


Research Data A-No. 20

Population Problems in Post War Japan
—Now Facing Their Transitional Difficulties—

Volume II.

by

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The Institute of Population Problems

Welfare Ministry

April 1957

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— Volume 2 —

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III. Present Status of National Effort to Regulate Overpopulation

1. The Intensification of Desire for Small Families, and Spread of Birth Control

We have already dwelt at length on the sharp drop in birth rate in recent years. The phenomenon speaks eloquently of how big was the pressure of accumulated population in postwar years and how quickly the people of Japan adapted themselves to the situation. At the present stage, the desire for small families is more of a physico-reflex movement induced by financial necessity than the result of rationalized attitude toward life born of up-to-date living and matured for a better form of life. It is certainly amazing, however, that the national awakening to the population problem is taking such vast and swift strides as were unthought of before World War II, even if the awakening is manifest only through such reflex movements.

The public opinion survey on birth control, conducted three times on a nationwide scale since 1950 by the Mainichi Shimbun's Population Problem Research Council under a sample survey system, is one of the best available data for following the transition of this movement.

(In each survey some 3,000 wives under 50 throughout the country and their husbands were polled at random. The sample ratio was roughly 1/4,000.)

One of the most significant factors borne out by the survey was the rapid growth of the desire for small families.

The couples chosen for the survey were asked; "How many more children would you like to have?" In past surveys, the persons polled were asked what they thought of the ideal number of children. But what the recent surveys sought to find out was the ideal number of children tempered by practical considerations.

Here are the results of the third poll taken in 1955.

Table No. 22. Percentage of Wives as Broken Down by the Present Number of Children and the Number They would Like to Have in Future

1. Do not want any more. Have enough already.
2. One more.
3. Two more.
4. Three more.
5. Four more and over.
6. Would like to have more. (number unspecified)
7. Never gave it a thought. Others.
8. Total.

Present Number of Children	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
1	14.7	36.5	34.4	6.0	1.3	0.9	6.2	100.0
2	43.5	28.4	18.6	2.3	0.9	0.4	5.9	100.0
3	77.8	9.5	5.9	0.1	—	0.3	6.4	100.0
4	90.6	3.1	0.4	0.3	0.6	—	5.0	100.0
5 and above	93.9	—	0.5	—	0.5	—	5.1	100.0

Note 1: For further details, see The Mainichi Shimbun's Population Problem Research Council, Population Problem Series No. 13, Thirp Public Opinion Survey on Birth Control in Japan.

Note 2: The figures for (1) is the total of those who replied they do not want any more and those who answered they have enough already, but the majority belong to the former group. However, in the case of those with five or more children, the latter group accounts for between one fourth and one third of the total.

The figures for (7) include non committal and qualified replies besides those who "never gave it a thought."

Note 3: No column was provided for wives with no children be-

cause of clerical error.

Note 4: The percentage was nearly the same for husbands, but husbands were less keen on keeping down the number of children.

As can be seen from the above table, among the mothers with one child, the largest percentage indicated they wanted another or two more. Among the mothers with two children, the largest percentage said they did not want any more children. The percentage rose to 78 for mothers with three children and 90 for mothers of four.

The desire for small families was stronger in the case of wives than husbands, but the gap was not big enough to cause marital rifts. Both husbands and wives polled were clearly in favor of keeping down the number of children and the largest group believed two was the ideal number.

A comparison with the past two surveys indicates that the desire for small families soared with the progress of time. The transition in the case of parents with two children is illustrated in Table 23.

In 1950, three was the ideal number of children for the biggest majority. In 1952, the ideal was reduced to two, and in 1955, the two children theory was endorsed by a still larger percentage of parents. The chart also shows that upholders of large families are swiftly disappearing.

Table 23. Trend in Percentage of Parents with Two Children as Classified by the Additional Number of Children Desired (1950-55)

-
1. Do not want any more. Have enough already.
 2. One more.
 3. Two more.
 4. Three more.
 5. Four more or above.
 6. Unspecified number.

7. Never thought of it.

8. Total.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
First Survey (1950)	29.3	32.8	19.2	3.5	3.4	—	11.3	100.0
Second Survey (1952)	39.3	35.2	14.7	4.4	1.0	—	5.4	100.0
Third Survey (1955)	42.7	32.3	15.8	2.5	0.7	0.7	5.3	100.0

Note 1: Refer to Note 1 of Table 22.

Note 2: The figures stand for both husbands and wives.

The desire for small families is growing both in the cities and the countryside and among parents in all walks of life. But there is a considerable difference in the intensity of that desire depending on the area of residence. While it is difficult to draw generalized comparisons because of the complex circumstantial factors involved, a statistical attempt to illustrate the difference was made in Table 24. The figures were calculated to lay emphasis on differences induced by area of residence and occupation, and little stress was given to the existing number of children.

Table 24. Difference According to Region in Parents' Intention of Having No More Children

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Percentage of those who do not want any more	National average value conformable to number of existing children in each group	$\frac{(1)}{(2)} \times 100$
(a) In Case of Wives			
1) Total	58.8	58.8	100.0
2) By Area			
Six Major Cities	58.9	49.4	119.2
Other cities	60.0	60.9	98.5
Rural Areas	57.5	60.7	88.9

3) By Educational Status			
Nine years and under	60.0	68.2	88.0
10-12 years	56.2	51.7	108.7
13 years and above	56.4	46.4	127.6
(b) In Case of Husbands			
1) Total	55.5	55.5	100.0
2) By Occupation			
Agriculture and Forestry Workers	57.6	62.0	92.9
Manual Laborers	54.0	54.8	98.5
Self-Employed	56.8	57.1	99.5
White Collar Workers	53.3	50.3	106.0

Note: Recalculated numerical values in column (2) are the weighted average of the specific rates by the number of existing children according to the distribution of the couples by the number of existing children in each group.

As indicated by the above table, the residents of rural areas and farmers and fishermen are less interested in halting the production of children than the other groups. There is also a clear dividing line between those with only compulsory education and those who received higher education. However, the gap is not big enough to justify the conclusion that the less educated, the farmers, fishermen and residents of outlying districts are being left behind in the birth control movement. Rather, it may be said that the culturally awakened group in the cities are spearheading a swift forward drive towards smaller families.

Such a general upsurge in preference for small families means a big change has taken place in public attitude towards family life. There is no doubt that the family system tradition of the past era under which children were sometimes regarded as personal properties to be placed at the liberty of the parents is in the process of swift liquidation.

The aforementioned survey by the Mainichi Shimbun

gives us an opportunity to catch this trend through two pertinent questions. One question asks the parents, in an effort to find out their sense of dependence on their children, if they intend to depend on their old age. The other asks them what they feel about the ordeals of bringing up children, to find out the extent of their sense of responsibility.

In the 1950 survey, 54.8 per cent stated explicitly that they expected their children to support in their old age. The percentage dropped to 51 per cent in the 1952 survey and to 45 per cent in the 1955 survey.

Needless to say, the percentage differed somewhat according to the occupation and area of residence of the parents polled, but it dropped in all cases through the three surveys.

Conversely, the percentage of those who do not plan to depend on their children in their old age rose by a wide margin. Even in the case of wives, generally considered to be more conservative than their husbands, the percentage was 8.4 in 1950, 14.9 in 1952 and 18.0 in 1955. (In the 1950 survey, some of the replies were qualified with the statement that they planned to live with their children when they grow old but on a financially independent basis. Therefore, the percentage of those who replied they do not intend to depend on their children was relatively low compared with the other surveys.)

On the question of bringing up children, those who said it was just natural that parents should undergo various forms of tribulations, or believed the hardship undergone because of children were well worth suffering, accounted for 80 per cent of the total in the 1950 survey and 87 per cent in the 1955 survey. The parents' sense of responsibility toward

their children is thus well stabilized and the degree of stabilization is clearly strengthening.

The degree of stabilization is higher in the cities than in the outlying districts, among the salaried workers than among the farmers and fishermen, and among the well educated than among those with little education.

These points indicate that the phenomenon is not merely an outgrowth of the old family system tradition but a manifestation of the strengthening of a wholesome way of thinking induced by the advancement of society and elevation of living standards.

