more children. But, these are measures to fight poverty, not to promote childbirth.

Taxes are reduced for the taxpayers with dependent children (200 thousand lira per child), unemployed spouses (1 million lira), and supported
family members (retired, disabled or unemployed). In addition, education and medical costs charged to taxpayers for their non-working dependents are tax-deductible.

2) Financial support through child allowance in Spain

Provision of a child allowance began under the Franco administration (Statutory Order 2945/66 on Social Security Family Protection Economic Benefits). The allowance amounts remained virtually static between 1966 (start) and 1990, but underwent a major amendment in 1990. The allowance per child was 200 pesetas between 1966 and 1971, and 250 pesetas between 1971 and 1990. This shows that, due to accelerating inflation and substantial advances in wage levels, the allowance declined in value compared to family income. The child allowance represented 5.6% of the minimum wage (MW) in 1970, 1.1% in 1980, and 0.5% in 1990. The spousal allowance provided at the same time as child allowance was 300 pesetas per month between 1966 and 1971, and 375 pesetas between 1971 and 1985, but was cut after 1985. A one-time marriage allowance was provided: 5000 pesetas between 1966 and 1971, and 6000 pesetas since 1971. First childbirth allowance was 2500 pesetas between 1966 and 1971, and 3000 pesetas since that time.

With an amendment in 1990 (Law 26/1990 on non-contributory benefits), child allowance and general support for needy people were integrated. Since this amendment was implemented without political debate or justification, political reasonability for the family allowance has been lost. The following are the three primary differences from the old law resulting from the amendment. These remain in effect to this day.

1) Establishment of tax-free child allowance
Before the amendment, recipients were limited to workers covered under the social security system, regardless of their income level.

2) General provision of child allowance was abolished. Only people on the minimum income have the right to receive the allowance (exceptions apply in the case where the child is handicapped).

3) The allowance is provided directly from social security funds, not by employers. The monetary value was reviewed and raised from the previous allowance of 250 pesetas per month, but it is still barely adequate. In 1990, an allowance of 3000 pesetas per month was provided to people with a minimum wage of 53,250 pesetas. This amount was only 5.6% of the minimum wage.

A review and revision of the monetary value of the allowance was not carried out until January 2000. The new law (January 14, Real Decreto-Ley 1/2000) came into force that month. Under the law, the allowance amount was increased and two new measures were approved. A review of monetary value was implemented for the allowance provided to children under 18 or those designated as physically handicapped (33% or greater) aged under 18. The allowance was
increased from 36,000 pesetas per year (3000 pesetas per month) to 48,420 pesetas (4000 pesetas per month) for children under 18, which equates to an increase of 4.2% to 5.7% of the minimum wage (70,680 pesetas per month in 2000). The allowance for physically handicapped (33% or greater disability level) persons under 18 was increased from 72,000 pesetas to 96,780 pesetas per year, with an increase of 8.5% to 11.4% of the minimum wage.

In addition, two new allowances were introduced:

a) Additional allowance for multiple births
b) 75,000 pesetas allowance per child for the third and subsequent children

These two allowances are provided for a child in his or her month of birth. The income threshold does not apply to a), but does to b) and to the allowance for healthy children (the income ceiling to qualify to receive the allowance is published every year; the allowance for the third and subsequent children is increased by 15%).

(4) Public child-care services (Table 6)

1) Public child-care policies in Italy

There are few day-care services for children under 3 years of age. Only 6% of children at that age are able to attend day-care centers. Since the centers are unevenly distributed (scattered across the central and northern regions and in larger cities), the utilization ratio of the centers varies. The number of centers is insufficient, especially in those areas where the service is in high demand. Some 80-90% of the costs are covered by fees for day-care paid by parents according to their income. Local governments subsidize the deficiency. Private day-care centers are scarce, and the fees are expensive. Therefore, many working mothers with infants rely on their own mothers for day-care (the mother leaves her child in the grandmother’s care and transfers her income to her mother). In Italy, many couples tend to buy a new house situated within 1 km of the homes of either or both of their own parents.