Coupled with the decline in the sense of dependence on children, it also shows that the strengthening of desire for small families is being nurtured by wholesome and rationalistic attitude toward life. The dissemination of the practice of birth control can be expected to take place only against the background of such rationalistic spirit.

Birth control spread rapidly since the war's end, especially since 1950 in the wake of the transition in the attitude and ideal of daily living. There is no reliable data on the extent to which birth control was practiced in Japan before World War II. The figures in Table 25 were obtained by retroactively estimating this extent from the birth records of married couples. The calculations were based on a nationwide sample survey conducted by the Institute of Population Problem as of July 1, 1952. They should be helpful in obtaining rough estimates.

The practice of birth control was taken up by the Japanese people in all walks of life at an amazing pace since 1950. It should be noted at the same time that the practice

was steadily spreading, although at a negligible rate, even before and during World War II.

Table 25. Estimated Extent to Which Birth Control Was Practiced in Past Years (Percentage of Married Couples With Experience in Birth Control. The Wives in these cases were under 50 years of age.)

	Total	White Collar Workers	Self-Employed	Manual Laborers	Farmers and Fishermen
Fall of 1939	5.3	9.1	5.7	4.1	3.1
Fall of 1944	6.3	9.8	7.0	5.0	3.4
Fall of 1950	14.9	21.5	24.3	11.8	8.6
Mid-1952					
Present Contraceptors	21.7	37.0	20.2	17.8	14.0
Past Contraceptors included	28.3	46.0	28.6	25.2	17.2

Note 1: The above statistics were compiled from figures provided by the 1952 Fertility Survey by the Institute of Population Problems.

Note 2: The figures for those with experience in birth control include both those who are now practicing it and those who practiced it sometime in the past. The figures may be regarded to include an increasingly large percentage of those who are now practicing it in inverse ratio to the lapse of years.

Table 26 indicates the extent to which birth control was practiced as of April 1, 1954, as revealed in a nationwide survey by the Welfare Ministry's Statistics Survey Department. This survey covered all wives under 50 and their husbands, and then extracted one per cent of them as sample specimens for statistical purposes.

As seen in the above table more wives in the 30 to 34 age bracket were practicing birth control than wives in any other age group. This would seem to indicate that birth control is

Table 26. Rate at Which Birth Control Was Practiced in 1954 as Classified by Wives' Ages and Existing Number of Children

a) By Wives' ages		b) By Present Number of Children			
Wives' Age	Percentage	Present Number of children	National average	Cities	Rural Areas
Total	33.2%	Total	33.2%	37.2%	30.4%
19 and under	20.7	0	11.5	14.4	8.9
20-24	31.7	1	30.6	33.6	28.0
25-29	38.7	2	42.2	47.5	38.1
30-34	41.1	3	41.8	46.7	38.5
35-39	38.1	4	37.9	41.8	35.5
40-44	24.5	5	30.5	32.8	29.3
45-49	10.2	6	24.2	26.8	23.1
Unknown	28.9	7 and over	16.8	18.9	16.1
		Unknown	18.4	23.9	14.7

Note: Figures are based on results of the survey by the Welfare Ministry's Statistics Survey Department

practiced in Japan not systematically from the time of marriage to adjust and extend the period between one birth and the next but more as a passive effort to stop bearing any more children after begetting two or three or more children.

Table 27 indicates how many children the couples had before they took up birth control as revealed in the Mainichi survey. Taking the national average, the largest number of couples started practicing it after they had two children. In the farming villages, couples took up birth control after the third child came along. Even in the six major cities, very few practiced birth control from the time of their marriage. A study of the three surveys reveal, however, that the trend is toward practicing birth control at an early stage of married life.

Table 27. Distribution of Those with Contraceptive Experience according to the Number of Children at the Time of Commencement of Contraceptive Practice)

	Number of Births when the practice was commenced							
	0	1	2	3	4	Not less than 5	Unk-nown	Total
a) Total number (comparison of Each Survey)								
1950	5.9	18.9	21.4	19.7	27.2		6.9	100.0
1952	8.7	18.4	22.9	19.3	11.7	10.4	8.6	100.0
1955	9.0	19.3	23.3	21.5	12.7	6.0	8.2	100.0
b) According to Districts (1955 Survey)								
Six Major Cities	13.2	23.4	24.0	18.8	9.4	5.6	5.6	100.0
Other Urban Areas	8.5	18.3	26.6	22.2	11.9	4.9	7.6	100.0
Rural Districts	8.0	18.7	20.0	21.8	14.7	7.2	9.6	100.0

Note: Figures are based on results of the survey by the Mainichi Shimbun

The situation of dissemination of contraception is such as shown above, but it should be borne in mind that contraceptive practice and births controlled subsequently are apparently two different questions. According to figures worked out separately by the Institute of Population Problems on the basis of other data for investigation, contraceptive practice by present-day Japanese has cut by 50 per cent the fertility rate expected when contraception is not practiced, or when the occurrence of pregnancy is naturally controlled by, for instance, actual pregnancy or nursing children. In order to make more effective the contraceptive practice there are needed, besides expert guidance in contraceptive techniques, great efforts and careful schemes in respect to the improving of married life of couples.

When the number of births controlled by contraception is calculated on the basis of the diffusion rate in the above table and the rate of effectiveness mentioned above, the result will be 650 thousand during the year 1954. Since in this year the actual childbirths numbered almost 1.77 million and the legal induced abortions registered were as many as 1.14 million, the total number of actual and expected pregnancies will be at least 3.56 million. Thus, the number of births controlled by successful contraception accounts for only 18 per cent of this figure, and is equivalent to less than two-thirds of the births checked by induced abortion. When the cases of unregistered abortions are taken into consideration, it is estimated that the number of births limited by contraception will be in the neighbourhood of half that limited by induced abortion.

Although the practice of contraception is being rapidly disseminated with the background of healthful attitude of living as observed above, it is rash to conclude, as evident from the foregoing facts, that the remarkable decrease of birth rate in recent years is a direct result of the dissemination of contraception. As a matter of fact, birth control in post-war years has been effected first by induced abortion (artificial termination of pregnancy) and abortion is being carried out at a yearly increasing pace in competition, so to say, with the dissemination of contraception.

2. Increase of Induced Abortions (Artificial Termination of Pregnancy) in Competition with Dissemination of Contraception

In the years of difficult living due to food shortage and

vicious inflation following the war, and during the several subsequent years until a new law was enacted to ease the restrictions on legitimate abortion, illegal abortion spread rapidly throughout Japan as did the black market dealings in rice. And illegal abortions were naturally caused at considerable risk to mothers. The new law which was enacted in June, 1948 at the proposal made chiefly by a group of doctor members of the Diet, had as its original aim the coping with this undesirable situation. The reason why the new law bears such a vague name as "Eugenic Protection Law" is that in its enactment not only amendments have been made to the old Eugenic Law which had been in force prewar years but the purport of the Mother Protection Law has been introduced in it. In fact, however, the new law has stressed the protection of mothers and it has further tended to legalize abortion in order to deal with the then existing difficult situation. Therefore, the enactment of the law had met considerable opposition, but the failure of those opposing the legislation to prevent the Diet from approving it shows how urgently the protection of mothers was needed. The original legislation imposed great restrictions on contraception and sterilization operations and prescribed inspection measures but subsequent revisions to the laws gradually lifted such restrictions and extended the legalization of abortion. Since the revision effected in May, 1952 whereby the inspection measures were abolished and the performance of abortion were left to the discretion of authorized physicians, it may be said that abortion was caused and sterility operations have been conducted as patients pleased. While the widened application of the law was by no means intended to

positively encourage abortion, it cannot be denied that it has led the public, with a will to control birth but yet unskilled in contraceptive technique, to resort to abortion in disposing their "unwanted child." The number of registered abortions performed since 1949, as can be seen from table 28, shows remarkable increase year by year.

Table 28. Annual Trend of Number of Abortions Registered under Eugenic Protection Law

	Actual Number (in thousands)	Proportion of abortions to number of childbirths in the same years
1949	246	9%
1950	489	21
1951	638	30
1952	798	39
1953	1,068	57
1954	1,143	65
1955	1,170	68
1956	1,156	70

Note: The limitation of births under the said law has been made not only by abortion but also by eugenic operations (sterilization), of which case numbers are shown in the following table.

The figures represent number of operations performed on both males and females, although in most cases they have been performed on women.

1949	5,752
1950	11,403
1951	16,233
1952	22,424
1953	32,552
1954	38,056
1955	43,255
1956	44,280

Abortion is also performed illegally or rather without being legally registered. This is partially illustrated by the fact that spontaneous still births, which were on the decrease

until the end of the war, have greatly increased after the war. According to various estimations, however, the number of the unregistered abortion has been on the decline since 1952. This is related to the above-mentioned revisions of the Eugenics Protection Law effected in the same year, and it may be said that the effort to encourage abortions in open instead of dangerous abortions in the dark has started to produce some effects. Since the unregistered abortions in the year 1955 is estimated at 350 thousand at the least, the total number of abortions performed both legally and illegally during the same year amounts nearly to 1.5 million.

This figure is twice as large as the number of births controlled by successful contraceptions if the number of such births are 800 thousand, as estimated in Table 30. Therefore, it may be considered that despite the rapid diffusion of contraception, abortion also continues to increase in number as though it were competing with contraception. It may be well imagined that the increase in abortion is chiefly due to its utilization as measure to terminate undesired pregnancies caused by poor contraceptive technique, and the above figures obtained from the 1952 survey of the Institute of Population Problems also give positive proof that half of the pregnancies resulting from unsuccessful contraception were dealt with by abortion. As a matter of fact, it is considered, the actual number exceeded this figure in view of the nature of the subject. In the 1955 survey by the Mainichi Shimbun a question was asked to all couples, including those without contraceptive experience, whether they had abortion, and the answers have been tabulated in Table 29. It shows that abortion is overwhelmingly utilized, along with contraceptive

measures, by those with contraceptive experience.

Table 29. Distribution of wives with or without Experience in Abortion among those with and without Contraceptive Experience (1955)

	Total	Those with Experience in Abortion	Those without Experience in Abortion	Unknown
Those with contraceptive Experience	100.0	44.9	39.3	15.8
Those without Contraceptive Experience	100.0	6.9	77.1	16.0

Note 1: The above are figures obtained in the survey conducted by the Mainichi Shimbun.

Note 2: The table is based on the questionnaires returned by wives.

Note 3: Also in the Mainichi Shimbun's survey in 1955 an investigation was made concerning the time of abortion. As to wives with contraceptive experience in the above table who ever had an abortion, 55 per cent of them answered to have resorted to abortion after failure in contraceptive practice, but this proportion exceeds 60 per cent when those who had abortion after discontinuation of contraceptive practice are counted in. This figure also shows that abortion is employed because of unskillfulness in contraception technique and also of abandonment of contraception practice due to such unskillfulness. Here, it may be said, lies the reason why abortion increases as though it were competing with the diffusion of contraception practice. Therefore, it is not quite unreasonable to expect future improvement of the situation through the acquirement of the proficiency in contraceptive technique. The crux of the question lies rather in the fact that the acquisition of the technique can not be fully expected without a drastic reform in the attitude of the general public toward daily life and ideal and this, in turn, may be said to depend ultimately on the future trend of the people's living standard.

3. Conflict of Intensive Birth Control with Epochal Decrease in Death Rate

It can be understood from the above-mentioned facts that the diffusion of contraception and even the increase of abortions are nothing but the results of a national effort to cope with the postwar overpopulation. In an observation of the real situation concerning the intensified tendency of recent birth control a comparison is made between the prewar and postwar situation by use of certain presumptive figures the results of which are such as shown in Table 30.

Table 30. Comparison of Prewar and Postwar Situation of
Birth Control

	1935	1950	1955
(A) Actual Number (in thousands)			
1) Total fertility	3,109	3,722	4,218
2) Spontaneous still births	280	219	161
3) Number of Births Controlled	638	1,165	2,330
a) By Contraception	139	287	797
b) By Abortion	499	878	1,533
4) Number of live births	2,191	2,338	1,727
(B) Proportion (%)			
1) Total fertility	100.0	100.0	100.0
2) Spontaneous still birth	9.0	5.9	3.8
3) Number of Births Controlled	20.5	31.3	55.2
a) By Contraception	4.5	7.7	18.9
b) By Abortion	16.0	23.6	36.3
4) Number of live births	70.5	62.8	41.0

Note 1: The total fertility (1) means the sum of (2), (3) and (4), which is the total number of actual and expected pregnancies.

Note 2: With respect to the estimations in the present table, these will be printed as separate data in an additional publication. Summarized remarks will be given here, as follows:

1) On the estimation of rate of spontaneous still births: The change in the rate of spontaneous still births should not be as large as that seen in the statistics of Japan, but the remarkable downward tendency of prewar rate of spontaneous still births is considered to be due chiefly to the decrease in induced abortions which were disguised as spontaneous still births. Accordingly, we have worked out the postwar rate of spontaneous still births from the rate which would be expected if this downward tendency in prewar days had remained unchanged till postwar days. Furthermore, since the registered number of spontaneous still births do not include those before the fourth month of pregnancy, the number of still births in such an early stage of pregnancy has been estimated on the presumption that it is twice as large as the number of stillbirths after the fourth month of pregnancy. The rate amounted to 8.5% of the total number of pregnancies.

2) On the estimates of effectiveness of contraceptive practice: The number of births limited by contraception is calculated by multiplying the expected number of age-specific live births of women by the diffusion rate of contraception according to wives' age and further multiplying it by the rate of effectiveness of contraceptive practice.

The expected number of live births have been calculated on the basis of the age specific birth rate of women as of 1925, and the above estimation for the rate of spontaneous stillbirths. The rate of effectiveness of contraceptive practice has been worked out on the basis of the results of the survey conducted by the Institute of Population Problems, and the pregnancy rate of those practising contraception has been found to be 50 per cent lower than that of those who were not practising contraception. However, since the rate of effectiveness of contraceptive practice is considered to have dropped with the rapid diffusion of contraception in recent years, [the figures representing the number of birth controlled by contraception for 1955 in the above table seems to be somewhat too large, and part of them may naturally be included in the figures standing for abortions.

3) On the estimation of unlawful (or unregistered) abortions:
(a) The published rate of spontaneous stillbirths which showed a downward trend in prewar years has come to rise in postwar years. It has shown higher values than the estimated rates of postwar spontaneous stillbirths

given in the above. The portion of the stillbirths in excess of the estimation may be considered to represent abortions disguised as spontaneous stillbirths. Thus, cases of unlawful abortions in 1949 included among reported stillbirths amounted to 165,000.

(b) The number of unlawful abortions in postwar years may be estimated by another method. The new postwar legislation which legalized abortions to a great extent has come into force fully since 1949, but in the early years of its enforcement between 1949 and 1950 most of the abortions registered under the law may be considered cases of legalization of accomplished facts and cases of abortions caused in open which would have been produced in the dark before, and it may not necessarily be taken that the new legislation encouraged the abortions in the said period. Therefore, we may consider that, of the great increase of abortions registered between 1949 and 1950, the part which exceeds the increase rate seen after 1950 represents abortions which were already accomplished facts. The number of such abortions were almost the same as that in (a) and the number has been estimated at 166,000.

(c) Abortions disguised as spontaneous stillbirths as in the case of (a) and those caused in the dark as in the case of (b) partly overlap each other, but assuming, on the ground that another part of the two types of abortions belong to different social strata, we have estimated the number of unlawful abortions in 1949 at 250,000.

(d) The number of unlawful abortions in 1950 and 1955 have been calculated on the basis of the 1949 total fertility (which is the sum of numbers of actual livebirths, births controlled by contraception, lawful abortions and unlawful abortions). In making the calculation, consideration has been given to the mechanical increase in the possible pregnancies which are carried over to the following year with the intensification of birth control.