By contrast, 90% of children aged 3-5 have access to child-care facilities. The government is not under obligation to provide this service, but the running costs of these facilities are largely supported by public funding, and the fees for child-care are reasonable.

2) Public child-care policies in Spain

Most of the rules about pre-school education (ages 0-6 years) were introduced into the education system under the general law for education (Ley General de Educación), enacted in 1970. However, the rules are non-binding. The final year of major educational reform was 1990. The LOGSE (Ley Orgánica General del Sistema Educativo-LOGSE) specifies pre-school education and terms it “child education.” Child education has two levels: the first for children aged 0-3 years, and the second for the 3-6 years age group. Since the establishment of the Spanish Constitution, education has been under the legal authority of autonomous
regional governments. Although child education is not compulsory, this education system is definitely approved and defined in the LOGSE as more than just kindergarten education.

There are few day-care services for children under 3 years of age. Only 5% of children at that age are able to attend day-care centers. A small number of children attend day-care centers or kindergartens from age 3. Children at that age are in transition, and one-third of them do not go to day-care centers or kindergartens. Most attendees at those facilities are children aged 4 and 5 years.

(5) Others

1) Housing Problems in Italy

The typical Italian family lives in a privately owned house (home ownership rate of more than 70%). Their preference for home ownership has long been supported by such government policies as tax relief. A policy to “protect needy people” through rent control was implemented in the early 1970s. This inhibited the market mechanism for rental housing and encouraged people to acquire their own homes. Public housing is now sold on the market, and no longer used to support needy families. However, the official definition of “needy” here is “no house to live in.” It seems that the problem of children is left virtually unconsidered.

2) Housing Situations in Spain

Young people’s delayed independence from their parents is the ultimate trigger for late marriage and low fertility. From this viewpoint, indirect measures would aggravate the declining fertility. Also, housing measures are so minimal that the government has not been able to cope with the housing problems. Most of the housing problems in Spain are related to difficulty in affording houses. This derives from a large disparity between housing market prices and middle-class incomes. But, in Spain, as in Italy and other Southern European countries, the rate of home ownership is high, rental housing is scarce and expensive, and the quantity of public housing is low.

6. Findings and Proposals

Characteristics of Fertility Trends and Family Policies in Southern Europe and Advocacy for Family Policies in Japan

An in-depth examination on the backgrounds of fertility trends, proximate factors, socio-economic factors and family policies in Southern European countries proves both common and different aspects between these countries and Japan. The situations in these countries can be summarized as below.

Major countries in Southern Europe in general underwent rapid declines in fertility after the late 1970s, and the total fertility rate fell nearly to the 1.1 level in Spain and Italy in the latter half of 1990s (not only period fertility rate but also completed cohort fertility rate). In comparison to Northern and Western Europe,
the fertility decline and related factors in the region can be characterized with the accelerated decline in fertility rates in spite of the late onset of fertility decline, the accelerated women’s labor force participation in spite of late beginning, legal and institutional systems to support parents with childbearing and rearing (such as maternity and parental leaves) and economic support in the form of family and child benefits which have begun to be developed, and deeply rooted traditional values including gender role division. Social situations have changed rapidly, and in particular, social environments surrounding women have dramatically changed. Women in Southern Europe have higher education than men, and increasing labor force participation rates. In some countries the labor participation rate of women in the 25-29 age group tripled between 1965 and 2000. Marriage and childbirth indices have also changed as proximate factors affecting fertility rates, with a notable increase in unmarried women in the 25-34 age group. The social support systems cannot accommodate these changes. It is explicit that the fertility decline is further pushed forward because women are unable to work while bearing and rearing children.