4) On the estimation of the number of births controlled voluntarily in prewar years:

(a) The total fertility for 1949 mentioned above somewhat exceeds the 1949 fertility calculated on the basis of the age-specific fertility of women for 1925. Since this divergence of fertility indicates that voluntary practice of birth control existed as early as in 1925, we have calculated backward, on this basis, to obtain the numbers of

- abortions and births controlled by contraception in 1925. The figure thus obtained totalled 500,000.
- (b) The number of births voluntarily controlled in 1930 has been estimated on the basis of the similar figure for 1925.

The above table shows that the number of the births controlled in 1955 is more than half the total fertility which would have been expected if there were no remarkable control of births. However, of the births controlled, nearly two thirds are by abortions, and those by contraception account for only one third of the figure. Nevertheless, it may be said that the diffusion of contraception is steadily taking effect since the births controlled in 1950 by contraception accounted for only one fourths of the figure.

When the situation in 1955 is compared with that in 1935 it can be said that the birth control system was extended in the former year; control spreading twice as wide as that in the latter year even if the additional number of births controlled which were needed by the intensification of control, are cut off.

This means that despite the great increase in total population, especially in the population of women at reproduction age, the number of children has shown a decrease even in its absolute number against that in prewar years.

However, the intensification of birth control in postwar years was facilitated partly by the decrease in the postwar marriage rate of women. As already referred to above this decrease in marriage rate was further intensified by the unbalance due to the war between the populations of marriageable men and women.

However, since the surprising improvement in death rate

Table 31. Comparison between Prewar and Postwar
Structures of Population Reproduction

	1935 (10th year of Showa)	1950 (25th year of Showa)	1955 (30th year of Showa)
(A) Factors of Population reproduction (in thousand)			
1) Female population between 20 and 34	7,797	10,095	11,333
2) Married women between 15 and 39	7,754	9,035	9,558
1') (1)÷15	520	673	756
2') (2)÷15	517	602	637
3) Total number of females born	1,060	1,144	842
4) Those expected to live more than 4 years	881	1,045	793
5) Those expected to live to 20 to 34 years of age	753	985	763
(B) Change in size of various factors under (A) (1935=100)			
1) Female population between 20 and 34	100	129	145
2) Married women between 15 and 39	100	117	123
3) Total numbers of females born	100	108	79
4) Those expected to live more than 4 years	100	119	90
5) Those expected to live to 20 to 34 years of age	100	131	101
(C) Structure of reproduction (A (1')=100)			
1') Size of population	100	100	100
2') Marital situation	99	90	84
3) Fertility	204	170	111
4) Infant and child deaths	170	155	105
5) Net reproduction rate	145	146	101

Note 1: The figures representing married women in 1955 are based on 1% Tabulation of 1955 Census.

Note 2: The number of population expected to be reproduced in 1935 is based on the Life Table No. 6 (April, 1935—March, 1936) published by the Statistics Bureau of the Prime Minister's Office and the similar figures for the postwar years of 1950

and 1955 are based on the abridged life tables compiled by the Institute of Population Problems. (The 1950 life table is based on facts between April, 1950 and March, 1951, and the 1955 life table is based on facts between April, 1954 and March, 1955.)

in postwar years has extended a new born baby's life expectancy by more than 10 years as compared with that in prewar years, the reproductivity of population did not decrease so much as might be expected from the decrease in births, despite such an intensive postwar restriction of marriages and childbirths, and the present situation is that while the effectiveness of intensive birth control is being offset by the epochal extension of life expectancy, the birth control is much enhanced by the improvement of life expectancy.

The postwar trend of the general reproduction structure of population in connection with marriages, childbirths and deaths is compared in Table 31 with its prewar trend.

In the above table, the female population between 20 and 25 has been used as the population representative of the reproductive population for the reason that the size of the woman population in this age bracket most adequately represents, from the viewpoint of size of population, the reproductivity of the total population when a woman's marriage age is taken at 20 and the period of effective reproduction at 15 years.

However, in the above table the number of married women between 15 and 39 has been taken as the actual working woman population in order to obtain a basis to observe how the potential reproduction power is restricted because of marital status.

As can be seen from column (A) in the above table, in

1935 the female population between 20 and 34 was about the same as the number of married women between 15 and 39. In other words, the situation in 1935 was such that it may be considered that every woman married at the age of 20 and continued bearing children during the 15 years following their marriage.

When the figures for postwar years are observed from this angle the decrease of marriage rate is quite remarkable in the population bracket of the reproductive age.

As can be seen from Index Number (B) in the above table, the female population between 20 and 34, (1), in 1955 increased as much as 45 per cent over the prewar year of 1935. However, married women between 15 and 39, (2),—the group actually playing an effective part in population growth—showed an increase of only 23 per cent. Nevertheless, voluntary control of fertility had the big effect of reducing the birth of baby girls, (3), by as much as 20 per cent as compared with the prewar year. Despite this, the postwar improvement in the death rate nullified this effect of the voluntary control to a great extent. It is thus estimated that by the time these baby girls reach the age of four, (4), about half the 20 per cent reducing effect as mentioned above will be lost, and that when they reach the 20-34 age bracket, (5), their number will recover almost to the same level as that of the prewar year.

Of course, the reproductive power of the population has greatly declined as can be seen from the fact that the population of reproductive age, which showed a nearly 1.5 fold increase, reproduced almost the same number of offspring as did their prewar counterpart. That is, as indicated in (C) of the

above table, the net reproductive rate decreased from about 1.5 in the prewar year of 1935 to almost 1.0 in 1955, or to the level of no substantial increase. However, this decline in the net reproductive rate (5) by nearly onethird was made possible only by the reduction of fertility (3) by almost 50 per cent. Thus, the postwar improvement in the death rate necessitated such a high degree of birth control.

Insofar as the main group responsible for reproduction is concerned, it may be said that Japan's population all but halted its upward curve as mentioned above. However, the total population showed an increase of more than 1,000,000 also in 1955. The inertia of population increase still remains very strong. As this population increase resulting solely from the extension of life span exerts more and more pressures, until the age-composition of population will be altered completely, birth control will have to be intensified accordingly. The situation is such that from the standpoint of arresting population increase as much as possible, it is not desirable for a married couple even to leave only two children in their lifetime. We are not allowed to remain indifferent to the serious social friction, which will naturally be occasioned by such a high degree of birth control.

4. Differential Fertility by Social Status

The comparison of the prewar and postwar fertility by the duration of marriage—that is, how fast children are born after marriage and how many children were or will be born if marriage life is not suspended—is given in the following Table 32, as based upon the results of fertility surveys con-

ducted in 1940 and 1952 by the Institute of Population Problems.

Table 32. Pre-war and Post-war Fertility by Marriage Duration

Marriage Duration	Pre-war Years (Showa Era, 1926-40)		Post-war Years 1951-52 (26-27 th of Showa)		Index Number (Pre-war years =100)	
	(1) Per Couple Number of Children ever Born	(2) Annual Increase	(3) Annual Number of Births Per Couple	(4) Accumulative Total of (3)	(5) Duration Specific Rate: $\frac{(3)}{(2)} \times 100$	(6) Accumulative Total of Births: $\frac{(4)}{(1)} \times 100$
0	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	100	—
1	0.55	0.53	0.53	0.55	100	100
2	0.85	0.30	0.27	0.81	90	95
3	1.15	0.30	0.28	1.09	93	95
4	1.45	0.30	0.27	1.36	90	94
5	1.75	0.30	0.27	1.63	90	93
6	2.05	0.30	0.23	1.86	84*	91
7	2.30	0.25	0.21	2.07	84	90
8	2.55	0.25	0.21	2.28	84	90
9	2.80	0.25	0.20	2.48	80	89
10-14	3.25	0.18	0.13	2.81	72	87
15-19	4.00	0.12	0.06	3.28	50	82
20-24	4.50	0.08	0.03	3.45	38	77
25-29	4.85	0.06	0.01	3.61	16	74
30 and over	5.05	0.01	0.00	3.63	—	72

* The annual increase (2) has been calculated at 0.275 on the basis of the tendency curve.


Note: The figures are based on the results of the fertility surveys conducted by the Institute of Population Problems in 1940 and 1952. The prewar figure was retabulated by picking up those married couples whose prime of fertility roughly coincided with the 1926-40 period, and the numbers of children ever born by them were compiled according to their duration of marriage. In the postwar figure, specific fertility rates of all married couples under 1952 survey according to their duration of marriage—that is, the rate per couple for the preceding one-year period (July 1951 to June 1952)—were calculated, and

their cumulative total was taken as the number of children presumed to be born by post-war couples in their lifetime. Refer for details to the "Analysis of Postwar Fertility in Japan—Renewed Tabulation of Results of Fertility Survey in 1952" by Tatsuo Honda, Research data of the Institute in English Edition, A-No. 18.


The general trend is indicated in Fig. 4. Now let us compare the prewar and postwar cumulative totals of children born until 20 to 24 years after marriage on the assumption

Fig. 4. Post-war Fertility by Marriage Duration

(A) Comparison with Pre-war Years



(B) Difference in Fertility due to Occupation



that the standard fertility period ends after this length of marriage. The postwar total stands at about 3.5 as against the prewar figure of 4.5, which fact shows the birth rate was cut by about one. From the downward trend of general birth rate following the 1951-52 period, it may be presumed that at present, the figure is already somewhat less than three, almost nearing the 2.5 level. British statistics as shown in Fig. 4 indicate the cumulative totals of specific fertility rates according to marriage duration during the depression period from 1935 to 38. They place the average number of children after 23 years of marriage at 2.10. Fig. 4 still reveals a considerable discrepancy between the Japanese and British figures. It would be safe to say, however, that Japan's fertility level as of 1955 was already getting very close to that of Britain.

Next let us see which social strata faced the stronger need for birth control after the war—that is, differential birth control according to social status. For this purpose, all married couples are classified into four groups according to their scale of livelihood—from A, the highest class, down to D, the lowest. Difference in Fertility by such social classification is shown in Table 33 and in Fig. 4.

Table 33. Difference in Prewar and Postwar Fertility
According to Social Strata

(Comparison of cumulative total of children
born to couple of 20-24 years' marriage duration)


	Total	A	B	C	D
1) Prewar Years	4.50	5.10	4.85	4.14	3.58
2) Postwar Years	3.44	4.01	3.60	2.96	3.53
3) (1)-(2)	1.06	1.09	1.25	1.18	0.05
4) (2)÷(1)×100	76.4%	78.6%	74.2%	71.5%	98.6%

Note 1: The prewar figures indicate the total numbers of children born to couples of 20-24 years' marriage duration. The postwar figures are the cumulative totals of specific fertility rates in the 1951-52 period, until 20-24 years' marriage duration.

Note 2: The classification shows the difference in social stratum with A indicating the highest class and D the lowest. That is, the living scales or standards of households are divided into four classes on the basis of the average cash spending of married couples in the past one-month period (excluding extraordinary expenditures). In this case, except for agricultural and forestry workers, the natural rise in income attendant on age increase was taken into consideration. Further, in considering the living scale, the total expenditures of household were not divided by the number of household members. For, it was considered that the earning capacity of a householder can be best represented by the total expenditures rather than by per capita spending. At the same time, it was feared that if the living standards were classified by per capita spending of household, the living standards of fecund couples might be overly underrated especially in the fertility survey, and that the prolific trend of poor couples might be overexaggerated. For details, refer to the treatise as cited in the Note of the preceding table.

The general tendency is such as shown in Figure 5, and A group, or the upper stratum, shows the highest fertility, with B group following it and group C, or the lower part of

Fig. 5. Bias of Postwar Fertility According to Social Strata
(A) All Couples and their Classification by Occupation




Order of living standard viewed from social strata


(B) Comparison with Prewar Years

----- Prewar years ——— Postwar years


All couples




Agriculture and forestry workers




Manual Laborers



Self-employed



White collar workers



Order of living standard viewed from social strata

Average Number of Children Born to Couples in Lifetime

the middle stratum, showing the lowest fertility. D group, or the lower stratum, again shows a higher fertility than C group, and indicates clearly the theory that the poor has more children, but even so its fertility is not higher than group A or B. Generally speaking, the control over postwar fertility is seen definitely in the lower strata and power of social class-wise control appears to be strong. When we break down the D group in two, the fertility of the lowest stratum who is almost unable to maintain the minimum standard of living obviously shows again a decreasing tendency.

As seen in the table, the fertility according to social strata was high in the upper stratum and low in the lower stratum even in the prewar years. It may be said, therefore, that birth control was required more strongly of the lower stratum. And such a tendency is seen more consistently in the prewar years rather than in the postwar years. When the postwar and prewar fertility is further classified into occupational groups the results are such as shown in Table 34, and such a tendency is observed consistently in each occupational group as can be seen in Fig. 4. The problem lies rather in the chaotic situation characteristic of postwar years.

If the decrease in fertility in inverse proportion to the level of social strata is an index to the modernization of population trend, such a tendency is also clearly observable in the postwar fluctuation of fertility. As the figures in Table 34 show, a remarkable decrease is seen in A group as well as in C group in the case of agriculture and forestry workers, and it indicates that the prolificacy of wealthy farmers observed invariably in prewar surveys has been

restricted and they have commenced to exhibit a modern tendency of birth control in proportion to their living standard. In the case of white collar workers such a tendency is observed more clearly throughout the group. Here, the decrease in birth rate symbolizes the improvement of their welfare, and such a birth control tendency under the welfare theory has also started to make steady progress in the postwar years. However, special attention must be paid at the same

Table 34. Postwar and Prewar Fertility as Classified by Occupation and Living Standard

(Cumulative total of per couple births for married couples with marriage duration of 24 years)

Occupation	Total	A	B	C	D
	(1) Prewar Years				
Agriculture and forestry workers	5.34	6.00	5.37	4.66	4.35
Manual laborers	4.83	6.13	5.43	4.03	3.68
Self-employed	4.26	4.49	4.56	4.33	3.45
White collar workers	4.21	4.66	4.46	3.66	3.08
	(2) Postwar Years				
Agriculture and forestry workers	4.13	4.62	4.64	3.32	3.92
Manual laborers	3.72	5.25	3.71	2.77	3.44
Self-employed	3.25	3.55	3.26	3.18	3.38
White collar workers	2.88	2.62	2.86	2.70	3.22
	(3) $(2) \div (1) \times 100$				
Agriculture and forestry workers	77	77	86	71	90
Manual laborers	77	86	68	69	93
Self-employed	76	79	71	73	98
White collar workers	68	56	64	74	105

Note 1: Figures for the prewar years represent the total number of children born in the past to couples of 20 to 29 years' marriage duration as of 1952.

Note 2: Figures for the postwar years represent cumulative total of births for couples of 24 years marriage duration based on the marriage duration specific birth rate as of 1951-52.

time to the fact that the postwar fertility bias towards lowness according to social strata is found in its lowest in C groups of all occupations (except the white color workers), namely about the bottom of the middle social stratum of present-day Japan, and numerical values of the bias are close to each other in all occupations.

From this it may be considered that, although the fertility of the lowest stratum (whose members are even unconscious of their own poverty) retains the tendency of "the poor will have more children," it never exceeds that of the upper strata, and that this is, together with other facts, fully suggestive of a semi-physical pressure of postwar birth control.

The most typical trend, in this respect, is that of the manual laborers, whose greater part of earning is expended in their children and whose control of birth is demanded only by the pressure of the cost of living.

The modern tendency of birth control which usually begins in the intellectual upper classes is really noticeable here and there in this country, but a semi-physical control, so to say, due to poverty may be said to be a stronger factor observed consistently in precipitating the general decreasing tendency of births.

And the actual condition which has induced the remarkable birth rate decrease in recent years, should be considered as proving directly the existence of a great pressure due to over-population in postwar Japan.