Both in Spain and Portugal, after being liberated from the long-lasting dictatorial regimes that were in power until the early 1970s, industrial modernization, employment expansion, and women’s labor market participation progressed altogether rapidly. Enhanced women’s education, a rise in labor market participation, narrowed wage gaps between male and female workers, and policies to approach social and economic status of major EU members prompted these nations to break away from their outmoded practices such as a gender role division model during the dictatorial regimes. However, these socio-economic changes occurred too rapidly while the social security systems were underdeveloped. As a result, women considered it incompatible to build a family while working, and were forced to choose either career life or family life. This directly led to the lowering of fertility rates. Therefore, the situation in Southern Europe has not yet reached the stage to discuss over the advantages and disadvantages of systems and options such as childcare leaves and childcare services that enable women to work and have children at the same time. More importantly, such systems should be established and spread across each country, and the use rates must be enhanced. When compared to countries in Northern and Western Europe, the speed of people’s change in values is slow. Men obsessed with the traditional gender role stereotype act against women wishing to work and have families.

The major four countries in Southern Europe are all affiliated with the European Union, and have laws and systems to promote the system reform to the EU model. However, it is a challenging process for the new systems to be adjusted and integrated in the socio-cultural context of each country with its unique historical background. The process will affect the future direction of lowering fertility in these countries.

As major factors for the lowering fertility in Southern Europe, traditional values such as family values and gender role division (gender values) are stronger than other countries in Western Europe. Compared to Southern European countries, there are greater gender differences, and a stronger moral
sense on marriage and childbirths in Japan. In addition to governmental measures to support women who want to make work and housework compatible, efforts must be made to enhance flexibility of workplace and family (husbands) to help women. Together with the development and reform of (gender equal) social systems, it is important that the systems should be widely known and utilized by individuals and corporations compulsorily so that the systems can prove to be effective. Unless such systems are realized and become effectively utilized as early as possible, it is possible that the lowering fertility rates will be further lowered than the level of Southern European countries.
Figure 1.1  Total fertility rate in Southern Europe  1960-2000

Source: Council of Europe, Recent Demographic Developments in Europe, 2001.
Japan: Own Calculations.

Figure 1.2  Total fertility rate in various countries  1960-2001

Figure 2.1  Completed fertility of female cohorts born 1930 or after


Figure 2.2  Completed fertility of female cohorts born 1930 or after

Figure 3.1  Total female first marriage rate in Southern Europe  1960-2000

<50compl. years

TFMR = Total female marriage rate.  <50compl. years
The marriage rates are over-estimated because of the celebration in Portugal of marriages of Portuguese living abroad.
Figure 5.1  Mean age of women at first marriage  1960-2000

<50 compl. years
It is the data which National Institute of Population and Social Security Research calculated on the basis of birth rate according to age by "VITAL STATISTICS OF JAPAN" and is different from the average age that used the number of birth. Before 1970 does not contain Okinawa prefecture.

Figure 5.2  Mean age of women at first marriage  1960-2000

MAOM = Mean age of women at first marriage  <50 compl. years
Figure 6.1  Mean age of women at first marriage  cohorts born 1930 or after


Figure 6.2  Mean age of women at first marriage  cohorts born 1930 or after

MAOM = Mean age at first marriage  
<50 compl. years  
Figure 7.1  Mean age at childbirth  1960-2000

Source: Council of Europe, 2001. Japan; It is the data which National Institute of Population and Social Security Research calculated on the basis of birth rate according to age by "VITAL STATISTICS OF JAPAN" and is different from the average age that used the number of birth. Before 1970 does not contain Okinawa prefecture.

Figure 7.2  Mean age at childbirth  1960-2000

Figure 8.1  Mean age at birth of first child  1960-2000

* Birth-order within current marriage.
Source: Council of Europe, 2001. Japan; It is the data which National Institute of Population and Social Security Research calculated on the basis of birth rate according to age by “VITAL STATISTICS OF JAPAN” and is different from the average age that used the number of birth. Before 1970 does not contain Okinawa prefecture.