IV. Some Supplemental Comments on Measures against Difficulties in the Population Problem

The population of Japan, like the various phases of her national economy and living, is now confronted with a big historical turning point. Fortunately, the transitional process has been in progress with a smooth and quick tempo, and for that reason, various difficulties attendant on the process are assuming all the more abnormal forms. Especially with reference to the population problem, this situation has two things brought into a bold relief as the focal points which are associated with each other. The one is the need of the extremely intensive practice of birth control, and the other concerns the question of how to cope with the unemployment problem which is assuming serious proportions as the problem of latent unemployment. This was the picture of the population problem in post-war Japan, which we have examined in the foregoing chapters. And it has already been seen that either of these issues, intertwined with the class structure of the national economy, are becoming increasingly serious in a way that the class contradictions and antagonism inherent in the structure are brought to the fore. The deepening class conflicts may also be recognized clearly in a case where a recent investigation has found a great number of "weak-minded" children or inferior children akin to them especially among the school boys and girls whose life is not a socially blessed one. In this sense, it may be said that the problem

of quality of population is another important point of the population problem, which is now challenging us. As the detailed discussion on the measures to be taken against those questions is beyond the scope of this work, we shall make here some additional remarks in the hope that they may serve to suggest the basic lines to guide such discussion and also be referred to as the supplement to the main part of this essay.

1. Significance of the "Family Planning" Viewed from the Standpoint of Population Policy

The current situation of birth control in Japan, as we have seen above, is such that induced abortion is being exclusively relied on to attain that end, owing to insufficiency of popularization of contraception, especially unskilfulness in contraceptive techniques. It has also been pointed out that a marked increase in the number of cases of induced abortion in the years after the war's end is closely associated with the new post-war legislation. However, under the present situation in which there is a strong social demand for intensive control of births, but in which the degree of modernization of the people's living is not ripe enough to meet it, the social *raison d'être* of the legislation, intended to bring into broad daylight the practices of induced abortion so far resorted to in the dark which are dangerous to mothers and to administer them under social protection, is yet to be resolved. At present, any opposition which may be directed against the existing legislation from the standpoint of moral idealism will invariably meet with the criticism that such opposite views

are merely idealistic phrases. In addition, presence or otherwise of the relevant legislation is not necessarily connected with increase or decrease in the practice of induced abortion. We, for our part, should make every positive effort to bring about the spread of contraceptive practice on a nation-wide basis and make the people more skilful technically in the practice, ensuring thereby that the practice of induced abortion may come to extinction as a matter of course before it becomes a settled practice of the people. Of course, in some quarters strong voices are being raised even against the practice of contraception. In this connection, a few words must be said by way of apology. That is, we do not mean, in hoping the nation-wide dissemination of the contraceptive practice, that such practice is in itself good, just or desirable. Contraception is in itself a technique, and so far as it is a technique, it is a matter beyond good or evil. The point here would rather be under what social circumstances is contraception practiced and by what manner of social adaptation it is prompted. It needs hardly to be mentioned that the reason why the voluntary acts of controlling births were formerly referred to as "Birth Control" or "Family Limitation," and have now come to be preferably called by the name of "Family Planning," is sought in the intention to clarify the connection of such acts with the social background.

In European countries, such changes in the designation took place as early as the 1930's. An excessive decrease in birth rates in these countries in those days had been aggravating the danger of starting a catastrophic contraction in their population in the not far distant future. Needless to say, this was sufficient to make them reflect on the over-indulgence in

limitation of births, which had at one time been glorified as the rationalization of sexual life of the modern citizenry. Thus the adherence to economic rationalism in private life had been suffering the loss of its social appropriateness, and rationality in the life of individuals had become more and more contradictory to that of social life. For these reasons, the change in the term, which had been popularized in that period, had undoubtedly the implication of correction of the over-indulgence in the practice. Or it might be said that the terms suggested in a very negative and reserved way a feeling in favour of checking the practice of limitation of births. However, with the extreme depression of the 1930's over, the apprehension, so loudly voiced by the population scientists in those days, that a biological catastrophe in population would be coming at any moment, proved to be groundless. Especially in recent years, birth rates in those countries are uniformly assuming the form of a reactionary rise trend. It can therefore be said that the crux of the problem did lie in the adverse economic condition which had compelled the people to resort to such an extreme practice of birth limitation, but not in the question of whether the mentality favouring voluntary repression of birth is right or wrong or good or bad. That each married couple seeks after the greatest happiness in accordance with their respective living conditions and ideals, and, when necessary for attaining that end, would voluntarily limit the number of their children to be born, may be said a wholesome attitude toward life whereby, they, as members of the modern citizenry, would purposively adapt themselves to the social demands of a modern society; and such an attitude may well be said an item of civic culture

with which a modern citizen must be equipped. It may also be said that excessive reliance upon economic rationalism in private life, which was subjected to severe criticism, was unavoidable in view of the economic depression in those days. Indeed, the happiness of family life can not be decided by the per capita expenditure level of a family, which is obtained by dividing the total income of the family by the number of family members. Of late, keen attention of the public has come to be drawn to the richness in emotion which is found only in the life of a reasonably large family, and particularly to its beneficial effects on the children from the educational point of view at the formative stage of character. Indeed, through the maturity of a thoughtful attitude toward life such as this can modern society continue to reproduce on a sound and reasonable basis an optimum size of population needed by society. To become keenly conscious of and emphasize such social purposiveness, which has to be realized as if through the ingenious scheme of the Providence, must have been the true meaning assigned to the new term: "Family Planning."

In Japan as well this term has come to be patronized in recent years. Undoubtedly, there are not a few similarities in the circumstances which have led to the adoption of this term. However, in the current situation in Japan, insufficient rather than excessive practice of family limitation ought to be complained of. In the case of Japan, insistence on social purposiveness is being used, it can be said, not for correction of the excessive practice of limitation but for making up for the inadequate practice. Necessity for limitation is being emphasized to such an extent that the excessive demand from the standpoint of the population policy may sometimes produce

a countereffect. However, it may be one of the unharmonious sounds inevitable in a transitional stage in which Japan is now standing. What is important is the intense consciousness on the part of individual persons as modern citizens, the implication of which is left to the term of "Family Planning," and its true social utility.

The reason why this is particularly important in present-day Japan is that the movement for dissemination of "Family Planning," which is pushed forward with emphasis on its social utility, does not serve to nurture a mind that would contemplate the question of how our national politics and economy should be, but is more likely to make the conformist mentality grow in power. Therefore, particular attention should be paid in order that the nation-wide movement for dissemination of "Family Planning," which should be taken up as one of the important supports of the current population measures, may be pushed forward in a manner sufficient to awaken the people to a definite life-consciousness and a firm attitude toward life. To carry out family planning, cooperation between husband and wife is necessary. Also it may be necessary that the common objective in life be keenly realized by all family members. If any and all persons, whether they be husband, wife, parent or child, or those to be born in future, are able to seek after and enjoy the largest allowable happiness as individual human beings—if that is the implicit major premise essential for carrying out the family planning, it should necessarily be the first step to be followed to reflect with such modern sense of life on how the existing pattern of their home life, and work out and reconstruct by themselves an ideal way of this smallest yet the most firmly established

form of common living. That course of action ought to enable the people to view their working places or local communities in a fresh light, and further, to make them anything but indifferent to the question of their national politics or economy as it should be. In other words, it is our earnest desire that the nation-wide dissemination of "Family Planning" be pushed forward as a link in the chain of the reorganization of our national economy and living on a modernized basis as a main body of such movement. Indeed, here, it may be said, underlies the very reason why we can and should take up the problem of the spread of "Family Planning" as one of the main-stays of the overall population policy. We therefore wish to see various measures on the details of the policy consistently mapped out and put into practice along such lines.

2. Two Mainstays for Expansion of Population

Supporting Capacity

Further inquiry into the population problem of present-day Japan, of which the problem of "Family Planning" forms one of the focal points, should necessarily bring in another focal point—the employment problem. The efforts for adaptation to over-population to be made from the side of population will be of no avail, but rather will cause harmful effects, unless such efforts are made in response to and in cooperation with the reasonable expansion and strengthening of population supporting capacity on the side of the national economy. If we think that we can settle the population problem or the unbalance between national economy and population simply

by arresting the increase of population and further bringing about the shrinkage in the size of population, it will put the cart before the horse. As we have already seen above, the population problem of present-day Japan posed itself, being motivated by the epochal advance movement in the national economy, which is now being compelled to convert decisively to the developmental stage of high-degree capitalism, and has come to have the root of an evil deep-seated in the national economic structure ache afresh. This means that the disproportion in the past national economic structure, which managed somehow or other to attain the development on a modern basis, while conserving and making opulent a vast number of pre-modern industries embraced in the structure; and, as it were, at the expense of them, has now come to overstep the margin of its utility from the viewpoint of national economy, and that affluent manpower which had been preserved among those backward industries, has turned to a heavy burden hard to be dealt with in the way of the advance movement of the national economy. It may also be said that this disproportion in the basic structure of the national economy has now come to reveal itself directly in opposition to the national economy as the unbalance between national economy and population. Herein lies the reason why the aggravation of the employment problem must present itself chiefly as the problem of latent unemployment. So does the reason why the employment problem cannot be solved without tackling earnestly the question of what pattern the basic structure of national economy should take. Nevertheless, this limping structure was to Japan in the past; as it were, a lever for her national development, and was a hidden source of racial vitality. In view,

however, of the fact that it has become a subject of the people's serious reflection as the bearer of the critical employment problem, it will be plain that expansion of the population supporting capacity is not so simple a matter.

It goes without saying that the main-stay for enlargement of population supporting capacity will be the strengthening of industrial productivity, in future as ever before. It is essential particularly for Japan who must rely solely upon the profits from the processing trade for her people's existence to put on a modernized and advanced basis her industrial production, lest she should drop out of the ranks in the international market. From the viewpoint of industrial policies, it will be necessary to foster the development of engineering and chemical industries which derive large added value and need less dependence on overseas supply of raw materials. In the field of international politics as well, efforts must be made to establish the course to be followed by the long-term trade policy, whereby to achieve the successful results of economic diplomacy.

However, for attaining the high-degree industrialization centering on export industries the drastic rationalization of management and enhancement of productivity are absolutely necessary. It would entail, as a matter of course, a temporary rise in the number of the unemployed. Meanwhile, the promotion of export industries must be pushed on through the qualitative advancement of smaller industries and their reorientation toward export industries especially in future, but it would depend largely on big capital for the motive power. Therefore, friction in the field of national economy to arise from the concentration of capital cannot be staved

off. Such being the prospective situation the question of "in what form the increased real national income to be earned from the promotion of export trade and high-degree industrialization will be made to enter the circulation process of the entire national economy" ought to be met as a specifically important one from the viewpoint of population policy. Needless to say, the progress of industrialization on an advanced basis would employ in future a larger number of industrial workers under higher labour productivity. Yet an increase in employment in the industrial sector is by far smaller than that in production to be demanded accordingly. The increase in the capacity of employment from the angle of national economy which is enabled by the development of productivity in the department of key industries should rather be realized in commerce and other service industries in the wider sense of the term and in small and medium enterprises from the viewpoint of the scale of management. On the other hand, if it is considered that these departments are not only dealing largely with the domestic market, but they have been already overoccupied as the field of people's occupation and that they are the focal point of the current population problem as the field of the latent unemployment question, it will also be evident why the effect of the increase of roundabout employment through the introduction of high-degree industrialization should not be left to run its own course or to be swayed by the economic necessity demanded by capital. This does not mean that it will not serve as an emergency measure. It would rather be said that the difficult point in the population problem now confronting us consists in that such economic rationality is bound to stand sharply in opposition and cont-

radiction to social rationality. It would imply that the process of reconstruction of national economy in postwar years has enforced the accumulation of capital and the expansion of production, while widening rather than narrowing its inner unbalance, and that the conspicuous growth of the post-war national economy has necessarily come to be confronted with an abnormal growth of the group of the latently unemployed. Then, we should render our utmost efforts to attain the development and expansion of our land and our domestic market, while pushing on the high-degree industrialization policy mainly directed to the international market. In other words, a policy designed to expand the scale of the national economy for solution of the population problem needs two pillars for support. It must not be a mere expansion for the sake of expansion but an expansion to restore the lost balance. Then, it follows that another basic measure should be established whereby to control and make efficient use of the above measure so that the constitutional defects of the national economy may be properly redressed.

The final goal of the land and domestic market development policy should be to correct as far as possible the extreme area differences of the national income and thereby to bring on the equitable distribution by areas of the population now persisting in the trend toward the intensive concentration toward big urban districts. Of the 6 million-odd persons, the increased population between the two censuses in 1950 and 1955, the proportion of nearly 70 percent or a little more than 4 million are registered as the increase of population in 7 prefectures including 7 large cities, namely Tokyo, Osaka, Kyoto, Kobe, etc. Needless to say, the main body of this popula-

tion absorbing capacity lies in the industrial productivity of these key industrial areas. But the population supporting power of these big cities is not so great as these may apparently suggest. Only in these big cities can the opportunities for employment be found which may assure the people of the bare means for existence such as is eked out from operation of petty commercial business, service trade or casual work. This may be said to represent the actual aspect of concentration of population in urban districts. And the extreme difference in the distribution of wealth between areas may well be considered to be reproducing poverty on an expanded scale in the big cities as well as in the backward areas. Here lies one of the reasons why we wish to see all manner of measures taken so that the modern industry may be established in the backward and undeveloped districts in this country. In this connection, it is earnestly desired that the multi-purpose national land development plan of today will not end merely in the power resources development, but will be expanded to the "multi-purpose" plan both in name and in substance which may actually put the area-wise distribution of population on an equitable basis. There should be obtained much results by the multiplied increase in the population supporting capacity which may enable the multi-lateral composition of all categories of industry set up in localities according to their respective features. Indeed, this would readily provide the primary industries, such as agriculture, forestry and fishery, with an opportunity for eliminating their superfluous labour force and having their management modernized. It will also offer wider and stabilized locations to other smaller enterprises forming the vast field of people's

occupation together with agriculture, forestry and fishery. Nowadays, counter-measures against smaller enterprises are being worked out largely from the financial point of view. As the first remedial measure this could not be otherwise, but it cannot have gone, as a matter of course, to the core of the matter.

As regards agriculture in particular, there should be a limit to the rice price policy mapped out from the viewpoint of national economy, so that it will be necessary to push on further the multiple management and mechanization, and thereby to ensure the enhancement of its productivity. The share agriculture has contributed, as a gigantic industry producing material goods, toward the development of the past Japanese national economy has been an important one. And there is still room, even within the framework of the petty farming system, for the rise of productivity through the modernization of agricultural production. This may be said to be the most reasonable course to meet the task assigned to agriculture as the food production industry. In the circumstances much is expected on the side of the policy for expansion of the domestic market from the modernization of agriculture in future. Of course, in such modernization of the agricultural enterprise it is essential to reorganize the group-wide distribution of farmhouseholds. Accordingly, it would be necessary to take care of the superfluous labour force who would be required to be eliminated consequently. It goes without saying that the progress of the land development plan such as is referred to above should serve as a guarantee in this regard. But, for the present, it is advisable at least to make clear the right direction Japanese agriculture should

follow in future and to adopt a separate measure with respect to the petty farmers with side work, now in the process of deserting farms. To make the agricultural enterprise stand on its own feet on a capitalist accounting basis would be the first, essential step and also the final guarantee for correcting the limping status of the national economic structure and place its population sustaining capacity on a sound basis, that is, for making the advance of the national economy and the increase of population turn, as it were, on the same gear. We should emphasize this point from the standpoint of the population problem.

The final goal of both land development and expansion of the domestic market is to enhance the proper productivity of these industries which today constitute the field of people's occupation and at the same time that of their employment in the latent unemployment and thus to establish them as the field of normal occupation. In this sense, this may justly be said to be the foundation work for the struggle against the "latent unemployment." And the first strategic point to be taken up on this work by this struggle would resolve itself to the establishment of the minimum wage system. The land reforms introduced after the war's end have released the rural communities of their function as safety apparatus for supporting the unemployed from urban communities. It may at least be said that these reforms have considerably reduced the flexibility of this function to an insignificant one. The pressure of the overpopulation is most likely in future to be brought to bear exclusively on the sector of petty enterprises in urban districts. Here lies the reason why the fixing of the minimum wage system should be demanded as the step for giving the

finishing touch to the population measures. Of course, the wage system of today with the unbalance between national economy and population for its setting, could not be improved so speedily. And under this very situation we should clarify the proper direction which the system is to follow and check its vicious cycle movement and establish even at some frictions the strategic positions which would be powerful enough to get the actual process of reorganization started even little by little toward an appropriate direction. And we may be justified in saying that the minimum wage system forms the most important measure of all the arrangements designed for that purpose.