Figure 8.2  Mean age at birth of first child  1960-2000

* Birth-order within current marriage.
Figure 9.1  Mean age at childbirth  cohorts born 1930 or after


Figure 9.2  Mean age at childbirth  cohorts born 1930 or after

Figure 10.1  Total Divorce Rate  1960-2000


Figure 10.2  Total Divorce Rate  1960-2000

TDR = Total divorce rate.
Figure 11  Proportion of married women in Spain

Source: INE, various years.
Japan: Major results by 1% sample tabulation.
Figure 12  Percentage of non marital couples over all couples age 16-29 1994

![Graph showing percentage of non marital couples over all couples age 16-29 in 1994](image)

Source: The Clearinghouse on International Developments in Child, Youth and Family Policies at COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Figure 13  Percentage of couples living in a consensual union 1996

![Graph showing percentage of couples living in a consensual union in 1996](image)

Figure 14.1  Extra-marital birth rate  1960-2000

Per 100 Live births

Figure 14.2  Extra-marital birth rate  1960-2000

* Extra-marital births Ratio per 100 Live births.
Source: Council of Europe, 2001
Table 1 Percentage Currently Using Contraception among Married Women of Reproductive Age, by Method, Various Dates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Base Population</th>
<th>Any method</th>
<th>Sterilization</th>
<th>Condom</th>
<th>Vaginal barrier</th>
<th>Withdrawal</th>
<th>Abstinence</th>
<th>Other or not stated</th>
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<td>Male</td>
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<td>18-44</td>
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<td>14.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
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<td>1995*</td>
<td>20-49 h</td>
<td>54.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>0.2</td>
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<td>3.6</td>
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<td>5.0</td>
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<td>4.3</td>
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<td>15.5</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>12.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>1995*</td>
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<td>60.8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>24.3</td>
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<td>1975</td>
<td>15-49</td>
<td>60.5 d</td>
<td>-----2.8 -----</td>
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<td>5.2</td>
<td>47.1</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>4.1</td>
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<td>1984</td>
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<td>46.1</td>
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<td>1990</td>
<td>15-49</td>
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<td>-----5.7 -----</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>..</td>
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<td>1994</td>
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<td>0.4</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>45.5</td>
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</table>

a in first marriage.  b Used since last pregnancy (since marriage if no pregnancy).  c Excluding sterilization.  d Figures for methods do not add to the total because methods used in combination.  e Spermicidal foam.  f Including Vaginal barrier method  g Including injections.  h If a combination of methods was being used, only the most effective method is shown; the methods are listed in descending order of efficacy.  


* FFS1995, various countries.
Figure 15.1  Legal abortions rate per 100 live births  1960-2000


Figure 15.2  Legal abortions rate per 100 live births  1960-2000

** Ratio = Legal abortions per 100 live births.
Figure 16  Gross enrolment ratios for the third level of education 1970-1996

The gross enrolment ratio is the total enrolment, regardless of age, divided by the population of the official age group which corresponds to a specific level of education.
Source: UNESCO, Statistical Yearbook, various years.
Figure 17.1  Economically active population/Age/Rates   1960-2000

Figure 17.2  Economically activity rates of women the latest year

Source: LABORSTA.

Table 2  Female economically activity rates by marital status in Spain

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Single Female (%)</th>
<th>Single Total (%)</th>
<th>Married Female (%)</th>
<th>Married Total (%)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>19.2%</td>
<td>68.6%</td>
<td>24.3%</td>
<td>20.3%</td>
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<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>61.1</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>22.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>40.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>1986</td>
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<td>49.0</td>
<td>45.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>32.3</td>
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<td>1996</td>
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<td>58.2</td>
<td>38.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>44.9</td>
<td>55.1</td>
<td>40.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1) From 1991, two wards of minutes of single and married.
Source: INE, various years.
Figure 18  Unemployment rates  1969-2000

Source: LABORSTA.
Table 3  Unemployment Rates by age and sex  2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Male</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Female</th>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>21.4%</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
<td>34.2%</td>
<td>24.9%</td>
<td>17.7%</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
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<td>14.4</td>
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<td>33.2</td>
<td>21.2</td>
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<td>13.0</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>19.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Spain; age 15-64  Italy; age 16-64  Portugal; age 15-64: Data refer to 1998.