3. Utilization of Social Security System as Antioverpopulation Measure

It is apparent that the optimum policy plan for the solution of employment problem is to put into operation such counter measures as related in the foregoing chapter in a way to reorganize and expand the present machinery of Japanese national economy to suit the modern standard of economic systems. Parallel with this, we shall have to endeavor to set up an overall policy which will enable us to put an end to the unhealthy tendency in the labor market in which an increasing number of persons unfit for labor, e. g. mothers and children under social protection or aged ones among the common run of people are being driven to scrape a living. The vast number of students who take to sideline jobs in order to earn their schooling expenses should likewise be taken care of. The measure should be one that not only adroitly can deal with

the drift of the working people attendant on the advancement of industry, but also capable of stabilizing the labour force fit to the national economic and social conditions both in scale and constitution, eventually to relieve the labor market from the undue overflow of surplus laborers. Such should be the sort of utility expected of social security system, to say the least. The system should not be allowed to be a makeshift instrument of poorrelief projects, but should be a machine effective enough to exhibit substantial efficacy for the rational recomposition of labor population. We have already dwelt elsewhere in other chapters on the role played by the decreasing minor labor for the balancing of supply and demand of labor in pre-war Japan. In those days gone by it was effected with comparative ease and in a rather natural fashion as the advancing productivity of adult laborers enabled their own dependents to be freed from toil and moil in a dexter environment when the national economy was in an expanding trend. In these days when a calculated reorganization of industrial system is demanded in line with the planned economy of a nation, the readjustment of labor population will have to be envisaged to suit the changing situation. It is perhaps pertinent for us to reappraise that, instead of being the extravagant accessories of a modern state administration, the social security is to become an indispensable requisite for the effective management of a society borne of highly developed state economy. While the system is accepted as a social cure for the cumulative stragglers falling behind in the wake of the marching capitalism or a guarantee against social insecurity that is attendant thereon, the notion of solidarity which is essential for the evolution of the mode of social life will be

rightfully given impetus for generalization and permeation among the public by the urge to solve such issues as mentioned above.

The rational reorganization of labor population may call for a thoroughgoing reformation of the present education system. Importance of industrial training and consideration the set up special institutions for building up vocational aptitude will be some of the major items to be taken up in such program. It will not be altogether useless to add that one can reasonably expect that men of truly lovable personality with mellow culture will come to be produced through vocational education of this sort.

Easing of the pressure on the labor market by means of emigration is of course desirable. Yet, international situation confronting Japan would seem less bountiful to admit a number of emigrants large enough to lighten the exigent conditions. Inasmuch as the population problem of a state is closely inter-related with that of the whole world, solution of which may only be sound in the goodwill and cooperation of various members of the family of nations, Japan too is in a position to take part in the development project of the unexploited resources of the world with her manpower. It must not be passed unnoticed that Japan has already passed the stage of the problem where the merit of casual alleviation by emigration populational pressure is offset mechanically by the increase of population subsequent thereto, though the complexity of the problem is such that a mere decrease in the number of men does not at once mean a proportionate lessening of population pressure in a mathematical fashion. It must be borne in mind that expecting too much, as many people do,

of the emigration as a medium of easing overpopulation is a theory, just as counting too much on the enforcement of birth control, failing to properly evaluate the means and end of the problem.

4. Necessity of Reexamining the Quality of Population

Conceding that the phase of overpopulation is subject to change under the economic conditions of the nation, becoming actualized or latent according to the transmutations of the society or of social strata in particular, it follows that it is bound to exercise no little influence over the quality of population. A survey conducted by the Ministry of Education tells us that of Japan's school children in compulsory education there are presently more than one million children who would require special education and of whom nearly 800,000 or approximately 4.5 per cent of the total school children are considered weak-minded. Furthermore, almost twice as much children as this are said to have been diagnosed to be on the border of the normal and abnormal in mentality. Although there are no available data of pre-war times to compare with this, it shows that those weak-minded children come decidedly of families of lower social strata, as observed in the light of living standard, and that those children and others on the borderline of mental normalcy belong predominantly to families under livelihood protection. The returns of the Welfare Ministry's Factfinding Survey on Mental Hygiene taken of the whole national population corroborate this strongly. The surveys testify that the case of mental

weakness occurs in inverse proportion to the size of incomes of the individual families and that agricultural-forestry-fishery communities afford more generous flourishing ground than the urban districts—a clear indication that the inferior quality of population tend to thrive, retard and reproduce itself in the lower walks of life. It is with good reason that the problem of quality of population should have come to be taken up with serious concern correlative to overpopulation inasmuch as the occurrence of inferior population must be self-examined by the society as the responsibility of its own instead of dismissing it as an act of God.

It is true that, academically speaking, a genuinely congenital ill heredity transmits itself to the succeeding generations with an accuracy of semi-fatal degrees as a matter of heterogenetic inevitability that its curing will admittedly be beyond our control and that the natural selection which abiogenetically works precisely true to the law of nature will also be out of bound of human criticism. Or, rather, it will well may be said that a society where the theory of natural selection is found unworkable has already lost its vitality, sociobiologically and socioecologically, the society will have to be judged as having some grave defect in its foundation, however sound and rational in its economic constitution, in the same sense as in a case when a society's populational reproductivity went down short of replacing its existing population strength. The question most important for us is if and how our own society is carrying into effect social selection, in place of the biologically mandatory natural selection, in a manner rational, humane and effective enough in the light of keen social conscience directed against the various contradictions coming from

class difference, etc. It is because of this that the overpopulation issue is now required to be reappreciated from the point of populational quality. Post-war Japan saw the legislation of the Eugenic Protection Law—designed to implement the eugenic Law and to protect the mothers' health by the legislation of abortion. Yet, we witness it with regret that while abortion has come into wide use nothing has been heard that earnest efforts were ever made to realize the professed ideals of the Eugenic Law. This apparent indifference may deservedly be called a clear indication of lack of consciousness for this serious social problem which seemingly looks inescapable.

The question of ill heredity is of course only one fragment of the population quality problem. There are many other issues like the capability of labor population which has much to do with the vicissitude of a nation's economy and for which stress must be placed on the a posteriori environmental trainings. Nutrition will be another major issue, and for this an instructive episode during the war that many farm youths industrially recruited to munition plants found that their customary dietary habit of "eating rice to one's fill" failed to afford then sufficient energy to keep up with the nerve-exhausting labor required of modern age factories will be counted on as one of valuable piece of experiences in promoting the reorganization projects of national economy. The problem of reforming dietary life from the populational quality point of view will ultimately have an important bearing on the country's population accomodating capacity as it will result in the modernization of the present agriculture structure. The problem is assuredly many-sided, but when one link of the problem is set to work all others will come

to follow the suit with a multiplicative effect.

In concluding the article, the writer feels that it should not be left unsaid that a society should see that it is responsible for the protection and bringing up of the talented elements it has in its own. Government grant of money under scholarship to students without means will be one of the programs yet to be repleted as a part of its social security administration. Populational measures should, by nature, be far-reaching enough to reckon on fruits one generation or scores of years afterwards so that we should perhaps make it our ultimate and supreme goal of endeavor that our contemporaries at school and their succeeding generations will eventually come to appreciate that the blessing promised under Article 25 of the Japanese Constitution—"the right to maintain the minimum standards of wholesome and cultural living" does not fail them.

After all, problems relative to population generate out of sources so deep rooted and develop with strides so long that any countermeasure which is wanting in far-sightedness for the well being of the nation is bound to end in a bungling socioeconomic manipulation distorted by the existing conditions of the time.