Unemployment rates = Unemployment/Activity population


Table 4  Maternity, Paternity, and Parental Leaves

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Duration of Child Birth Related Leave</th>
<th>Percentage of Wage Replaced</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>17 weeks maternity;</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.5 months parental leave for each parent</td>
<td>Unpaid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>5 months maternity including 1 month pre-birth;</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Additional 10 months parental leave, 20 months for multiple births Fathers applying for 3 months leave will be granted extra month. Unused parental leave can be taken until the child's 9th birthday. Family (sick) leave-5 days/year for children 3-8 years old</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>6 weeks mandated maternity leave post-birth</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Additional 6-24 months parental includes adoption</td>
<td>Unpaid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5 days paternity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Up to 30 days/year family leave for children</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&lt;10 and 15 days for &gt;10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Special leave up to 4 years for sick child</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Right to part-time work</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>16 weeks maternity; may transfer up to 10 weeks to father; 2 additional weeks maternity per child in multiple birth; Additional parental leave until child is 3. 2 days paternity leave</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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Figure 19  Maternity, Paternity, and Parental Leaves  1960-2000

Note: Including an unpaid period. Portugal; Excluding an unpaid period (except 1999).

Table 5  Family And Child Allowance Programs: Coverage, Qualifying Conditions, Benefit Levels And Other Related

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Coverage</th>
<th>Qualifying conditions</th>
<th>Benefit levels</th>
<th>Other allowances</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Employees in industry, commerce and related occupations with one or more children. Employees receiving equivalent allowances from employer exempted.</td>
<td>Child must be under age 18 (no limit if disabled), 22 if student), single, living in Greece or other European Union member country. Parent must have 50 days employment in preceding year for full allowance.</td>
<td>2,000 drachmas/month for first child, 6,000 drachma/month for two children; 13,500/month for three children, 16,400 for four children; and 2,750 drachmas/month for each additional child.</td>
<td>Additional payments for widows, widowers, and soldiers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Souse dependent on insured; children must be under age 18 (no limit if disabled); brothers and sisters, nieces and nephews must be orphans or dependents under age 18, (no limit if disabled) and not eligible for survivor pension. Separate provisions for self-employed and formerly self-employed pensioners.</td>
<td>Spouse dependent on insured; children must be under age 18 (no limit if disabled); brothers and sisters, nieces and nephews must be orphans or dependents under age 18, (no limit if disabled) and not eligible for survivor pension.</td>
<td>Benefit varies according to size and income of family from 20,000 to 1,869,000 lire for up to 7 children.</td>
<td>Large family supplements. Annual adjustment of pensions based on average increase in gross domestic product within the last five years. Separate provisions for self-employed agricultural workers, self-employed and formerly self-employed pensioners.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Employed persons, unemployed and pensioners. Voluntary insurance available to certain categories of employed persons not covered by any other contributory program.</td>
<td>Child must be under age 16 (25 if student or disabled).</td>
<td>Benefit levels vary by income and number and age of children. Family with high income levels not covered.</td>
<td>Special supplement for disabled children. Special education allowance. Constant attendance supplement. Funeral grant. Supplement for parents taking leave to care for sick children under age 10 (no limit if disabled).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Contributory system: All employees, social security pensioners and persons receiving cash sickness benefits who have one or more eligible children. Non-contributory system: All citizens and legal residents not entitled to childrens' social security or other public benefits.</td>
<td>Child must be under age 18 (no limit if at least 65% disabled). For income tested allowance the family income must be below 1,202,991 pesetas/year if one child and 15% increase for each additional child. No income limit for disabled children.</td>
<td>For children under age 18: 36,000 pesetas/year; 72,000 pesetas/year if child 33% disabled; 455,460 pesetas if at least 65% disabled, 683,220 pesetas if 75% or more disabled.</td>
<td>Low income supplement. Disabled supplement.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Figure 20  Percentage of child allowances per wage in manufacturing 1961-1999

Note: An amount of money of full amount receipt. Excluding Birth grant, etc.
Table 6  Percent of married/cohabiting mothers and lone mothers, employed in selected OECD countries (most recent available data), and percentage of young children in out of home ECEC (selected countries).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Married/ Cohabiting Mothers (%)</th>
<th>Lone Mothers (%)</th>
<th>Percentage of Children by Age in ECEC (Full Day &amp; Part Day)</th>
<th>Compulsory School Age (years)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0-3</td>
<td>3-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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**Greece**

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